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It is-no longer uncommon to see headlines about lawyers defecting from
their firms in order to start their own firms or to join competing firms.' Indeed,
1. See, e.g., Brill, The PartnerBreakup Follies, Am. LAW., Mar. 1988, at 3 (background and
suit in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord); Brill, The Shakeout Is Here, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1983, at I
(spinoffs from New York City firms of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood and Donovan,
Leisure, Newton & Irvine); Pollock, PartnerChargesFirm Conspiredto Oust Him, AM. LAW., Sept.
1980, at 14 (dispute at Philadelphia's Adler, Barish, Levin & Creskoff); Taylor, The Highest Pricefor
a Failed Union, Nat'l L.J., June 13, 1988, at 3, col. 3 (failed merger that led to dissolution of Texas
firm of Reynolds, White, Allen & Cook); Cox, Court Freezes the Status of LA. 's Wyman Bautzer,
Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1988, at 3, col. 2 (describing ongoing litigation between ex-partners and L.A.
firm of Wyman, Bautzer, Christensen, Kuchel & Silbert); Middleton, FatalBlow?, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
18, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (30 of 75 lawyers are leaving Chicago firm of Isham, Lincoln & Beale); Wise,
"Too Horrible," Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (debts incurred by breakup of Finley, Kumble);
Cox & Tensen, Finley Bankruptcy, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (ongoing litigation over
dissolution of Finley, Kumble); Tensen, Ex Finley PartnerAlleges Trustee Fraud, Conflicts, Nat'l
L.J. Feb. 29, 1988, at 17, col. 1 (allegations of trust fraud and conflicts of interest as result of Finley,
Kumble breakup); Ranii, PittsburghDispute, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1988, at 2, col. 2 (breakup in Pittsburgh firm Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck); Kerlow, Lewis, Mitchell Dissolves as Partners
Diverge, Legal Times, Oct. 19, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (dissolution of Virginia's Lewis, Mitchell & Moore);
Anderson, PartnershipAgreement Upheld in Suit by Law Firm'sDefectors, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1987, at
1, col. 3 (background and decision in Levy v. Kreindler); Anderson, Ex-Associate, Firm in Dispute
Over Clients, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (background and decision in Dinkes, Mandel,
Dinkes & Morelli v. Ioannou); Oder, Firm Enmeshed in Litigation Over Split, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 30,
1987, at 3, col. I (background and suit filed regarding breakup of Charleston, West Virginia firm
Preiser & Wilson); Lewin, Smaller Firms Are Vanishing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at D2, col. 1
(dissolution of New York's Schwartz, Klink & Schreiber and Sage Gray Todd and Simms and phenomenon of small and mid-size firm breakups); Fox, 4 Lawyers Who Left LL Firm Barred From
Seeking Its Clients, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (background of decision in Koeppel v. Schroder, involving Mineola, New York firm); Mobley, Venerable Firm Torn Apart By Modern Pressures,
Legal Times, May 26, 1986, at 6, col. I (dissolution of Wall Street's Guggenheimer & Untermyer);
Fox, Law Partners'DisputeSent to Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (background and
decision in Greenberg v. Gitlin); Galante, ForFirms, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26,
1985, at 1, col. 2 (breakups of various firms around the country); Graham, Busting Loose: How
Abruptly Must PartnersGo, Legal Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at 2, col. I (comparison of fast and slow
breakups and description of breakup of Chicago's Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann Hoban & Fuller
and several other firms); Melton, A Top Md. Law Firm Dissolves, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1984, at B6,
col. I (breakup of Levitan, Ezrin, West and Kerxton); Graham, Can Ugly Litigation Be Avoided
When Firms Undergo Divorce?, Legal Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (background of three New
York breakup cases); In the Matter of Fulop & Hardee, a Partnershipin Dissolution, Nat'l L.J., Apr.
16, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (describes breakup); Galante, PartnerLeads Mass Exodus From LA. Firm,
Nat'l LJ., Dec. 19, 1983, at 3, col. 1 (defection of real estate attorneys from Los Angeles firm
Lawler, Felix & Hall); Galante, Lawsuit FlurryFollows Dissolution of Belli Firm, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12,
1983, at 4, col. 3 (background and resulting suits in breakup of Belli & Choulos); Stewart, A Blue
Chip Law Firm Comes on Hard Times After a Coup d'Eta" Donovan, Leisure Faces Risk Some
Clients May Follow Top Partnersin Leaving, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (background of
defections at New York's Donovan Leisure); Galante, Jenkins & PerryFeud Almost Over, L.A. Daily
J., Mar. 17, 1983, at 5, col. 1 (breakup of San Diego firm of Jenkins & Perry); Simon, Howrey &
Simon Hit By Fight Over Money, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 2, col. 4 (rumors of a major defection at
Howrey & Simon); Graham, Jacksonville Partners Win Control Lose Colleagues, Legal Times
Wash., Apr. 5, 1982, at 2, col. 1 (background on departure of twenty-two lawyers from Jacksonville's Maloney, Hadlow & Adams); Moore, Houston's Butler, Binion Sees Biggest Split in City's
History, Legal Times Wash., Feb. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 2 (defections from Houston's Butler, Binion,
Rice, Cook & Knapp); Granelli, Breakup Prompts Need for Referee, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 2,
col. 4 (background and status of suit involving the Los Angeles firm of Gilliand, Roberson & Moser);
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it is not unheard of for entire firms to disappear. 2 All too often, these law firm
"breakups ' 3 are not a pretty sight. What is clear from even a cursory review of
the literature is that clients, ethics, and even common decency can be forgotten
4
in these disputes.
This article focuses on the ethical pitfalls and malpractice consequences
that can occur when law firms break up. Ethical pitfalls are relevant in a legal
malpractice symposium because, as one commentator has observed, ethics "has
ceased to be a matter of homilies and is now often a matter of civil liability."Section I contains a brief description of the problem. It sets the factual
stage for the remainder of the article by showing the issues that can arise when
law firms break up. Section II explores the ethical pitfalls lurking in the breakup
situation. It identifies seven different categories of ethical violations. Section III
focuses on the possible malpractice consequences of law firm breakups. It begins
with an analysis of traditional malpractice claims and describes the ways in
which these claims have arisen during a breakup. The section then explores the
way ethical violations have been used in legal malpractice actions. It explains
that the courts increasingly have permitted ethical violations to be used as evidence of malpractice. The section then suggests how particular ethical violations during a breakup could form the basis for a malpractice action. The final
section of the article reviews the various prophylactic measures and after-thefact steps that others have recommended to minimize these and other problems
that can occur in a breakup. Among other steps, many lawyers now have available to them bar-sponsored alternative dispute resolution programs tailored for
6
the law firm breakup.
Graham, ProgressiveIdeals Put to Test at Wald, Harkrader,Legal Times, Jan. 18, 1982, at 44, col. 1
(change in firm's direction and management following departures of partners); Tell, MarshallBratter Loses Seven Partnersin a Rift, Nat'l L.J., Jan 11, 1982, at 2, col. 3 (background of split at New
York City firm); Fox, Law FirmSues Ex-PartnersFor Taking Clients With Them, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3,
1980, at 1, col. 2 (describes background and decision in Ladas & Parry v. Abelman).
2. The breakup of New York City's Finley, Kumble and Los Angeles' Fulop & Hardee are
probably among the most well-known of such dissolutions. See, eg., Jensen, Scenes from a Breakup,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (dissolution of Finley, Kumble); Adams, Finley, Kumble: More
Fallout, More Problems, Legal Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at 8, col. 1 (dissolution of Finley, Kumble);
Galante, Requiem for a Law Firm, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (dissolution of Beverly Hills'
Fulop & Hardee).
3. The term "breakup," as used in this article, includes three different situations: where a lawyer withdraws from a firm but the partnership continues; where a law firm goes through dissolution
but the remaining partners stay together and form a new partnership; and where the entire firm
dissolves or breaks apart. The discussion also covers lawyers who practice in a professional
corporation.

4. See infra notes 8-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of lawyer behavior in breakup
disputes.
5. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Address to ABA Economics of Law Practice Section, ABA An-

nual Meeting (Aug. 6-13, 1986) (ethical implications of withdrawal, expulsion, and retirement from
law firm), quoted in [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 325 (1986).
6. The focus of this article is on the ethical pitfalls and malpractice consequences of a breakup.
This article does not explore the legal doctrines, such as contract, partnership, or tort law, that affect
an attorney's rights or obligations vis-a-vis other attorneys. Thus, this article does not explore issues
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
It is indisputable that the last ten years have witnessed an explosion in publicized law firm breakups. 7 The details of some of these breakups are the material of soap operas. In one case, departing partners reportedly drove up in a van
in the dead of night and carted away client files. 8 In another case, the firm hired
a guard to watch the law offices so that nothing would be removed pending an
audit. 9 One lawyer charged that his partners changed the locks on the filing
cabinets in an effort to force him to withdraw.' 0 There are reports of a partner
who showed up one Thanksgiving weekend with a suitcase to carry away client
files;11 of a lawyer who physically attacked his partner and threw him out of
their office;1 2 of clients who called the firm and were misled or misinformed
about the status and whereabouts of departing lawyers;' 3 of a departing lawyer
who signed up clients by misrepresenting his association with his ex-firm;' 4 of a
breakup caused by personality conflicts between the son of the founding partner
and the remaining partners;' 5 and of a partner who allegedly told clients6 the
other partner was "a crook and a cheat," "not competent," and "senile."'
such as how fees should be allocated after a dissolution or tort law limitations on solicitation of
clients.
7. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. One question, of course, is whether the actual
number of breakups has increased or whether there is just increased publicity regarding those breakups that occur. The latter explanation is certainly plausible since much of the publicity appears in
the National Law Journaland the American Lawyer, publications that did not exist until August 7,
1978 and February 1979, respectively. On the other hand, there may in fact be more breakups
recently, as opposed to more publicity about breakups. Leading management consultants have contrasted large firm breakups, which they say are a recent phenomenon, with small firm breakups,
which have always occurred: "Small firms have often been fragile arrangements with frequent
breakups and reformations." M. ALTmAN & R. WElL, How TO MANAGE YOUR LAW OmFICE
§ 16.03, at 16-13 (1986).
One indication that law firm breakups have increased is that the Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct began, in its February 3, 1988 index, to have a separate heading for "Withdrawal
From Law Firm." 4 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 1, at 31 (Feb. 3, 1988).
8. Pollock, Withdrawal Today: Big News Becomes Old News,.LEGAL ECON., May/June 1987,
at 58 (departure of attorneys from Philadelphia's Freedman, Borowsky & Lorry).
9. Granelli, Breakup Prompts Need for Referee, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 32, col. 3 (breakup
in Los Angeles firm of Gilliland, Robinson & Moser).
10. Pollock, supra note 1, at 14 (alleged ouster of partner from Philadelphia's Adler, Barish,
Daniels, Levin & Creskoff).
11. Jensen, supra note 2, at 46 (experiences of Finley, Kumble lawyer); see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 660, 431 A.2d 1336, 1339-40 (1981) (on Wednesday night
before Thanksgiving, associates removed files from partner's office for photocopying so they could
inventory and evaluate cases for financial settlement with partner).
12. See Galante, Lawsuit FlurryFollows Dissolutionof Belli Firm, supra note 1, at 4, col. 3 (fight
between Belli and his partner).
13. Fox, 4 Lawyers Who Left L. Firm Barred From Seeking Its Clients, supra note 1, at 1,col.
3 (Koeppel, Sommer & Del Casino breakup).
14. See Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 515-16, 488 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1986)
(describing event).
15. Oder, supra note 1, at 32, col. 3 (breakup of Charleston, West Virginia's Preiser & Wilson).
16. Galante, Lawsuit Flurry Follows Dissolution of Belli Firm, supra note 1, at 10, col. 3.

19881

LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

1059

These disputes can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees 1 ' and
can continue for decades.18 What is particularly distressing is that such disputes
appear to be increasing. One loss prevention specialist recently estimated that
among the large firms his group insures, the incidence of dissolution has increased" 'probably tenfold-it's far, far beyond what anyone has experienced or
anticipated.' "19
The explanations for this phenomenon vary. Among other factors that
have been cited are increased access to financial information concerning competitors, the decreased stigma of changing law firms, weakened collegiality, the effect on firm loyalty of hiring practices (including lateral hires), the size of firms
and the effect of size on stability and loyalty, the increase in big ticket cases,
differences in management style, and the effect of law firm mergers that are not
20
successful.
One thing is certain-while these breakups certainly take their toll on the
17. See Moss, When Partners Split, 10 PA. LAW. June 1988, at 9 (relating fee estimates of
$1,000,000 and actual fees, in ongoing cases, of $50,000, $65,000, $80,000, and over $100,000); Pollock, supra note 8, at 60 (legal fees to settle breakup at Cleveland's Guren, Merritt, Feibel, Sogg &
Cohen); Galante, supra note 2, at 26, col. I (quoting former partner of Fulop & Hardee as saying,
"It's an incredible mess that has been strung out so long, the costs have become astronomical. The
only person coming out of it whole is the receiver-and he's making a bloody fortune.").
18. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 237 Cal. Rptr. 14,
17, 22 (1987) (description of three adjudications in 13-year-old, still ongoing litigation); Handler v.
Fearen, 106 Dauph. 70 (1985); Handler v. Fearen, 105 Dauph. 8 (1984); Gerber v. Weinstock, 102
Dauph. 50 (1980) (all involving preliminary skirmishes in the ongoing dissolution of Handler,
Gerber & Weinstock); Levin v. Barish, 505 Pa. 514, 481 A.2d 1183 (1984) (issues in dispute involving lawyers who withdrew from original firm in 1976 and have gone through four firms since that
time and brought suit against departing associates from their firm); Moss, supra note 17, at 9; Pollock, supra note 8, at 60, Galante, supra note 2, at 26, col. 1 (quoting receiver of Fulop & Hardee as
"half-jokingly" saying matter may not be resolved in his lifetime).
19. Moss, supra note 17, at 9 (quoting R. O'Malley, Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society).
20. See generally M. ALTMAN & R WEIL, supra note 7, at § 16.03; Brill, supra note I at 11-12
(suspected reasons for troubles at firms like Dewey, Ballantine and Donovan, Leisure); Jensen, supra
note 2, at 44 (reporting Finley, Kumble breakup attributed to mismanagement, personality disputes
and power struggles, media attention, banks, extension, overexpansion and greedy leaders); Kerlow,
supra note 1, at 6 (firm reportedly dissolved because of disagreement over whether to emphasize
government contracts or real estate development practice); Lewin, supra note 1, at D2 (quoting
lawyers who point out difficulty smaller firms have in competing in national market); Mobley, supra
note 1, at 6, col. 1 (sources attribute breakup of Guggenheimer & Untermyer to such things as
increased lawyer mobility, weakened collegiality, increased business emphasis, departure of key partner, and differences over management and money); Galante, PartnerLeads Mass Exodus supra note
1, at 33 (partners attribute defection from Los Angeles's Lawler, Felix & Hall to both money and
style differences); Galante, supra note 2, at 26, col.2 (partners attributed dissolution, in part, to
merger troubles); Stewart, supra note 1, at 1 (defections reportedly due, among other reasons, to
decline in business because of drop in antitrust cases); Simon, supra note 1, at 2 (rumors of defection
attributed to large cuts in income due to drop in business); Weil, Dividing the Law Firm: Take the
Surprise Element Out, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 17, 1980, at 2, col. 3 (some lawyers should not be partners
because of different attitudes regarding profits, time, goals and decor, among other things). Another
explanation offered is the perceived decrease in "professionalism." See generally ABA, IN THE
SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM

(1986).
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lawyers involved, 21 they also can take a tremendous toll on clients and third
parties. One judge recently observed that the lawyers' disagreement "spawned
petty and irresponsible behavior, which has spread far beyond their personal
dispute. Clients, other lawyers, insurance carriers and the courts have been
drawn into this unseemly mess." 2 2 Another judge said that the breakup of a
firm resulted in an intolerable situation "where the main loser is the innocent
client." 23 Law firm breakups have been followed by malpractice actions 24 and
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, 25 as well as litigation among the law21. See, eg., Pollock, supra note 8, at 58 (withdrawals analogized to divorce, where friends for
decades no longer speak, no one can agree on money, and feuds can get out of control); Jensen, supra
note 2, at 44 (Finley, Kumble lawyers speaking of financial, emotional, and personal wreckage created by breakup, including feelings of murder, suicide, betrayal, and financial ruin); Galante, For
Firms Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, supra note 1, at 44 (lawyer stated, "The files are the children,
with each side fighting over them. It's a custody battle for money."); Stewart, supra note 1, at 1, 20
(confrontation created situation where partners from factions barely disguised mutual hostility and
associates believed partners' demeanor often concealed anguish).
22. Greenberg v. Gitlin, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 6, col. I (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). But see Graham,
Busting Loose, supra note 1, at 8, col. 4 (client suffered no damage when attorney split, stating, "We
didn't really notice a blip").
23. Dinkes, Mandel, Dinkes & Morelli v. Ioannou, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1987, at 11, col. 3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.).
24. See, eg., Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970) (attorney
responsible for conduct of his partner in divesting funds from trust account during dissolution);
Redman v. Walters, 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1979) (court reversed summary judgment for defendant attorney, finding he could be liable for malpractice committed after his withdrawal from firm); Hayden v. Green, 166 Mich. App. 352 (1988) (malpractice suit brought against
firm as a result of a case ignored while attorney was a member of a firm, from which he later left),
rev'd, 429 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1988); Vollgraff v. Block, 117 Misc. 2d 489, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup.
Ct. 1982) (attorney, in process of firm breakup, allowed statute of limitations to run; court rejected
partnership's defense that firm had "dissolved"). But see Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga. App. 593, 59495, 275 S.E.2d 154, 155-56 (1980) (court held partner was not liable for malpractice committed after
dissolution of firm).
25. See, e-g., Morales v. State Bar, 44 Cal. 3d 1037, 751 P.2d 457, 458, 245 Cal. Rptr. 398, 399
(1988) (court disbarred attorney; discipline "related either directly to the firm's breakup or indirectly
to the financial crisis that came in its wake"); Gordon v. State Bar, 31 Cal. 3d 748, 647 P.2d 137,
139, 183 Cal. Rptr. 861, 863 (1982) (court disbarred attorney who, inter alia, misappropriated client
funds, rejecting mitigation defense that attorney was under extreme financial pressure because of the
dissolution of his law partnership and his assumption of partnership obligations to clients); In re
Crumpacker, 269 Ind. 630, 642-43, 383 N.E.2d 36, 42 (1978) (court disbarred attorney for violating
Code by, inter alia, opposing former clients in identical matters and using client confidences to
disadvantage of client after dissolution of attorney's firm), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Cook, 409 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1987) (attorney
disciplined, interalia, for failure to file personal tax returns; court rejected excuse that delay was due
to dispute over fees caused by firm dissolution); Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654,
679, 431 A.2d 1336, 1349 (1981) (associate disciplined for misappropriating information from partner's files to facilitate plan to represent partner's clients); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So. 2d
781 (Miss. 1983) (court rejected recommended disciplinary action against attorneys who allegedly
defrauded their ex-partner by secretly accepting extra money from client who "felt sorry" that attorneys had to share fee with their ex-partner); Grievance Comm. v. Lempesis, 248 S.C. 47, 50-51, 148
S.E.2d 869, 871 (1966) (attorney disciplined for client neglect; mitigating factor cited was law firm
dissolution); In re Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 121-22, 310 N.W.2d 789, 791, 793 (1981) (attorney
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Given that the phenomenon of the firm breakup appears to be increasing,
lawyers need to become sensitive not only to the law that affects their responsibilities towards each other, 27 but also to their obligations to their clients and
third parties, as reflected in the ethical regulations and malpractice law. 28
disciplined for, inter alia, neglecting various matters; court rejected defenses based on dissolution of
attorney's partnership and accompanying pressures and distractions).
26. See cases cited infra notes 90, 128, 145.
27. There has been a fair amount written concerning the practical issues involved in a breakup
and concerning attorneys' rights and responsibilities toward one another under contract, partnership, and tort law. See, eg., M. ALTMAN & R. WElL, supra note 7, § 8.16, at 8-15; ABA, WrrTDRAWAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES (1986); Bellows, Break Ups; Facing the PracticalIssues, 13
LEGAL ECON., May-June 1987, at 25 (uses model spreadsheets to illustrate financial issues that can
arise during breakup and offers suggestions); Crum, Dissolution of Law Partnership-Goodwill,
Winding Up Profits, and Additional Compensation, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 277 (1981) (discussing issues
such as allocation of goodwill and profits among partners during breakup); Hildebrandt & Bright,
Withdrawal.A PracticalPrimer, LEGAL ECON., May-June 1987, at 36 (steps to take before and after
a withdrawal to smooth the departure); McMenamin, Dissolution of a Law Firm, 85 CASE AND
COMMENT, July-Aug. 1980, at 3 (10 practical steps to take during dissolution); Comment, Barefoot
Shoemakers: An UncompromisingApproach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law
Firms Split Up, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 509 (1987) (how fees should be allocated among lawyers in a law
firm breakup situation); Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnership" The No-Compensation
Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1597 (1985) (how fees should be allocated among lawyers
in breakup situation, focusing in particular on lock-in and lock-out and offering suggested revision to
Uniform Partnership Act); Comment, Adler, Barish." ClearlyProtectedor Clearly ProscribedSolicitation, 1979 DET. C.L. REv. 477 [hereinafter Comment, Adler, Barish] (analysis of Adler, Barish and
limits of interference with contract tort); McMenamin, Dismembering a Law Firm, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
29, 1983, at 18, col. 2 (practical steps that must be taken when dissolving law firm); Weil, supra note
20, at 2, col. 3 (practical steps to minimize breakup problems); Annotation, Liability in Tort for
Interference with Attorney-Client or Physician-PatientRelationship,26 A.L.R.3d 679 (1969). See also
Bonner, When PartnershipsDissolve, CALIF. LAW., Feb. 1985, at 15 (Uniform Partnership Act and
ethics law that determine fees and disposition of client files); Hagerty, Dissolution of a Law Partnership: Effect on Representation of the Firm's Clients, 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 189 (1984) (partnership,
fiduciary, ethics, and malpractice law as it relates to firm dissolutions, client responsibility, and firm
assets); Robinson, When the Party is Over: Rights of Departing Attorneys to the Clients of Their
FormerFirm, ILL. B.J. 552 (1987) (discussing Pratt v. Blunt and tort, constitutional, and ethics law
regarding right of departing attorneys to contact their clients); Comment, Lateral Moves and the
Quest for Clients: Tort Liability of Departing Attorneys for Taking Firm Clients, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1809 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, LateralMoves] (offers alternative test to determine liability of
lawyers for intentional interference with economic relations); Comment, Recent Development: Law
Firm May Obtain Injunction BarringSolicitation of Clients By FormerSalariedAssociates, VILL. L.
REv. 770 (1978-1979) [hereinafter Comment, Recent Developments].
Some of the issues that can arise during a breakup include: access to clients and files; fee allocation for ongoing matters; notification of associates and support staff; agreements regarding malpractice responsibility; valuing and collecting receivables; allocation of assets including tangible assets
such as computer disks and intangible assets such as a firm telephone number and name; disposal of
closed and inactive files; liability to creditors; and arrangements with landlords, banks, insurance
carriers, and communications equipment and service providers. See generally M. ALTMAN & R.
WEIL, supra note 7, § 8.15, at 8-15 to 8-16 (consequences for partners when firm dissolves).
28. There has been much less written about an attorney's ethical obligations and malpractice
exposure during a firm breakup. Compare articles cited in supra note 27 with Bufford & Hubbell,
The Ethical Pitfalls of Closing Up Shop, L.A. LAW., Apr. 1983, at 10 (survey of various ethical issues
involved in law firm breakups); Comment, Attorneys Must Not Enter Into PartnershipAgreements
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ETHICAL REGULATIONS AFFECTING LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

A. Overview
Lawyers have long been subject to ethical regulation. 29 These ethical regulations are adopted by state courts or legislatures 30 and enforced in disciplinary
Prohibiting Themselves From Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the Partnership,4
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1975) [hereinafter Comment, Attorneys] (criticism of Dwyer v. Jung's
refusal to enforce restrictive covenant in partnership agreement); cf Comment, LateralMoves, supra
note 27 (evaluates ethics provisions in order to propose new test for tortious interference); Comment,
Recent Developments; supra note 27 (discussing Adler v. Barish); Comment, Adler, Barish, supra note
27 (Adler, Barish). See also Bonner, supra note 27 (Uniform Partnership Act and ethics law that
determine fees and disposition of client files); Hagerty, supra note 27 (partnership, fiduciary, ethics,
and malpractice law as it relate to firm dissolutions, client responsibility, and firm assets); Robinson,
supra note 27 (discussing Pratt v. Blunt and tort, constitutional, and ethics law regarding right of
departing attorneys to contact their clients).
29. The history of this regulation is well documented. The first lawyers' ethics code was
promulgated in 1887 by the Alabama State Bar Association. See ALA. CODE OF ETHIcs, 118 Ala.
xxiii (1899) (Code of Ethics adopted by Alabama State Bar Association published); H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHIcs 352-363 (1953); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 53-54 & nn.20-21 (Practitioner's ed. 1986).
It was over 20 years later, in 1908, before the American Bar Association, relying on the Alabama ethics code, adopted its first ethics code. This code was known as the "Canons of Ethics." See
H. DRINKER, supra, at 21-25; C. WOLFRAM, supra, § 2.6.2, at 54. Both the Drinker and Wolfram
works contain informative and entertaining accounts of the background of the Canons, although
each approaches the topic from a different perspective. Mr. Drinker attributed the passage of the
Canons to "the realization by thoughtful leaders of the bar of the growing commercialism all over
the country. The consequent weakening of an effective professional public opinion clearly called for
a more definite statement by the bar of the accepted rules of professional conduct." H. DRINKER,
supra, at 25. In contrast, Professor Wolfram said that the Canons "seem to have been a statement of
professional solidarity-an assertion by elite lawyers in the ABA of the legitimacy of their claim to
professional stature.... [The document was] intended primarily to celebrate the ancient lineage of
the bar's professional stature." C. WOLFRAM, supra, at 54.
It was approximately 50 years before criticisms of the Canons prompted the ABA to consider
revising them. In 1964, former ABA President Lewis F. Powell appointed a committee to consider
amendments to the Canons. C. WOLFRAM, supra, § 2.6.2, at 54. This committee, known as the
"Wright Committee," responded by drafting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
§ 2.6.3, at 56. The ABA adopted this Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in 1969. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESFONSIBILITY (Final Draft 1969).
Within less than ten years, however, the Model Code was being redrafted to adequately address
increasingly complex ethical problems. See ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES

v preface (1987) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES]. Six years after starting the revision process, in 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct See C.
WOLFRAM, supra, at 62.
30. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 2.6.3, at 57. The federal courts often, by local rule, adopt
the ethics regulations of the state in which they sit to govern the behavior of lawyers practicing in
their courts. See, eg., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 650 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (local rules
of district court incorporated by reference ethical regulations adopted by Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, including rule requiring prior court approval before grand jury subpoenas served on
attorneys to obtain information regarding clients), vacated per curiam, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (upholding validity of rule regarding grand jury subpoenas); Unified Sewerage Agency v.
Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1342 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court adopted by local rule disciplinary
rules of Oregon; court used these provisions in evaluating disqualification motions); E.D. PA. R. 14
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actions. 3 1 If a violation is found, the state may impose a penalty ranging from a
private admonition to disbarment. 3 2 The stated purpose of these regulations is
the maintenance of standards within the profession for the protection of the pub33
lic and the administration of justice.
Forty-nine states base their ethical regulations on either the Model Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility34 ("Model Code" or "Code") adopted by the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1969, or the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct 35 ("Model Rules" or "Rules"), adopted in 1983 by the ABA to replace the
Model Code. 36 Because so many states use the Model Code or the Model Rules,
albeit with some significant changes, 37 these provisions are used in this article to
(IV)(B) (as amended Feb. 1, 1988) (adopting Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as adopted by Pennsylvania Supreme Court); M.D. PA. R. 304.2 (as amended Mar. 15, 1988) (adopting Model Rules of
Professional Conduct as adopted by Pennsylvania Supreme Court); W.D. PA. R. 22(I)(B) (as
amended Apr. 1, 1988) (adopting Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct as adopted by Pennsylvania
Supreme Court).
31. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983); accord STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DisCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 2.1, 3.1 [hereinafter STANDARDS] (describes enforcement mechanism recommended for these provisions).
32. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 3.5.1, at 118; STANDARDS, supra note 31, at 33-43.
33. STANDARDS, supra note 31, § 1.1. But see Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977) (lawyers' ethics codes are self-serving); Schnapper,
The Myth of LegalEthics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202, 203 (1978) (because lawyers are responsible for enforcement of the Model Code, there is dissimilarity between Model Code as written and as enforced).
34. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The

Model Code includes Canons, Ethical Considerations ("ECs") and Disciplinary Rules ("DRs").
The DRs are mandatory and "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action." Id Preliminary Statement. The EC's "are aspirational
in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive." Id The Canons "embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and
the Disciplinary Rules are derived." I Although technically only the DRs are mandatory, some
courts have treated the ECs as binding. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 2.6.3, at 59 n.60 (and
cases cited therein).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The
Model Rules use a Restatement format, consisting of black letter Rules accompanied by explanatory
Comments. The reasons offered in support of this format were that it would be more convenient for
resolving professional responsibility questions, it would remedy the problem of inconsistent application of the Canons and ECs, and it was a format with which lawyers are familiar. See LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES, supra note 29, at 3-4.
36. As of fall 1988, 19 states used ethical regulations based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and 30 states used ethical regulations based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See [4 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 77 (Mar. 16,
1988); id. at 93 (Mar. 30, 1988); id. at 208 (July 6, 1988). California uses ethical regulations based
on its own format. See CAL. R. PROF. CONDUCT § 1-100. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility reports that four states and the District of Columbia have pending proposals to adopt
the Model Rules.
37. The initial version of the Model Code was adopted almost in toto by the vast majority of
states. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 2.6.3, at 56-57. However, many states declined to adopt
the Model Code amendments. Id at 57. Similarly, many states adopted the Model Rules with
significant changes. See generally 2 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT app. No. 4 (Supp. 1987) (state

variations of Model Rules, for 22 states, are contained in hundreds of pages of changes). Penn-
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38
analyze the ethical issues affecting law firm breakups.

B. Applicable Ethics Principles
A common mistake lawyers can make during a breakup is to view clients as
"property" in which the lawyers have an interest, or as "files," which are subject
to negotiation, barter, or sale. 39 Lawyers must guard against this somewhat understandable perspective because it is contradictory to the underlying principles
0
of both the client-lawyer relationship and ethics lawA
The client has the right both to select a lawyer and to discharge that lawyer
at any time for any reason. 41 If the firm the client initially retained breaks up,
sylvania, for example, has required many fee contracts to be in writing, unlike the Model Rules.
Compare PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1988) with MODEL
RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5. Pennsylvania has also changed dramatically the confidentiality
rule. Compare PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.6 with MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.6. In order
to demonstrate some of these changes, the Pennsylvania version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct have been included throughout this article for comparison purposes. (Pennsylvania was
selected not necessarily because it is typical, but because Pennsylvania is the state in which this
article is published).
38. The goal of this article is to analyze the ethics issues that could arise during a breakup.
This doctrinal approach should provide a checklist of ethics issues that courts and attorneys may
consult. Moreover, even if the problems that occur during a breakup change, this doctrinal approach provides a framework for analyzing the unexpected. It should be clear, however, that the
goal of this article is to provide an analysis of the relevant ethics principles, rather than an analysis of
the breakup situation. Hence, this article does not attempt to analyze how the ethics principles will
be balanced against other, sometimes competing, principles that may be relevant in a breakup.
39. See e.g., Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill.
App. 3d 517, 519, 417 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1981) (agreement
said all files shall remain "sole and absolute property" of certain clients and that certain attorneys
were "owners" of certain files); Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 345, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (Ch.)
(agreement said certain clients "shall be designated to certain individual partners" if partnership
terminated), remanded, 68 N.J. 177, 343 A.2d 464, aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d
208 (App. Div. 1975); Saltzberg v. Fishman, 123 Il. App. 3d 447, 449, 462 N.E.2d 901, 903-04
(1984) (parties resolved dispute over breakup by agreeing in settlement documents that fees from
fies defendant-lawyer brought into firm were "defendant's property" and fees from firm files defendant worked on were to be split by defendant and firm); Frates v. Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 82 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (partnership agreement said withdrawing partner would have no other interest
in cases of firm; court observed that contracting parties intended that withdrawing partner would
leave all pending cases for the remaining partners); see also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171,
179, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1984) ("no compensation" rule discourages former partners from scrambling to take physical possession of files); Mobley, supra note 1, at 16, col. 4 (stating many attorneys
leaving Guggenheimer, & Untermeyer firm after breakup took their personal clients).
40. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 300 (1961) "Clients
are not merchandise," and lawyer cannot "barter in clients"); see also Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash.
App. 304, 311-12, 556 P.2d 233, 238 (1976) (observing that attorney properly abandoned theory
based on proprietary interest in former clients because attorney-cient relationship is personal and
confidential). C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 16.2 at 888, states,
Attempting to resolve the issue [of who deals with which clients] by referring to clients as
"files" and debating which client each lawyer "owns" or to which lawyer a client "belongs" obscures and distorts the lawyer-client relationship. The compelling fact is that the
client-lawyer relationship is personal; clients should accordingly have a free choice of
counsel.
Id. See also cases cited infra notes 41-44.
41. See, eg., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 791, 494 P.2d 9, 13, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389
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the client, not the lawyer, must select the group that thereafter will represent the
client.4 2 While the lawyers may negotiate regarding how the client is notified,
by whom, and who will keep temporary physical custody of the files, 43 the client
should be notified of the change in circumstances and given the opportunity to
select the counsel it prefers." If lawyers remember these overriding principles
during a breakup, they are more likely to comply with the applicable ethical
regulations.
In addition to these overriding principles, there are at least seven "catego45
ries" of ethical regulations that could be violated during a law firm breakup.
These categories are as follows: 1) a lawyer's continuing obligations to the client; 46 2) restrictive covenants; 47 3) fees and fee division; 48 4) publicity; 49 5) con(1972) (client has right to hire and discharge attorney at will); Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md. App. 499,
509, 434 A.2d 582, 588 (1981) (client has the right to select counsel he prefers); Simon, Come &
Block v. Duke, 429 So. 2d 507, 508 (La. App.) (in suit between firm and client, client has right to
discharge attorneys at any time, with or without cause), cert denied, 437 So. 2d 1147 (La. 1983).
42. Missan v. Schoenfeld, 111 Misc. 2d 1022, 1026, 445 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (1981) (clients, not
partners, choose their counsel, thus partner had no "property right" to clients which would permit
him to sue for client's departure); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1457 (1980) (Code permits letter to clients advising them of attorney's withdrawal if, inter alia,
it notifies clients of client's right to decide who will complete representation); id., Informal Op. 910
(1966) (there are no ethical problems in representing ex-cients of former firm because "it is for the
client to decide who will represent him"); Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility,
Op. 83-2 (1984) (allocation of ongoing cases at termination of lawyer's employment "should not be
determined at the 'insistence' of the affected attorneys" but at client's preference).
43. A discharged lawyer, without a lien, must honor a client's request to turn files over to new
counsel; pending client action, however, the law regarding temporary physical custody is unclear.
See eg, Dinkes, Mandel, Dinkes & Morelli v. Ioannou, N.Y.L.J, July 22, 1987, at 11, col. 3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) (court ordered attorneys to turn over files to departing associate who had obtained substitution of counsel forms from certain clients; plaintiff firm at most has charging lien rather than
retaining lien); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. C-787 (1964)
(lawyer acted improperly in removing client files from firm without permission of firm or clients);
Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 83-11 (1984) (in discussing sale of
good will, committee said transfer of active fies may be done only if appropriate safeguards are
taken pending client consent); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 168 (1986) (upon
demand, firm must release files to clients' current counsel, an ex-associate, if withholding files would
lead to prejudice to client). This issue of fie custody, which is not directly addressed in the ethics
regulations, is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 38. Compare Bonner, When Partnerships Dissole, supra note 28. Obviously, the ideal solution is for the lawyers to negotiate who will
keep temporary physical custody of the files pending client action so that this legal issue need not be
decided.
44. See, eg., Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash. App. 304, 311 n.6, 556 P.2d 233, 238 n.6 (1976) (in
situation where attorney temporarily took over another's practice, attorney should allow the clients
to choose who represents them); State Bar of California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct, Formal Op. 1985-86 (attorneys going through breakup are required to notify client and
advise it of right to have all files delivered to client or to whomever client wishes to handle representation). See also cases cited supra note 43.
45. These "categories" do not appear in the ethical regulations, per se. Rather, they are categories identified by the author. They are grouped together according to their themes or concerns.

46. This category would include MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule
1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation).
The Model Code counterparts include MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 6-101 (Failing to Act
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flicts of interest; 50 6) confidentiality; 51 and 7) a lawyer's duties with respect to
safekeeping property. 52 Categories one through four are likely to present the
most difficult and troublesome issues.
1. Continuing Obligations Owed to Clients
Although phrased differently, both the Model Code and the Model Rules
impose on a lawyer an ethical obligation to represent the client competently.
The Model Code is framed in the negative and prohibits neglect and incompetence, although competence is never defined. 53 The Model Rules, on the other
hand, are framed in the affirmative and require a lawyer to be competent (which
56
55
is defined), 54 diligent and to communicate regularly with the client.
Competently), DR 2-110 (Withdrawal from Employment). See infra notes 53-85 and accompanying
text.
47. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.6 (Restrictions on Right to
Practice). The Model Code counterpart is MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-108 (Agreements
Restricting the Practice of a Lawyer). See infra notes 86-129 and accompanying text.
48. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5 (Fees). The Model Code
counterparts are MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-106 (Fees for Legal Services), DR 2-107 (Division of Fees Among Lawyers). See infra notes 130-72 and accompanying text.
49. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.2 (Advertising), Rule 7.3 (Direct Contact with Prospective Clients),
Rule 7.5 (Firm Names and Letterheads). The Model Code counterparts are MODEL CODE, supra
note 34, DR 2-101 (Publicity), DR 2-102 (Professional Notices, Letterheads and Offices), DR 2-103
(Recommendation of Professional Employment), DR 2-104 (Suggestion of Need of Legal Services).
Of course, these provisions must be applied in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's line of cases involving lawyers and the first amendment right of commercial speech. See
infra notes 185-224 and accompanying text for a discussion of a lawyer's ability to communicate
with potential clients in the firm breakup context.
50. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule), Rule 1.9 (Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions), Rule 1.10 (Imputed Disqualification: General Rule), Rule 1.11 (Successive Government and Private Employment). The Model
Code counterparts are MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 5-101 (Refusing Employment When the
Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment), DR 5-105 (Refusing
to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent
Professional Judgment of the Lawyer), DR 4-101 (Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a
Client), DR 9-101 (Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety). See infra notes 225-38 and
accompanying text.
51. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information). The Model Code counterpart is MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 4-101 (Preservation of
Confidences and Secrets of a Client). See infra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
52. This category includes MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property).
The Model Code counterpart is MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 9-102 (Preserving Identity of
Funds and Property of a Client). See infra notes 245-57 and accompanying text.
53. The Model Code states, in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to
handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 6-101. The Model Code does not define competence.
54. "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the rep-
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During a breakup, a lawyer could violate these continuing obligations ethics
regulations by neglecting a client the lawyer has been actively representing." In
Grievance Committee v. Lempesis,58 for example, a disciplined lawyer failed to
execute and record a mortgage, and attributed his oversight to the confusion
surrounding his dissolved law practice and his personal situation.5 9
A more difficult issue is raised, however, if a lawyer's partner neglects a
client the partner has been actively representing. The obligation contained in
the Rules to be competent, diligent, and to communicate is owed to "a client." 6°
Yet the ethics regulations never define the term "client. ' 6 1 The Rules, like the
Code, 62 are silent on the issue of whether a lawyer's client should also be viewed
as the partner's client, imposing on the partner the ethical obligations of compe63
tence, diligence, and communication.
One could turn to partnership, contract, or tort law to define the word "client," which is used in the ethics regulations. Under these bodies of law, when a
client comes to a law partnership, the general understanding is that the client is
a client of the partnership, not just a client of the particular lawyer consulted. 64
resentation." MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.1. The Pennsylvania version of Model Rule 1.1
is slightly different in that it omits the word "reasonably." PA. R. PROF. CoNDucr Rule 1.1.
55. "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.3. The Pennsylvania version of Model Rule 1.3 is identical to
the ABA version. PA. R. PROF. CoNDucT Rule 1.3.
56. "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule
1.4. The Pennsylvania version of Model Rule 1.4 is slightly different in that the word "reasonably"
is omitted. PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.4.
57. See, &g., Dinkes, Mandel, Dinkes & Morelli v. Ioannou, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1987, at 11, col.
3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (breakup affected clients); Greenberg v. Gitlin, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 6, col. 1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (same); accord Moss, supra note 17, at 9 (breakups can affect clients).
58. 248 S.C. 47, 148 S.E.2d 869 (1966).
59. Id. at 48-51, 148 S.E.2d at 870-71.
60. See supra notes 54-56.
61. See supra notes 54-56. See also 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 53-54, which
states that
an essential first step in applying the law of lawyering is to determine whether a person
with whom a lawyer is engaged is a client or a nonclient. However, neither the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct nor the law at large explicitly defines the identity of the
client in any transaction or situation. Indeed, legal rules could not make such an a priori
identification, for the client-lawyer relationship is fundamentally a contractual relationship,
the existence of which will depend upon specific circumstances.

Id
62. See MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 6-101; supra note 53 for the text of DR 6-101.
63. See supra note 61 for authority stating that the Model Rules do not explicitly define the
identity of a "client."
64. Se e g., Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 558-59, 463 P.2d 418, 423-24, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194,
200 (1970) (although partners regarded plaintiff as client of only one partner, court treated plaintiff
as client of partnership since firm held itself out as partnership and since no one informed plaintiff
that partner was not representing him as member of firm); Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 521,
417 N.E.2d 764, 768 (1981) ("It is fundamental that the employment of one member of a law firm is
the employment of all whether all are specially consulted or not, except where there is a special
understanding to the contrary.").
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Each member of the partnership owes an obligation to the client to perform
the contract. 6 5 Each lawyer is responsible for any breach of a duty to the client.66 Furthermore, a lawyer is not relieved of these responsibilities immediately upon the breakup of a firm. The majority rule is that when a partnership
breaks up, it goes through a dissolution period before the partnership is finally
terminated. 67 During this dissolution period, the partnership and each partner
have an obligation to complete the partnership work. 68 For a lawyer to be relieved of these obligations, the old partnership must be discharged and new
69
counsel substituted.
Using this understanding of the word "client," both the lawyer personally
serving the client and that lawyer's partner would have to comply with the continuing obligations ethics regulations. Smith v. Daub70 comports with this interpretation. In Smith, two partners brought an accounting action against the
third. One issue was the proper allocation of money collected in contingency
cases that were ongoing matters when the firm dissolved. 71 The issue facing the
court was whether the lawyer handling these cases after the breakup was entitled
to extra compensation, beyond his partnership share, for the work he did.72 In
65. See, e.g., Redman v. Walters, 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 453, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 45 (1979) ("And
as such a partner Walters would, of course, be responsible also for the negligent act of the partnership or one or more of his partners."); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820
(1985) ("Both under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the partnership... was obligated to complete the work for the clients or afford the
clients an opportunity to seek other counsel."); see also cases cited infra note 127.
66. See cases cited supra in note 65.
67. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 16.2, at 887; see also cases cited infra note 126.
68. Eg., Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 179, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1984) (each partner
has responsibility to complete ongoing matters); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81, 485
N.E.2d 413, 416 (1985) (in fee allocation case, court said attorneys' "duty with regard to that unfinished business of the partnership was to wind it up and complete it for the partnership"); Resnick v.
Kaplan, 49 Md. App. 499, 507, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (1981) (retention of firm obligates every member
to fulfill contract and, upon dissolution, to do so without extra compensation); accord C. WOLFRAM,
supra note 29, § 16.2, at 888; UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 36(1), 6 U.L.A. 436 (1914) (dissolution of
partnership does not terminate existing liability).
69. See, e.g., Redman v. Walters, 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 453, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 45 (1979) (partner could be responsible for malpractice that occurred after his withdrawal from firm since he never
withdrew from representation and the "dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the
existing liability of any partner"); Blackmon v. Hale, I Cal. 3d 548, 559 n.3, 463 P.2d 418, 424 n.3,
83 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 n.3 (1979) ("It is immaterial in this case that the-actual misappropriation
occurred after the partnership of Adams and Hale was dissolved. Until plaintiff had notice of the
dissolution and consented to a discharge of the partnership, Hale remained liable for obligations
assumed before dissolution."); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81, 485 N.E.2d 413, 416
(1985) ("law partnership's dissolution did not terminate its contractual relations with its clients");
Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1985) ("Both under the provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the partnership . . . was
obligated to complete the work for the clients or afford the clients an opportunity to -seek other
counsel."). But see Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga. App. 593, 593-94, 275 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1980) (attorney not liable for malpractice because partnership dissolved before alleged malpractice; case was
accepted during partnership and no discussion of whether client knew of dissolution).
70. 219 Neb. 698, 365 N.W.2d 816 (1985).
71. Id. at 699-701, 365 N.W.2d at 817-18.
72. Id
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concluding he was not, the court relied in part on the following reasoning:
"Both under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act and the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility, the partnershipof Daub, Stehlik, and Smith was obligated to complete the work for the clients or afford the clients an opportunity to
seek other counsel."' 73 Although this language was cited in a civil case between
lawyers rather than a disciplinary proceeding, it suggests that each member of a
partnership has an obligation to comply with the continuing obligations ethics
provisions. It is arguable that Smith v. Daub implicitly defined the word "client" as a client of the partnership and imposed on all partners the ethical obligations to competently represent that client.
This interpretation is troubling, however, because it is at odds with other
provisions in the Rules and the law upon which they are based. 74 Ordinarily, a
lawyer is not responsible for ethical violations committed by another lawyer,
even one's partner. 75 One is only responsible, ethically, for one's own conduct,
even though contract and tort law may impose vicarious liability. 76 Of course, a
partner has a personal responsibility to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm has measures that give reasonable assurances that all lawyers in the firm
73. L at 704, 365 N.W.2d at 820 (emphasis added).
74. The relevant provisions are Rules 5.1 and 5.2:
RULE 5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or
has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.1.
RULE 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
(a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the
lawyer acted at the direction of another person.
(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that
lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable
question of professional duty.
Id Rule 5.2.
The Model Code does not contain any provisions addressing the issue of the relationship of the
individual partners to a client of the partnership. The courts construing the Model Code, however,
generally refused to impose vicarious ethical responsibility. See cases cited in ABA, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 280-83 (1984) (law upon which Model Rule 5.1 was
based).
.75. See supra note 74.
76. Compare text of Model Rule 5.1, supra note 74 with cases cited in supra notes 64-69.
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conform to the rules of professional conduct." 77 Furthermore, a lawyer can
become personally responsible for another lawyer's violation if the lawyer orders
the violation, ratifies it with knowledge of the conduct, or learns of the conduct
at a time when the consequences can be avoided or mitigated and fails to take
such steps. 78 Absent those circumstances, however, one lawyer is not responsible for another lawyer's ethical violations. These provisions, then, appear inconsistent with a definition of "client" that would include all partnership clients.
It is submitted that in defining the "client" to whom ethical obligations are
owed, the better interpretation is that "client" refers to clients personally served
by the lawyer. This interpretation has the advantage of being consistent with the
other Rules' provisions and the law upon which they are based. 79 Furthermore,
there are few, if any, policy reasons to hold a lawyer vicariously responsible for
another's ethical violations. Vicarious ethical responsibility is not necessary to
make the client whole; partnership and tort law can accomplish that.80 Furthermore, such vicarious responsibility probably would not increase significantly the
level of ethical compliance. A partner or supervisory lawyer already has a personal ethical responsibility to institutionalize measures for compliance and is
personally responsible for ethical violations the supervisory lawyer ordered, rati81
fied, or failed to correct, if correction was possible.
Until this issue is clearly resolved, however, the conservative approach is
for lawyers to recognize that they have potential ethical exposure, as well as
contract and tort exposure, with respect to clients served by their partners.
Lawyers should notify all partnership clients of their departure from the firm.
Unless the partnership agreement specifically provides that a lawyer's withdrawal does not dissolve the partnership,8 2 the lawyer would be well advised to
have the original partnership withdraw from representation and new counsel
substituted.83 Furthermore, even if the vicarious responsibility approach is re77. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.1(b); supra note 74 for text of Rule 5.1.
78. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.1(c); supra note 74 for text of Rule 5.1.
79. See supranote 74; accord Hazard, EthicalIssues In Withdrawal,Expulsion And Retirement,
in ABA, WITHDRAWAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES 35-36 (1986) ("In the absence of any indications to the contrary, an exiting lawyer can assume the need to be concerned only for 'his' or 'her'
clients, that is, assume that the remaining lawyers will take care of the clients they served.").
80. See supra notes 64-69.
81. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 35, Rule 5.1; supra note 74 for text of Rule 5.1.
82. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 29, 6 U.L.A. 364 (1914) (dissolution "is the change in the
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on... of the
business"); idL § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914) (stating partnership rights and duties, but permitting them
to be modified by agreement). See generally Champion v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 777, 247
Cal. Rptr. 624 (1988). In Champion, the court refused to enforce an agreement limiting a departing
partner to the partnership percentage of fees collected after dissolution, reasoning that such a contract would "create a de facto dissolution. It would impose on the lawyer the burden of performing
his share of the work in winding up unfinished cases." Id. The court found that the firm was
protected because it could elect to dissolve the partnership. Id
83. See supra notes 68-69. If the lawyer or old firm withdraws, they should comply with the
relevant withdrawal provisions. Model Rule 1.16 provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if.
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jected, under the Model Rules a partner has a personal responsibility to ensure
that the firm has in place measures giving reasonable assurance of conformance
to the ethical rules.8 4 Thus, during a breakup, each partner should make an
effort to institutionalize procedures that will ensure that all firm clients are represented adequately.8 5
2. Restrictive Covenants
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer's use of restrictive covenants. The Model Code's Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 2-108, for example, states:
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the
right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client, if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the
lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw
unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.16. The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.16 is identical to the
Model Rule. See PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 1.16. Cf MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-110.
84. See MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.1; supra note 74 for text of Rule 5.1.
85. Cf. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 456-57 (1985) (Rule 5.1 would be violated
f partner made no efforts to ensure that firm lawyers study recently adopted Model Rules). This
provision could be used to ensure that all firm lawyers took steps to ensure that there were no
unwanted clients whose legal matters were ignored. Accord Hazard, supra note 79, at 35-36 (if there
are unwanted clients after breakup, firm must comply with withdrawal provisions).
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practice law. 8 6
Model Rule 5.6 is substantially similar to DR 2-108.87 The comment to Rule
5.6 explains the rationale for these provisions. Restrictive covenants are undesirable because they limit the lawyer's professional autonomy and the client's
88
freedom to choose a lawyer.
Although these ethics provisions have been criticized,8 9 the courts, disciplinary authorities, and ethics committees interpret these provisions strictly. 9° In86. MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-108.
87. Model Rule 5.6 provides:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to
practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits
upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the
settlement of a controversy between private parties.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.6. The Pennsylvania version of the Model Rule is identical to
the ABA version. PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 5.6.
88. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 5.6 comment. Accord 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES,
supra note 37, at 486 (1985) ("Covenants not to compete once were attacked as being 'unseemly,'
.unprofessional,' or even 'ungentlemanly.' Those arguments no longer carry legal weight. A better
rationale-amply supporting the rule-is that such covenants impinge upon the right of future clients to free choice of counsel.").
89. See, eg., Kalish, Covenants Not To Compete and The Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J.
423, 456-57 (1985) (Model Code and Model Rules should be interpreted to proscribe only unreasonable restrictive covenants, and courts should apply general rule of law to legal profession and enforce
all reasonable covenants not to compete); Comment, Attorneys supra note 28 (attorney restrictive
covenants should be adjudged using the common-law "reasonableness" test, rather than per se prohibition contained in Model Code, especially when they do not involve covenants appurtenant to employment contracts).
90. See, eg., Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 522-24, 417 N.E.2d 764, 769 (1981) (court
did not cite DR 2-108, but, relying on Dwyer v. Jung, found unenforceable agreement that Corti
"owned" certain files); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 685-88, 490 A.2d 1224,
1225-26 (1985) (disciplinary proceedings brought against Hyatt Legal Clinic attorneys for, among
other things, entering into employment agreement prohibiting employee attorneys from later setting
up legal clinic or "similar" legal services organization; court dismissed these charges without prejudice, but with leave to refile if necessary, in view of the parties' agreement to rewrite agreement and
fact that Hyatt Legal Services never sought to enforce it); Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 418-19,
390 A.2d 1161, 1166-67 (1978) (in case upholding restrictive covenant against physician, court distinguished and approved Dwyer v. Jung because covenant there involved lawyers; court also noted
Dwyer v. Jung involved absolute prohibition whereas covenant at issue was geographic prohibition);
Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 346-49, 336 A.2d 498, 499-501 (Ch.) (court relied on DR 2-108,
ethics opinions, and principles underlying lawyer-client relationship to hold unenforceable, as void
against public policy, partnership agreement provision stating that one partner couldn't represent
certain designated clients within five years), remanded, 68 N.J. 177, 343 A.2d 464, aff'dper curiam,
137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975); Cohen v. Graham, 44 Wash. App. 712, 717,
722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (1986) (purchase and sale agreement following dissolution whereby attorney
agreed not to represent certain clients violated DR 2-108 and was unenforceable; covenant not to
contact certain clients held enforceable), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1033 (1987); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1417 (1978) (relying on DR 2-108 and former
opinions, Committee opined that certain partnership agreement was unethical; agreement would
prohibit departing partner from hiring firm associates for certain number of years); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1171 (1978) (relying on ABA Formal Op. 300
and DR 2-108, Committee opined that partnership agreement was unethical; proposal stated that
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deed, research has not revealed any cases decided after the adoption of the
Model Code or the Model Rules that have upheld a restrictive covenant between
departing attorney would perform no legal services for firm clients for two years); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1072 (1968) (relying on ABA Formal Op. 300
and overruling dicta in ABA Informal Op. 521, Committee opined that restrictive covenant in proposed partnership agreement would be unethical; agreement would prevent withdrawing partner
from practicing within county for period of perhaps five years); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 521 (1962) (relying on ABA Formal Op. 300 and Canons 7 and
27, Committee opined that it would be unethical to have an agreement restricting lawyer-employee
from handling matter for firm client or firm practicing within locality for certain period of time; in
dicta, Committee noted that restrictive agreement in partnership agreement as opposed to employment agreement would not involve any question of ethics since parties are dealing on equal footing);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (relying on Canons
7, 27 and general principles, Committee opined that it was unethical to have covenant restricting
employed lawyer from practicing in community for stated period); District of Columbia Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 181 (Committee opined that confidentiality agreement which, among other
things, stated that employee "agrees and covenants not to disrupt, impair or interfere with the business of the firm in any way, whether by way of interfering with or raiding its employees, or disrupting or interfering with the firm's relationships with its clients, agents, representatives/venders or
otherwise" violated DR 2-108); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 122 (1983) (relying on DR 2-108, Committee opined that proposed covenant in partnership agreement was unethical; covenant would, among other things, prohibit departing partner from performing services for
clients of firm for 18 months); Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 108 (1981) (relying on DR 2-108, Committee opined that shareho!der agreement may
not restrict geographic areas or clients lawyer serves upon termination); New Jersey Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 147 (1969) (relying on Canons of Ethics and proposed draft of
Model Code, Committee opined that covenant in partnership agreement was unethical; covenant
prohibited withdrawing partner from practicing within county for five years); State Bar of Texas
Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 422 (1984) (relying on DR 2-108, Committee opined that proposed
partnership agreement and employment agreement between law firms and associates was unethical;
among other things, agreements restricted associates for "reasonable time" from "practicing law in
competition" with firm in its geographical area and from soliciting firm's current clients for two
years, and restricted withdrawing partners from continued representation of firm clients); 0. MARU,
DIGEST OF BAR AssociATiON ETHics OPINIONS No. 10126, at 493 (Supp. 1975) (Virginia, Informal
Op. 200) (employment agreement which would preclude attorney from practicing in same geographical area as firm for specified time after attorney leaves firm would be improper); id No. 9527, at 412
(North Carolina, Op. 776 (1971)) (attorneys may not, when forming association, enter into agreements restricting their practice after end of association); i No. 9212, at 367 (New York County,
Op. 621 (1974)) (it is improper for attorney to enter into agreement which would restrict his acceptance of professional employment from any person who was client of partnership at time he ceased
being member); id No. 8453, at 212 (Indiana, Op. 5-1974 (1974)) (attorneys may not enter into
restrictive covenants which limit geographical area where associate may practice after ending association with firm). Accord C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 16.2, at 885 ("One limitation is that the
[partnership] agreement may not contain a restrictive covenant limiting the right of any partner to
practice law after termination of the partnership except as a condition to payment of retirement
benefits."); Galante, supra note 2, at 28 (attorney from Fulop & Hardee "has caused a stir" by
suggesting receiver should enforce provision of shareholder agreement that members of firm must
remit 50% of fees collected from ex-Fulop & Hardee clients). See also Ladas & Perry v. Abelman,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (court denied plaintiff law firm's request for preliminary injunction prohibiting departing attorneys from soliciting or accepting business from firm clients; court
reasoned that such injunction would be tantamount to restrictive covenant and can only be used if
needed to protect clients from such duress as would tend to interfere with their informed and reliable
decision-making).
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lawyers. Furthermore, there are only a handful of cases decided before the
Model Code was in existence that have upheld a restrictive covenant. 91
The ethics committees, with the exception of that of Illinois, 92 similarly
condemn restrictive covenants. The closest these committees have come to permitting restrictive covenants is to opine that certain agreements are not restrictive covenants. 93 For example, the District of Columbia Legal Ethics
Committee concluded that an employment agreement limiting the manner in
which an associate may solicit firm clients is not a restrictive covenant. 94 The
agreement prohibited the associate from contacting the clients by telephone or in
91. Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11 Ill. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1957), appears to be the most recent
case upholding a restrictive covenant.
Hicklin enforced a restrictive covenant against a lawyer who had received payments pursuant to
the "Contract of Sale" of his law practice. Id. at 545-47, 138 N.E.2d at 49-50. In doing so, it used a
"reasonableness" test. Id. at 547-50, 138 N.E.2d at 50-52. The defendant had argued that the contract was illegal, unethical, and against public policy. Id. at 546-47, 138 N.E.2d at 50. The court
found no illegality and said, without further explanation, that it need not consider the Canons of
Ethics. Id at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
Other opinions enforcing a restrictive covenant are extremely old. See Heinz v. Roberts, 135
Iowa 748, 110 N.W. 1034 (1907) (court granted injunction to enforce contract containing restrictive
covenant against attorney); Thorn v. Dimsmoon, 104 Kan. 275, 178 P. 445 (1919) (court upheld
contract between law student and attorney for sale of law practice which included restrictive covenant).
One explanation for these cases might be that before the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility was adopted, the extent to which the Canons of Ethics prohibited restrictive covenants was unclear. See, e.g., ABA, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 115 (1979) ("The old

Canons had no explicit provision dealing with restrictive covenants between lawyers."). Compare
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (unethical for employment contract to
prohibit employee-lawyer from practicing within region for specific time after his employment) with
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962) (restrictive covenant in partnership
agreement would not be unethical because parties are on equal footing). Opinion 521 was overruled
in ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968).
92. When it adopted the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, the Illinois Supreme Court
declined to adopt DR 2-108, stating that "the common law relating to restrictive covenants is sufficient to handle the problem, and that lawyers should not be subject to disciplinary action for entering into such agreements." ILL. CODE PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 Commentary. The court
may have been thinking of Hicklin v. O'Brien, II Ill. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1957), when it
made this statement. See supra note 91 for a discussion of Hicklin.
This explains the unusual position of the Illinois Ethics Committee. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-16 (1987). Among other things, the Committee declined to express an opinion regarding the validity of an employment agreement whereby the associate agreed to surrender all future business referred by firm clients, since such restrictive covenants
were not covered by ethical regulation, but were a matter of common law. See id. Compare id with
opinions cited supra note 91 and infra notes 105-06.
It is interesting to note, however, that notwithstanding Hicklin v. O'Brien, an Illinois court
relied on Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch.), remanded, 68 N.J. 177, 343 A.2d
464, aff'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975), and refused to enforce a contract
provision that specified certain files "were the sole and absolute property of" the attorney. Corti v.
Fleisher, 93 Il. App. 3d 517, 520, 417 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1981).
93. See, e.g., District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 97 (employment agreement
that prohibits solicitation of firm clients but not mailed announcements is not improper restrictive
covenant); District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 77 (same).
94. District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 77.
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person, permissible in the District of Columbia, but did not prohibit mailed announcements to firm clients. 95
Given the clarity of the ethical regulations and the adherence to that language by courts and ethics committees, what is perhaps surprising is that lawyers continually propose such restrictive covenants, that restrictive covenants
96
actually exist in lawyer agreements, and that lawyers even try to enforce them.
Such agreements are not limited to any particular type of practice. They have
been used in two-person firmS, 9 7 mid-size firms, 98 and even legal clinics. 99
Dwyer v. Jung 100 demonstrates the current standard reaction to a restrictive
covenant in a partnership agreement. 10 ' After practicing together approximately one and a half years, Jung dissolved his three-lawyer partnership. 1° 2
Jung's former partners then brought an accounting action against him. 10 3 Jung
counterclaimed, alleging that his former partners had violated the restrictive
covenant contained in the partnership agreement.') 4 That provision stated:
Should the partnership terminate, all clients listed in exhibit "A" shall
be designated to certain individual partners. Upon termination, and by
virtue of this Agreement, all partners shall be restricted from doing
business with a client designated as that of another partner for a period
of 5 (five) years.' 0 5
After noting the scarcity of reported opinions, the court reviewed DR 2108, the legal principles underlying that provision, and various ethics committee
opinions.' 6 The court then held that the restrictive covenant in the partnership
agreement was void as against public policy. 107 Dwyer v. Jung thus illustrates
the unforgiving approach to an absolute prohibition on competition. 0 8
A more difficult issue is raised if an agreement imposes a financial penalty
for competing, but does not absolutely forbid such competition. Two different
types of financial penalties can be imposed. One type requires the departing
lawyer to forfeit certain monies if the lawyer competes with the firm.' 0 9 This
95. Id
96. See supra note 90, infra notes 109-10.
97. See, eg., In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 663 P.2d 1285, petition for appeal denied, 295
Or. 541, 668 P.2d 384 (1983).
99. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 490 A.2d 1224 (1985).
100. 133 N.J.Super. 343, 345, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (Ch.), remanded, 68 N.J. 177, 343 A.2d 464,
aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975).
101. See supra note 90 for a discussion of the reluctance of courts and ethics committees to

enforce such restrictive covenants.
102. 133 N.J. Super. at 345, 336 A.2d at 499.
103. Id at 345-46, 336 A.2d at 499.
104. Id at 345-46, 336 A.2d at 499.
105. Id. at 345, 336 A.2d at 499.
106. Id at 346-49, 336 A.2d at 499-501.
107. Id at 346-49, 336 A.2d at 499-501.
108. Accord cases cited supra note 90.
109. See, eg., Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 68 Or. App. 700, 703-04, 683 P.2d 563, 564-

65 (1984) (court refused to enforce buy-sell agreement that reduced shareholder's payments by 40%
if shareholder failed to enter into binding noncompetition agreement, finding penalty violated DR 2-
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type of penalty is not tied to a particular client. A second type of financial
penalty is tied to a particular client. The agreement gives the firm some or all of
the fees attributable to work done for certain clients after the lawyer's departure. 110 The approach taken by the majority of courts and committees consider108); Gray v. Martin, 63 Or. App. 173, 181-82, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (court refused to enforce partnership agreement that deducted one-half of one year's profits if partner competed upon withdrawal),petitionfor appeal denied, 295 Or. 541, 668 P.2d 384 (1983); District of Columbia Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 181 ("Confidentiality Agreement," which required employee-attorney to covenant, inter alia, not to disrupt firm business in any way after departure and which provided for
liquidated damages of $150,000 plus attorneys' fees and costs upon violation, violated DR 2-108);
District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 77 (employment contract which provided penalty of $4,000 per year of employment for solicitation of firm clients was not unethical because
mailed announcements were permitted; committee assumed financial penalty could constitute restrictive covenant); Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-326 (1987) (committee opines that
partnership agreement that ties partner's right to certain payments to covenant not to compete
within geographic area violates DR 2-108); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op.
880 (1987) (relying on DR 2-106, Virginia's version of Model Code DR 2-108, committee opined
that proposed deferred compensation plan for professional corporation was unethical insofar as it
would deny compensation, comparable to death benefits, for withdrawing attorneys who practiced
within certain geographical radius and insofar as money for such benefits initially was contributed to
plan by attorney-employee, rather than firm-employer); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Op. 428 (1981) (committee found unethical partnership agreement provision linking
termination compensation to agreement not to practice for five years in certain communities, specifically finding termination benefits did not constitute "retirement benefits" contemplated in DR 2108). But see Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, No. 34,599 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 15, 1988) (1988 N.Y.
App. Div. LEXIS 11226) (reversing lower court, court enforced partnership agreement which required partner who competed in certain geographic area to forfeit share of partnership profits collected in three years following his withdrawal to which he otherwise was entitled; rejecting Gray v.
Martin, court concluded that financial disincentive does not "restrict" lawyer and that DR 2-108(A)
was intended to protect the rights of the public to select counsel of choice, not to safeguard attorney's right to departure compensation); M. ALTMAN & R. WEIL, supra note 7, § 8.03, at 8-5, app. 63
(observing that "[s]ome partnership agreements specifically deny payments to a former partner in
competition" and presenting sample agreement with differing benefits).
110. See, e.g., In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 819, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (1980) (court found
agreement that required departing partner to remit 80% of net billings from certain clients violated
DR 2-108 and was not enforceable in arbitration). See also Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517,
522-23, 417 N.E.2d 764, 769 (1981) (court did not cite DR 2-108, but relied on Dwyer v. Jung to find
unenforceable employment agreement provision stating that "the owner of each file... shall be
entitled to all fees received subsequent to the date of termination of this agreement"); Dallas Bar
Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 86-1 (1986) (agreement giving firm 10% of all fees collected on new
business of ex-firm clients handled by departing attorney violated DR 2-107, fee division provision;
committee relied in part on District of Columbia Bar, Op. 65, infra, and State Bar of Texas, Op. 422,
supra note 90); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 122 (partnership agreement that
required attorney to give firm 20% of gross billings from certain client for five years after departure
violated DR 2-108; committee drew no distinction between fees for new matters and fees for ongoing
matters); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 65 (employment agreement that required attorney to give firm 40% of net billings for firm clients for two years after departure violated
DR 2-108 because it created restriction on right to practice; committee drew no distinction between
fees for new matters and fees for ongoing matters); State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional &
Judicial Ethics, Op. C-1145 (1986) (committee found that employment contract which said that
lawyer who represented firm client within two years after departure had to purchase goodwill associated with client, as measured by value of billable time spent servicing client in past 12 months,
violated DR 2-108; committee drew no distinction between fees for new matters and fees for ongoing

1988]

LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

1077

ing the issue is that such agreements are indeed restrictive covenants."' 1
Gray v. Martin 112 is perhaps the leading example of a case finding that a
financial penalty was an improper restrictive covenant.' 13 In Gray, a law firm
brought an accounting action against Martin, a departing partner.' 14 Martin
counterclaimed, seeking money provided for in the "benefits paragraph" of the
6
partnership agreement. ' 15 The trial court dismissed Martin's counterclaim. 1

The court found these benefits were excluded by the "withdrawal paragraph" of
the partnership agreement. 1 7 The withdrawal paragraph said that a partner
who withdrew and then practiced law within a three-county area forfeited certain benefits, amounting to one-half of one year's profits. 18 The Oregon Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of Martin's counterclaim. The
court found the withdrawal paragraph void as against public policy because it
violated DR 2-108.119
Although the withdrawal paragraph imposed a financial penalty, rather
than an outright prohibition, the court reasoned that it was a restrictive covenant because it affected Martin's right to practice in three counties. If Martin
did practice, he would lose benefits which otherwise would be his. 120 The court
also rejected the law firm's argument that the withdrawal provision was merely a
condition of retirement benefits, thus falling within DR 2-108's exception. 12 1
matters). But see Levy v. Kreindler, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1987, at 11, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (court
rejected argument that agreements which allowed senior partner to determine percentage of fees
departing partner would receive for cases in which he was substituted did not have chilling effect on
clients' right to select counsel and did not violate DR 2-108, given senior partner's duty to act in
good faith). Cf cases cited infra note 145, where there was no agreement but the courts ruled
departing lawyers must share fees in ongoing cases with their partners.
111. See supra notes 109-10.
112. 63 Or. App. 173, 663 P.2d 1285, petition for appeal denied, 295 Or. 541, 668 P.2d 384
(1983).
113. 63 Or. App. at 181-82, 663 P.2d 1290-91.
114. Id. at 176, 663 P.2d at 1286.
115. Id at 181, 663 P.2d at 1290. The paragraph in question, paragraph 11, will be referred to
as the "benefits paragraph" for convenience.
116. Id. at 176, 663 P.2d at 1287.
117. Id. at 177, 663 P.2d at 1287. The paragraph in question, paragraph 25, will be referred to
as the "withdrawal paragraph" for convenience.
118. Id. at 181, 663 P.2d at 1290.
119. Id. at 181-82, 663 P.2d at 1290-91.
120. Id., 663 P.2d at 1290.
121. 63 Or. App. at 181-82, 663 P.2d at 1290. Gray v. Martin's rejection of the "retirement
benefits exception" is consistent with the commentary. See, eg., ABA, ANNOTATED RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT 297 (1984) (citing Dwyer v. Jung and Gray v. Martin with approval),
which states,
As described above, an agreement between lawyers purporting to restrict the right to practice after dissolution is void as against public policy and is in violation of a lawyer's ethical
obligation if the restriction is unrelated to benefits upon retirement ....
Similarly, a partner's right to payment upon withdrawal from the firm may not be made contingent on the
partner's covenant not to compete within the geographical area.
Id. See 1 G. HAzARW & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 486 (1985) (observing that "purpose and
meaning of the last clause of Rule 5.6(a) is not crystal clear," the context suggests these authors view
this clause as applying to true "retirement" situation rather than "withdrawal" situation).

1078

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

The court said that if withdrawal has the same meaning as "retirement" in DR
2-108, then the disciplinary rule has no meaning. 122 The court concluded by
noting that it was appropriate to find the withdrawal paragraph unenforceable
because of the violation of the disciplinary rule. 123 Thus, Gray v. Martin exemplifies the authority holding that a financial penalty, as well as an outright prohibition, can constitute a restrictive covenant.1 24
As discussed above, the majority of courts and ethics committees have
found unethical agreements that absolutely forbid a departing lawyer from com122. 63 Or. App. at 182, 663 P.2d at 1290. Of course, one could argue the flip side: if retirement means true retirement from law practice, rather than withdrawal from a law firm, then DR 2108(BX2)'s exception is meaningless-pure surplusage-because one would not need a noncompetition clause in these circumstances.
123. 63 Or. App. at 182, 663 P.2d at 1290.
124. This reasoning-that a financial penalty is indeed a restriction and can be equivalent to a
prohibition-appears sound. Nevertheless, this reasoning has been rejected in one financial penalty
case. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, No. 34,599 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 18, 1988) (1988 N.Y. App.
Div. LEXIS 11226) (court upheld agreement requiring lawyer who competes to forfeit approximately one year's salary, which would have been paid out over three years had lawyer not competed;
agreement imposed a "financial disincentive" but did not restrict lawyer's ability to practice law).
Cf Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1974) ("[Florfeiture [of retirement
benefits], unlike the restraint included in the employment contract, is not a prohibition on the employee's engaging in competitive work but is merely a denial of the right to participate in the retirement plan if he does so engage.").
Contrary to Cohen, supra, the author believes that a financial penalty can affect both the lawyer's autonomy and the client's right to select counsel of choice. Indeed, both DR 2-108 and Rule
5.6 prohibit restrictionson the right to practice law, not just outright prohibitions. See supra notes
86-88 and accompanying text for the prohibitions in DR 2-108 and Rule 5.6 against restrictive covenants on the right to practice law. Even the Cohen court might consider a 99% financial penalty to
be a restriction, although it did not consider an alleged penalty of $285,000, approximately one
year's salary, to be a restriction. Rather than have each court determine an arbitrary threshold that
must be exceeded before a financial penalty is considered a restrictive covenant, the better approach
is to treat all agreements that impose financial penalties for competition as restrictive covenants. See
generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-10 (1963) (state may not deny unemployment benefits to person who refuses to work on Saturday for religious reasons); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 518-19 (1958) (government may not act indirectly to produce result that it could not command
directly).
On the other hand, the type of financial penalty found in Gray v. Martin is arguably less egregious than the client-based penalty because it will not have as great an impact on clients although it
may have either a greater or lesser impact on lawyers. See supra notes 109-10. To illustrate, it seems
impossible to predict which type of financial penalty will have the greatest impact on the lawyer's
professional autonomy because that undoubtedly will depend on the circumstances. (The relevant
circumstances include the size of the noncient-based penalty and, for the client-based penalty, the
lawyer's need to have a particular client's business in order to afford to leave the firm.) On the other
hand, a client-based penalty probably will have the most direct impact on the client's freedom to
choose a lawyer. If an attorney gets only 20C for every dollar billed for certain clients, as in In re
Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980), the attorney probably will not represent the
client for long. That client probably will be deprived of its first-choice lawyer (or pay high fees). On
the other hand, a penalty that is not tied to a particular client will not deprive a particularclient of
its first-choice lawyer. The lawyer has no financial incentive to decline representation of a particular
client. What could happen is that clients will have a smaller number of firms to choose from and
perhaps a different type of firm or practice will be available because the lawyer will be discouraged
from leaving the firm.
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peting with the firm or that impose a financial penalty on such competition.
However, even where there are no restrictive covenant agreements, there are two
situations in which the parties might resort to arguments based on DR 2-108 or
Rule 5.6. These are situations in which there are no restrictive covenant agreements, but the parties contend that a proposed rule of law should not be applied
because it is equivalent to a restrictive covenant agreement. The argument is
that if an agreement that imposes a restrictive covenant is improper, a proposed
rule of law that accomplishes the same thing also should be improper and
rejected.
The first situation in which this "indirect" restrictive covenant argument
could be used is where there is a dispute among partners over the allocation of
fees and profits after a breakup. To understand this issue, a review of partnership law is needed. Absent a contrary agreement, a partnership is dissolved
when the relationships change by any partner ceasing to be associated with the
carrying on of the business, that is, when the firm breaks up. 125 The firm then
26
goes through a winding-up period before the partnership is finally terminated.1
During the dissolution period before termination, each partner has an independent obligation to complete the partnership work. 127 In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, no partner is entitled to extra compensation for this

"wind-up work," even if it lasts for years.' 28 This "no-compensation" rule of

125. See, eg., Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1985) (partnership
dissolves when relationships change); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 29, 6 U.L.A. 364 (1914).
126. See, e.g., Howe v. Horton, Davis & McCaleb, 85 Ill. App. 3d 970, 972, 407 N.E.2d 766,
767 (1980) (court permitted claim for legal fees by dissolved firm against estate, noting that dissolved
partnerships go through winding-up period before termination); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704,
365 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1985) (law partnership goes through winding-up period between dissolution
and termination); Gerber v. Weinstock, 102 Dauphin Cty. 50, 55 (1980) (firm of Handler, Gerber &
Weinstock went through winding-up period after dissolution); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 30, 6
U.L.A. 367 (1914).
127. See, e.g., Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 I1. App. 3d 77, 81, 485 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1985) (departing
partner had duty to wind up uncompleted partnership obligations); Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md. App.
499, 506-07, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (1981) (same); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816,
820 (1985) (same); Platt v. Henderson, 227 Or. 212, 231-32, 361 P.2d 73, 82 (1961) (same); UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 36(1), 6 U.L.A. 436 (1914) (dissolution of partnership does not terminate existing liability).
128. Fox v. Abrams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 610, 616-17, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265-66 (1985) ("no
compensation" rule applied to professional corporation as well as partnership, and because agreement was silent, fees in ongoing cases should be divided on basis of Jewel v. Boxer); Jewel v. Boxer,
156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 178-79, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1984) (in absence of agreement, fees in cases
ongoing at time of dissolution to be shared according to attorneys' rights to fees in former partnership); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 216-20, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 18992 (1983) (because attorney breached fiduciary duty by failing to complete ongoing antitrust case for
partnership, fees belonged to partnership); Sheradsky v. Moore, 389 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. App.
1980) (law partner in dissolution owes duty to partners to conclude firm business without extra
compensation, including overhead), petitionfor appeal denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981); Frates v.
Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 81 (Fla. App. 1964) (adopting rule that retention of law firm obligates every
member to fulfill contract and that upon dissolution, each partner is obligated to complete that
obligation without extra-compensation); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 IM.App. 3d 77, 82-83, 485 N.E.2d
413, 417 (1985) (court adopted "no compensation rule" for contingency fee cases completed after
firm dissolution); Berkson v. Berryman, 62 Md. App. 79, 93-94, 488 A.2d 504, 511-12 (in absence of
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partnership law could be challenged by relying on the "indirect" restrictive covenant argument. 129 The argument is that if an agreement that imposes a financial penalty on lawyers for continuing to represent "firm" clients is improper, a
rule of law that accomplishes the same thing also should be improper. Although

this "no compensation" partnership principle theoretically could be challenged
on the ground that it is tantamount to a restrictive covenant, the courts generally have not been troubled by this point. 130 One reason may be that the "no
compensation" principle is evenly balanced, requiring all partners to share, after
a breakup, fees from ongoing matters, whereas a restrictive covenant is more
likely to cover fees for future matters or to impose a burden only on the departing party.131
contract, partners were not entitled to extra compensation for work done during "winding up" of
partnership), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985); Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md. App. 499,
507, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (1981) (court adopted "no compensation" rule, finding attorneys had duty to
share fees according to usual percentages); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820
(1985) (applying Uniform PartnershipAct, held that partner was not entitled to additional compensation for work performed on contingency cases following dissolution); Platt v. Henderson, 227 Or.
212, 233-39, 361 P.2d 73, 83-85 (1961) (partner was not entitled to any special compensation for
"winding up" work). But see Cofer v. Hearne, 459 S.W.2d 877, 880 (rex. 1970) (departing partner
is entitled to keep compensation for work done after his departure on cases that originally were firm
cases; majority rule rejected as unconscionable and inequitable). See also Dinkes, Mandel, Dinkes &
Morelli v. Ioannou, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1987, at 11, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (court referred case to
referee to determine if firm and associate had agreement; if not then plaintiff firm should receive
reasonable value for legal services for work done prior to time defendant-associate took over certain
cases); McLean v. Michaelowsky, 117 Misc. 2d 699, 701, 458 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(after associate departed and took over certain cases, firm was entitled to quantum meruit recovery).
129. See Fox v. Abrams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 610, 616, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (1985) (apparently
without citing DR 2-108, attorneys argued that "no compensation" rule "will discourage continued
representation of clients by the attorney of their choice"; court rejects argument); Jewel v. Boxer,
156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 179, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1984) (same). Butsee Cofer v. Hearne, 459 S.W.2d
877, 880 (rex. App. 1970) (rejecting "no compensation" rule because it would be unconscionable
and inequitable). Without relying on DR 2-108 or Rule 5.6, several commentators also have argued
against this rule. See, eg., Comment, Barefoot Shoemaker" An Uncompromising Approach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 509 (1987); Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1597 (1985). See also Champion v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 777, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 624 (1988) (court found unenforceable agreement giving partner only partnership share in
cases handled after withdrawal because client was effectively precluded from choice of counsel and
resulting fee to firm was unconscionable).
130. Compare cases and opinions cited supra note 109 with Heywood v. Sooy, 45 Cal. App. 2d
423, 425, 114 P.2d 361, 362 (1941) (adopted "no compensation" rule; no mention of ethics); Kreutzer v. Wallace, 342 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) ("no compensation" rule used for ongoing
cases; no discussion of ethics issues), cert denied, 353 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1977); Frates v. Nichols, 167
So. 2d 77, 81-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (in pre-Code case, court adopted common law "no
compensation" rule without any discussion of ethics issues; fee division applied to ongoing cases)
and Berkson v. Berryman, 62 Md. App. 79, 488 A.2d 504 ("no compensation" rule applies for
ongoing matters; no discussion of ethics issue) cert denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985) and
Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 704, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1985) (same); Platt v. Henderson, 227 Or.
212, 237, 361 P.2d 73, 85 (1961) (adopted "no compensation" rule; no mention of ethics).
131. Compare the "no compensation" cases cited supra note 128 with the cases and ethics opinion cited supra note 110, which find client-based financial penalty agreements to be improper restrictive covenants. The agreements in the cases cited supra note 110 found to be restrictive covenants
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The second situation in which an "indirect" restrictive covenant argument
could be offered is where a law firm seeks a preliminary injunction against the
departing lawyers to prevent them from contacting or representing clients of the
old firm. In an attempt to defeat the injunction, lawyers have argued that an
injunction is improper because it is equivalent to a restrictive covenant. 1 32 This
133
argument has met with limited success.
In sum, it is clear that some lawyers still are using employment, shareholder, or partnership agreements that absolutely forbid competition or that impose a financial penalty for doing so. It is also clear that some lawyers, at least,
will try to enforce such restrictive covenants during a law firm breakup. These
actions are inadvisable. With very few exceptions, such agreements consistently
have been found unethical and probably are unenforceable.
It is also clear that during breakup disputes some lawyers have cited DR 2108 and Rule 5.6 in situations where there is no agreement. They rely on these
ethical principles to support their position on other issues such as fee allocation
and injunctions against client contact. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss how ethics principles and other legal principles will be reconciled in particular situations if they conflict.' 34 It should be noted, though, that these situations probably will only increase, and that it is difficult to predict how these
135
issues will be resolved in the courts.
appear to penalize only the departing lawyer or to impose a client-based financial penalty on the
lawyers with respect to new matters, rather than ongoing matters, that the lawyers are handling for
former "firm" clients.
In the future, the courts might not only reject this "indirect" restrictive covenant argument,
discussed supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text, but also might conclude that a client-based
financial penalty is not a restrictive covenant if it applies equally to both sides of the dispute and is
limited to fees for ongoing cases. The rationale would be that parties should be able to enter into an
agreement that is equivalent to the rule of law the court will impose in the absence of an agreement.
132. See, e.g., Ladas & Parry v. Abelman, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1980, at 13, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(court denied injunction that sought to enjoin defendants from soliciting or accepting business from
firm clients, relying on DR 2-108 and principle that no restriction may be placed upon lawyer's right
to practice law and that injunction should only be used to protect clients from such duress as would
interfere with their decision-making).
133. Compare Ladas & Parry, id with Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 InI. App. 3d 512, 521,
488 N.E.2d 1062, 1069 (1986) (court preliminarily enjoined associates from future contact with firm
clients without mentioning ethics issue).
134. See supra note 38.
135. The unpredictability of the courts is demonstrated by Champion v. Superior Court, 201
Cal. App. 3d 777, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1988). Because of its effect on a client's choice of counsel, the
court found unenforceable a contract which said that
all clients and client files remain the property of the Partnership and any fees realized in
any such case shall remain the property and asset of the Partnership. The withdrawing
partner shall be entitled to that percentage of the fees equal to his percentage in the Partnership at the time of departure.
Id. at 782, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 626. The court interpreted the contract to mean that fees from an
ongoing case the departing attorney took with him had to be shared, but not fees from all ongoing
cases since the partnership did not dissolve, hId Because the policy concerns are similar to those
used to challenge the "no compensation" principle, and had been previously rejected, one might
have expected this California court to enforce the contract. Instead, however, this court invalidated
the contract provision and permitted the attorney to retain fees from these cases.
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3. Fees
Both the Code and the Rules regulate the maximum fees that a lawyer may
charge the client. 136 Assuming that lawyers do not change their fee agreement
with the client and that the agreement was proper to begin with, these provisions
should not prove particularly troublesome when law firms break up. However,
both the Model Code and Model Rules have limitations on fee splitting 137 that
could present a problem during a breakup. Unfortunately, whether these provisions apply during a breakup presents difficult statutory construction issues.
Neither the Code nor the Rules regulates the manner in which lawyers
within a firm divide a fee provided the amount of the total fee is reasonable.
136. See MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5 (lawyer's fee must be "reasonable"); MODEL
CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-106 (lawyer prohibited from charging "illegal" or "clearly excessive"
fee). The Pennsylvania version of the Model Rule is different in that it prohibits an "illegal" or
"clearly excessive" fee, but defines such a fee using the factors the Model Rules use to define a
"reasonable fee." See PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5.
In addition to these regulations regarding maximum fees, various bar associations have, during
the past, issued guidelines regarding minimum fees. The Supreme Court held that these minimum
fee schedules violate the antitrust laws. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
(mandatory minimum fee schedule published by county bar association and enforced by state bar
violated Sherman Antitrust Act).
137. DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a
partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a
division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility
assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for
all legal services they rendered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate
pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-107. Subsection (e) of Rule 1.5 provides:
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if.
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by
written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the
lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5(e). The Pennsylvania version of the Model Rule is significantly different in that subsection (e) is a complete new version of the ABA subsection (e). The
Pennsylvania version of subsection (e) deletes the requirement that the fee division be in proportion
to the services performed or that the attorney has agreed in writing to assume joint responsibility for
the case:
(e) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not in the
same firm unless:
(1) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers
involved, and
(2) the total fee of the lawyers is not illegal or clearly excessive for all legal services
they rendered the client.
PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.5(e).
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However, both the Code and the Rules regulate the manner in which lawyers
from different firms may split a fee. Both the Code and the Rules permit interfirm fee division, but only if the client is advised, the total fee is not excessive,
and other conditions are met.' 38 Disciplinary Rule 2-107 of the Model Code
requires the division to be made in proportion to the services performed and the
responsibility assumed by each lawyer.139 The Model Rules require, at a minimum, that all lawyers dividing the fee assume joint responsibility for the representation. 140 Thus, when a firm and its departing lawyers divide fees for legal
work performed after the breakup, the threshold issue from an ethics perspective
is whether such division should be regarded as a regulated interfirm division or
an unregulated intrafirm division.
Under the Model Code, even if a division of fees is between different law
firms, the attorney may not have to comply with the requirements of the disciplinary rule: "This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement." 14 ' Thus,
assuming there was an interfirm fee division under the Code, the second issue
will be whether the fee division was made pursuant to a "separation agreement."
The Model Rules' fee splitting provision, Rule 1.5(e), does not contain a
comparable exception for separation or retirement agreements. 1 42 The comment
to Rule 1.5 does not explain this omission. Furthermore, this issue never arose
during the debates before the ABA House of Delegates. 143 Hence, it is difficult
to tell if this was an inadvertent oversight by the drafters or a deliberate omission. 144 Furthermore, even if it were a deliberate omission, it is unclear whether
this provision was omitted because the drafters considered such agreements to
138. See supra note 137.
139. See id. There has been some disagreement regarding what DR 2-107(AX2) means in requiring attorneys to divide a fee "in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed
by each." MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-107(A)(2). See generally ABA, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 58 (1984) (and cases cited therein); AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 111-13 (1979) (ethics opinions regarding DR 2-107); 1 G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 86 (Supp. 1987) (different
interpretations of DR 2-107); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 9.2, at 512 (same).
140. See supra note 137. Unlike the Model Code, then, the Model Rules permit "referral fees"
provided the referring attorney assumes in writing joint responsibility for the representation and
complies with the other requirements. The Model Code was concerned about "brokering," Vogelhut
v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 190, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986), but the Model Rules permit a referral fee
because it "facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could
serve the client as well." MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5 comment.
141. MODEL CODE, supra note 35, DR 2-107(B); see supra note 137 for the text of DR 2107(B).
142. See MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5(e); supra note 137 for the text of Rule 1.5(e).
143. LEGisLATivE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES, supra note 29, at 39-47.
144. Cf. 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 84-86.1 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (no reference made in treatise to omission of "separation agreement" exception from Rule 1.5(e)). The drafters may have intentionally omitted the exception because they thought such agreements were
"intrafirm" agreements, and no exception was needed to an interfirm fee splitting rule. Alternatively, the omission may have been inadvertent. It may be that the drafters would have included
such an exception if aware of its omission. A third possibility is that the drafters considered such
agreements to be interfirm divisions, but felt an exception was inappropriate and deliberately omitted
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be unregulated intrafirm agreements or because they wished to delete the interfirm separation agreement exception. Thus, under the Model Rules, assuming there was an interfirm division, additional issues are whether a separation
agreement exception should be read into the Rule and, if so, whether the agreement in question satisfies that exception.
The cases do not provide a clear answer to these statutory construction
issues. To begin with, research has not revealed any disciplinary cases which
raise the issue of whether lawyers violate Disciplinary Rule 2-i07 or Rule 1.5(e)
by splitting fees following a breakup. The issue of fee splitting has been raised in
some, but not all, of the civil cases among lawyers regarding proper allocation of
fees following a breakup. 14 5 These fee allocation cases suggest different ways to
it. In this case, however, one might expect the drafters to note the Rules' departure from the Model
Code.
145. Sem eg., Champion v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 777, 782, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626
(1988) (contract fee provision that only gave partnership interest in ongoing cases to departing partner held unconscionable); Fox v. Abrams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 610, 613-17, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 263-66
(1985) (after dissolution, court divided fees from ongoing cases of professional corporation in accord
with Jewel v. Boxer formula, finding buy-sell agreement did not completely address issue; no discussion of ethics issues); Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1984) (in absence of
agreement, court divided fees in ongoing cases in proportion to partnership interest; no discussion of
ethics issues); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180
(1983) (court reinstated claim for breach of fiduciary duties based on failure of departing partners to
handle ongoing case on behalf of firm; no discussion of ethics issue); Heywood v. Sooy, 45 Cal. App.
2d 423, 425, 114 P.2d 361, 362 (1941) (in absence of agreement, court adopted "no compensation"
rule; no mention of ethics); Sheradsky v. Moore, 389 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. App. 1980) (in absence of
specific agreement, court awarded fees in ongoing cases in accord with partnership interests; no
mention of ethics issues), petitionfor appeal denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981); Kreutzer v. Wallace, 342 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (no additional compensation for completing case after
dissolution of partnership; no discussion of ethics issues), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1977);
Frates v. Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 81-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (in pre-Code case, and in absence
of agreement, court adopts common law "no compensation" rule without any discussion of ethics
issues; fee division applied to ongoing cases); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 485 N.E.2d 413
(1985) (in absence of agreement, court divided fees from ongoing cases in accordance with partnership interests; court briefly considered and rejected argument based on DR 2-107); Saltzberg v. Fishman, 123 Ill. App. 3d 477, 462 N.E.2d 901 (1984) (court divided fees between firm and associate in
accordance with consent decree; court briefly considered and rejected argument based on DR 2-107);
Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 417 N.E.2d 764 (1981) (court refused to enforce employment
agreement between firm and lawyer specifying that fees from certain clients belonged to lawyer;
court found agreement violated DR 2-107); Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 517 A.2d 1092 (1986)

(court enforced agreement between discharged lawyer and successor giving discharged lawyer 25%
interest in case; court rejected argument based on DR 2-107); Berkson v. Berryman, 62 Md. App.
79, 89, 488 A.2d 504, 511 (in absence of agreement, court affirmed "no compensation" rule for
ongoing matters; no discussion of ethics issue), cert denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985);
Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md. App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 587-88 (1981) (in absence of agreement, court
refused to award departing partners extra fees for working on ongoing cases, allocating such fees on
basis of partnership percentages; no mention made of ethical fee division rule); Smith v. Daub, 219
Neb. 698, 705, 365 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1985) (in absence of agreement, court affirmed "no compensation" rule for ongoing matters; no discussion of ethics issue); Nishman v. DeMarco, 62 N.Y.2d 926,
927, 468 N.E.2d 23, 24, 479 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (1984) (court dismissed without explanation argument that fee agreement violated DR 2-107); Levy v. Kreindler, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1987, at 11, col. 1
(court rejected argument that partnership agreement violated DR 2-107 and enforced agreement
that allowed senior partner to allocate fees); In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480

1988]

LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

1085

define 'regulated interfirm fee divisions and the separation agreement exception.
One definition of an "interfirm" fee division is a division between lawyers
who, as a practicalmatter, are in different firms at the time the division is made.
This is the likely definition implicitly used in In re Silverberg.146 In Silverberg,
the agreement said that if the departing lawyer thereafter represented clients of

his former partner, he had to give his former partner eighty percent of the net

billings for a period of eighteen months. 147 The court found this agreement
violated DR 2-107 and was unenforceable. 148 To find a violation of DR 2-107,
the court must have concluded that the agreement involved an interfirm division. The court could have reached this conclusion if it implicitly used the first
definition; the division of fees in this case was between lawyers who, as a practical matter, were practicing in different firms at the time the division was made.
A second definition of interfirm fee division would again be based on the
time a division of fees is made, but would define "law firm" in a theoretical,
rather than a practical sense. Under this definition, a division of fees for ongoing
matters would not involve an interfirm division since a partnership is not terminated until all partnership business is wound up. Thus, theoretically, if not
practically, the division involves the same partnership or firm, not different
firms.
This second definition appears to be the one used in two Illinois cases,
Saltzberg v. Fishman 149 and Ellerby v. Spiezer.150 These courts concluded that
it would not be illegal1 5 ' or improper under DR 2-107152 for lawyers who for(1980) (court refused to enforce agreement giving each partner 80% of net billings from other partner's "clients"; court found agreement violated DR 2-107 as well as DR 2-108); McLean v.
Michaelowsky, 117 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 458 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (in absence of
agreement, court uses a "reasonable value of work" rule to apportion fee between a firm and former
associate in contingency case associate handled while at firm and later on her own; no mention made
of ethical fee division rule); Platt v. Henderson, 227 Or. 212, 241, 361 P.2d 73, 85 (1961) (in absence
of agreement, court adopted no compensation rule; no mention of ethics); Cofer v. Hearne, 459
S.W.2d 877, 881 (rex. 1970) (without mentioning DR 2-107, court rejected majority "no compensation" rule and gave departing partner extra compensation for work on "ongoing cases"); Baron v.
Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Baab, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 457, 461-62 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (affirmed contract between departing associate and firm agreeing to two-third/one-third split of fees in ongoing
contingency fee cases; court found agreement did not violate DR 2-107 because it was permissible to
pay former associate pursuant to agreement reached after departure); Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash.
App. 304, 556 P.2d 233 (1976) (court enforced "Business Agreement," finding agreement in nature
of partnership or employment agreement so that there was no violation of DR 2-107). See also Levi
v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 1983) (disciplinary Complaint Tribunal considered
fraud allegedly occurring on execution of fee allocation agreement; no suggestion that the agreement
to split fees in ongoing cases two-third/one-third violated fee splitting provisions).
146. 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980). See also Fraser v. Bogucki, 203 Cal. App. 3d
604, 610, 250 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1988) (suit for "misappropriation of [a] law firm enterprise" treated
as suit for goodwill; as such, violates fee division rule).
147. Id at 818, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
148. Id
149. 123 Ill. App. 3d 447, 462 N.E.2d 901 (1984).
150. 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 485 N.E.2d 413 (1985).
151. Id at 81, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
152. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 454-55, 462 N.E.2d at 907.
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merly practiced together in a firm to thereafter divide fees from cases ongoing at
the time of dissolution. The Ellerby court said,
[The fee division] does not result in improper fee splitting as suggested
by Spiezer, since as we already noted the partnership continues until
the winding up of the partnership affairs has been completed and it is
1 53
perfectly proper for law partners to split fees among themselves.
The Saltzberg court concluded the fee division was not illegal because "[i]t was
simply perpetuating defendant's employment with the firm for the limited purpose of disposing of cases on the group B list."" 4 This second definition also
may be the one contemplated by those courts adopting the "no compensation"
rule referred to earlier;1 55 under this definition, the fee divisions among former
partners for ongoing cases would be unregulated intrafirm divisions.
Because the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit interfirm fee divisions, rather than interfirm fee division agreements,1 56 the first and second definitions examine the lawyers' relationship at the time the fee division occurs.
These two definitions differ, however, in the way they analyze the lawyers' relationship. The approach used in the first two definitions is not the only possibility, however. Notwithstanding the statutory language, one might argue that the
Model Code and the Model Rules necessarily prohibit interfirm fee division
agreements. Then, one could analyze the lawyers' relationship as of the time the
agreement is made, rather than the time the division is made.
In most instances, this third definition should produce the same results as
the second. Like the second definition, this third definition would not regulate a
prebreakup agreement by partners to divide fees for work performed after the
breakup, for cases ongoing at the time of the breakup. This third definition, like
definition two, also could explain the "no compensation" cases.' 57 Definition
three would not prohibit the courts from dividing fees among ex-partners pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Act because there is no fee division agreement
among the parties in this situation.
This third definition could produce a different result in at least two situations. If the fee division agreement is reached after the lawyers have formed new
firms, the fee division would not be permissible under this definition or definition
one, but would be permissible under the second definition. Additionally, unlike
the first two definitions, this third definition would permit an agreement that
divides fees not only for matters that were ongoing at the time of the breakup,
but also for new matters handled for certain clients.15 8
153. 138 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
154. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 454-55, 462 N.E.2d at 907.
155. See cases cited supra note 145.
156. See supra note 137.
157. See cases cited supra note 145.
158. Under this third definition, the agreement in In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427
N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980) would be proper. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this agreement, which purported to divide fees for new matters, as well as ongoing matters.

Cf. ethics opinions cited infra note 182 (opining that fee division agreements concerning new matters
are improper).
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A fourth definition of "interfirm" fee division is suggested by Vogelhut v.
Kandel.159 This definition does not require a choice between a practical or a
theoretical definition of "law firm;" nor does it require a choice between the time
of division or an agreement to evaluate whether different firms are involved.
Instead, the Vogelhut court concluded that DR 2-107 is limited to those situations involving concurrent representation of a client by two lawyers. 16° Thus,
this definition would not apply to a division of fees between the firm that initially
represented a client and the lawyers who represented the client after the
breakup.
In Vogelhut a discharged lawyer sued his successor for breach of contract
for twenty-five percent of the fee.161 The successor argued that the agreement
violated DR 2-107 and thus was unenforceable.162 The court held that DR 2107 did not apply because "DR 2-107 contemplates concurrent representation of
63
a client by more than one attorney."
None of these four definitions is ideal. The second, third and fourth definitions1 64 have the advantage of being simple to apply in the breakup situationsthey would exempt from regulation postbreakup fee divisions for ongoing
cases.1 65 Furthermore, because they exempt from regulation most postbreakup
fee divisions, one need not ever resolve the difficult issues of the meaning of the
separation agreement exception in the Code or whether such an exception
should be read into the Rules.
Although simplicity often is desirable, it should not be paramount. This
author submits that the preferable interpretation is the first 166 because, for several reasons, it comports most closely with the plain meaning of the statutes, and
it satisfies the policy concerns behind these principles.167 First, it is likely that
most people would interpret the statutory language in a practical, rather than a
159. 308 Md. 183, 517 A.2d 1092 (1986).
160. Id. at 190, 517 A.2d at 1096.
161. Id at 186, 517 A.2d at 1094.
162. Id at 188, 517 A.2d at 1095.
163. Id at 189, 517 A.2d at 1096.
164. The second definition states that an interfirm division is one between lawyers who, as a
theoretical matter, are not still practicing together in the same firm. The third definition states that
an interfirm division is one between lawyers who were not practicing together at the time of the fee
division agreement. The fourth definition states that an interfirm fee division is one between lawyers
who concurrently are representing a client. See supra notes 149-53, 158-59 and accompanying text.
165. The second definition also has the advantage of being consistent with the law firm-associate fee allocation cases. In those cases, the firm does not have an ongoing interest in the fees, but has
been limited to quantum meruit recovery. These cases are consistent with the second definition
because, in the absence of a partnership, there is not even, theoretically, the same firm dividing fees.
See, eg., Dinkes, Mandel, Dinkes & Morelli v. Ioannou, cited in N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1987, at 11, col. 3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (directing referee to determine if there was agreement between firm and associate
and, if not, to award fees based on the "reasonable value of legal services rendered" by firm in cases
now handled by associate); McLean v. Michaelowsky, 117 Misc. 2d 699, 704, 458 N.Y.S.2d 1005,
1007 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (same).
166. The first definition describes a regulated interfirm fee division as a division between lawyers who, as a practical matter, are in different firms at the time the division is made. See supra notes
146-48 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
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theoretical, sense. For example, assume that three years after a bitter breakup,
lawyers in the old firm and the new firm are splitting fees from a case that was
accepted one week before the breakup. This division would probably be considered to involve different firms. Even partnership law recognizes that, once there
has been a dissolution, the relationship has changed, even though the partnership is not yet terminated and the partners have a duty to wind up partnership
business. 168 Second, by speaking of an improper division rather than an improper agreement, the statutory language suggests that "different firms" should
be measured as of the time of the division, rather than the time of any agreement. 169 Finally, there is no reference in the language to the concurrent repre170
sentation requirement imposed by Vogelhut.
Policy concerns also support this first definition. Disciplinary Rule 2-107
was formulated to prohibit brokering of clients, to protect a client from clandestine payment and employment, and to prevent aggrandizement of fees. 1 71 While
Rule 1.5 now permits referral fees, i.e., "brokering," provided the referring attorney retains responsibility, the rule still requires a client to be advised of any
fee division and requires the total fee to be reasonable. 172 Thus, it appears that
the Rules still intend to regulate fee division to protect a client from clandestine
payment and employment and to prevent aggrandizement of fees. In a breakup
situation, the old and the new firms probably will not have the type of relationship that creates a large risk of clandestine employment. There is a risk, however, of aggrandizement of fees. A lawyer in the situation of Silverberg, who
received twenty cents for every one dollar of net billings, might be tempted to
pad his bill. 173 This was the concern of the California appellate court in Champion v. Superior Court,174 which found that the fee would be unconscionable if
the departing attorney handling the case received less than three percent of the
fees generated by his work. 17 5 In this kind of situation, clients will be better
protected if they are advised of the division of fees between the old and the new
168. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 137.
170. Compare supra note 137 with Vogelhut, 308 Md. 183, 189, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986).
One could argue that a "concurrent representation" requirement is implicit in DR 2-107 and Rule
1.5(e). The rationale would be that in requiring attorneys to assume joint responsibility for a case or
to divide fees in proportion to services and responsibility, these ethical regulations contemplate concurrent representation. Furthermore, when the comment explains the purpose of the rule by saying
it "facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter," MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule
1.5 comment, it is contemplating concurrent representation. The "concurrent representation" interpretation, however, ignores the fact that both the Code and the Rules require disclosure and consent,
that some of the purposes of fee splitting regulations are to prohibit clandestine payment and aggrandizement of fees, Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. at 189, 517 A.2d at 1096, and that these evils can
occur when there is successive representation as well as concurrent representation.
171. See eg., Krajewski v. Klawon, 84 Mich. App. 532., 537, 270 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1978) (goals
of DR 2-107); Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 190, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986) (same).
172. See supra note 137.
173. See In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 818, 417 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (1980).
174. 201 Cal. App. 3d 777, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1988).
175. Id
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firms so that they can evaluate the risks of such representation and scrutinize
carefully their bills and representation.
In sum, both the statutory language and the policies of these ethical regulations probably are satisfied by a definition of interfirm fee division that includes
successive representation, that defines law firms in a practical rather than a theoretical sense, and that determines firm affiliation as of the time of the fee division
itself, rather than the time of any fee division agreement.
If this definition of interfirm fee division is accepted, a fee division following
a breakup would trigger the requirements of Disciplinary Rule 2-107 and Rule
1.5(e). Because there is no exception to Rule 1.5(e), under the Rules, resolution
of the fee splitting issue becomes simple. 176 Attorneys who divide fees after a
breakup will be required to notify the client of the division, ensure that the total
fee is reasonable, and assume joint responsibility for the representation. 177 The
client is placed on notice of the division and can act accordingly.
Under the Code, however, resolution of the issue is not quite so simple.
Disciplinary Rule 2-107(B) exempts payments made "to a former partner or
associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement." 1 7 8 Thus, under the
Code, fee divisions for ongoing matters could be permitted either because they
are not viewed, in the first instance, as covered by DR 2-107(A), or because they
will be treated as falling within DR 2-107(B)'s separation agreement exception.
Although the vast majority of courts 179 considering the issue have concluded
that fee divisions for cases that were ongoing at the time of the breakup are not
prohibited by DR 2-107, they generally do not explain their reasoning and do
not define the separation agreement exception. 180
The reasoning of the ethics committees also has been sketchy and inconsistent, although they generally concur that fees for ongoing cases may be divided
without violating DR 2-107.181 Generally, they also agree that if a fee division
176. See supra notes 137, 142-44 and accompanying text, which explain that there is no "separation agreement" exception in the Rules. The author submits that such an exception should not be
"read into" the Rules. One can justify the conclusion on statutory construction grounds. See, eg.,

2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 194 (rev. 4th ed. 1984) ("expressio unius est exclusio alterius" rule of statutory construction creates inference that "all omissions
should be understood as exclusions"). Furthermore, the omission of an exception is consistent with
appropriate policies of the fee division provisions. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 137.
178. li
179. Compare cases cited supra in note 145 with Corti v. Fleisher, 931l. App. 3d 517, 519, 417
N.E.2d 764, 767 (1981) (employment agreement stating that "owner of each file... shall be entitled
to all fees received subsequent to the date of termination of this agreement" found invalid under DR
2-107); In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980) (agreement giving each partner
80% of net billings from other partner's "clients" violated DR 2-107 as well as DR 2-108).
180. See cases cited supra note 145.
181. See Dallas Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 86-1 (1986) (Committee condemned agreement regarding new matters, it expressed no opinion regarding ethical implications of fee division
between firm'and former associate with respect to client matters which do not constitute new business); Florida Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 84-1 (1984) (Committee advised associate that issue of proper
fee split between associate and firm in event client hures associate is not ethics issue but matter of
contract); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 610 (1978) (partner-
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concerns new matters, it is a regulated interfirm agreement that does not fall
within the separation agreement exception.18 2 For those cases and ethics opinship agreement requiring withdrawing partners to share firm fees on client files commenced prior to
withdrawal is proper under DR 2-107; it is merely practical provision for sharing fees earned in part
by old firm and in part by withdrawing partner); Iowa State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op.
80-40 (1980) (dissolved partnership agreed that fees from contingent fee cases would be apportioned
based on time worked on files by respective attorneys; Committee opined that there was no specific
rule covering this and subject is one for compromise, settlement or arbitration, or as provided in
partnership agreement); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-59 (1983) (associate
sought advice regarding, inter alia, handling of fees for ongoing matters involving former firm clients; committee said inquiry could only be partially addressed given broad nature of inquiry and fact
it involved legal questions, citing various opinions without applying principles); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-2 (1982) (DR 2-107(B) permits
payment to withdrawing partner over period of years based on anticipated earnings of firm on cases
already in firm at withdrawal); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 76-40 (1976) (issue
of fees due resigning attorney by successor in contingent fee matter is question of law; assuming such
division is made, it must comply with DR 2-107); 0. MAiRu, supra note 90, No. 10642, at 88 (Supp.
1980) (Los Angeles County, Op. 1979-1 (1979)) (division of fees between lawyers must be made in
proportion to services performed). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. C-787 (1964) (relying on Canons, Committee opined that fees collected by associate for
work on former firm cases would belong to firm; in answering inquiry, committee assumed files had
been taken by associate without firm approval); New York County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 596 (1971) (associate cannot divide fees with firm for ongoing matters for cases
referred to firm by associate; such division would violate DR 2-107 because associate performed no
services); opinions cited infra note 182, where many committees opined that agreements dividing
fees for new matters were improper, without any effort to segregate agreements regarding fees in
ongoing cases; cf Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-13 (1988) (where
clients had consented to fee division following breakup, committee considered how firm accounts
should be handled, especially regarding proper signatory). In ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Informal Op. 852 (1965), where an attorney inquired whether Canon 34 requires partners upon
dissolution to pay only that proportion of fees representing work completed, the Committee ambiguously replied,
Except as controlled by Canon 34, that no division of fees for legal services is proper unless
based upon a division of service or responsibility, the division between the two lawyers who
were at one time in partnership but who are not now in partnership is a matter of contract
law to be determined by the partnership agreement and the law as applied thereto.
Id
182. Dallas Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 86-1 (1986) (it would violate DR 2-107 for
firm to enter into "referral fee agreement" with associate which gave firm fees for new business
generated by former clients of firm who retain associate; such agreement did not constitute "referral
fee or forwarding fee" permitted by Texas nor is it permissible "separation agreement" under DR 2107(B) because it is concerned exclusively with new business); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 122 (1983) (even with client consent, Memorandum Agreement requiring departing
partner to pay firm for five years 20% of fees earned from representation of specific client violated
DR 2-107; Committee did not rely on distinction between fees for new matters or ongoing matters or
limit its opinion accordingly); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 65 (1979) (agreement requiring associate to pay firm 40% of net billings if he "performs any legal work for a client of
the firm during a two-year period" violated DR 2-107 and did not fall within DR 2-107(B)'s exception); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 86-16 (1987) (Committee opined
that it would violate DR 2-107 if firm attempts to collect fees from client or associate, after associate's departure, where all legal work was done by departing associate and involved matters associate
did not work on with firm); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 8415 (1985) (employment agreement requiring attorneys departing from professional corporation to
remit, for two years, 25% of all fees collected from entity that was client of corporation at time of
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ions that rely on DR 2-107(B), there has been no significant effort to justify an
interpretation of the term "separation agreement" that exempts fees for ongoing
cases, but not fees for new matters; that is, to explain why the language and
policies of DR 2-107(B) exempt not only fees for work completed before the
breakup, but also fees for some, but not all, legal work done after the
breakup.18 3 Because of the conflicting approaches taken by the courts and ethics committees, their failure to examine and explain the statutory language, and
withdrawal violated DR 2-107; committee did not rely on distinction between fees for new matters
and ongoing matters); New York County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 596
(1971) (associate cannot divide fees with firm for services rendered after associate leaves, even with
respect to clients brought to firm by associate; such division violates DR 2-107); Virginia State Bar
Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 794 (1986) (Committee stated that "to the extent your predecessor firm's agreement requires conduct not consistent with [Virginia's version of DR 2-107], then it
violates that DR"; partnership agreement required partner "who leaves the firm to continue to work
on matters for clients he served prior to the time he left the firm, but to submit all bills for processing
and payment through the predecessor law firm" and give firm one-third of fees).
183. See, e.g., Corti v. Fleisher, 93 IM.App. 3d 517, 531, 417 N.E.2d 764, 775 (1981) (DR 2107(B) did not apply where payments are not tied to particular files and clients are not affected by
relationship because DR 2-107(B) "sanctions payment to a former partner or associate of a law firm
for legal services which contributed to the firm's overall profit"); Nishman v. DeMarco, 62 N.Y.2d
926, 929-30, 468 N.E.2d 23, 24, 479 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (1984) (court cited DR 2-107(B) as support
for its conclusion that fee division for ongoing matters was proper; no explanation of exception);
Levy v. Kreindler, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1987, at 11, col. I (court cited DR 2-107(B) in support of
conclusion that fee division agreement giving senior partner discretion to allocate fees in ongoing
cases was proper, no explanation of exception); Baron v. Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Baab, Inc., 623
S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (fee division agreement between firm and associate was permitted under DR 2-107(B) because it was "during the overall process of his separation from the
firm" and payments in ongoing cases "would ripen into a payment to a former associate pursuant to
the agreement reached on his separation"); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-2 (1982) (agreement to divide fees in ongoing cases was "separation
agreement" under DR 2-107(B); committee analogizes agreement to retirement agreement and does
not address issue of whether fees could be based on new matters); Dallas Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 86-1 (1986) (agreement giving firm 10% of fees on new matters handled by ex-associate
for former firm clients was not "separation agreement;" defining separation agreement as agreement
"between a law firm and its former associate [or partner] concerning litigation which the... attorney and [the] law firm were working on when they were associated"); District of Columbia Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 65 (1979) (agreement requiring payment of 40% of fees attributable to
former firm client was not "separation agreement"). The District of Columbia Legal Ethics Committee stated that a separation agreement is limited to situations
in which an attorney withdraws from a firm with certain amounts due him or her with
respect to work previously preformed or other accrued rights.... It was not the intent of
DR 2-107(B) to exempt from the restrictions of DR 2-107(A) circumstances involving
post-separation payments flowing from the withdrawing attorney to the former firm, relating to work performed by the withdrawing attorney after the date of withdrawal.
District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Committee, Op. 65 (1979); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Op. 610 (1978) (partnership provision was valid "separation agreement"
under DR 2-108(B) "insofar as it provides for division of fees on matters commenced before the
withdrawal date"; committee said it was practical provision for sharing fees and would result in firm
getting more than billed on some cases and less than billed on others). See also Garfield v. Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, 103 A.D.2d 709, 711, 477 N.Y.S.2d 983, 985 (1984) (Asch, J., dissenting)
(agreement to pay retired partner fees on sliding scale according to client billings "does not seem to
satisfy the requirements of a genuine retirement agreement" and should be void as against public
policy).
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the absence of legislative history explaining the policy concerns behind DR 2107(B)'s exception, the fee splitting issue will probably remain difficult and unpredictable in Code jurisdictions.
When deciding how to divide fees after a breakup lawyers should know that
the scope of the fee-splitting provisions is still unresolved. The better and more
conservative approach is for lawyers to treat these fee divisions as regulated,
notify the client of the division, ensure that the total fee is reasonable, and recognize their joint responsibility for the case. Lawyers should also recognize that
even with client consent, the ethics committees may treat fee divisions for new
matters, as opposed to ongoing cases, as unethical. Furthermore, some courts
might rely on these provisions in a civil fee allocation case to invalidate the
parties' contract.184 In short, the fee division statutes raise some of the most
difficult statutory construction issues that can arise during a breakup. Attorneys
should be prepared for uncertainty, inconsistency, and inelegant solutions.
4. Publicity
While the fee division regulations may be the most troublesome from a theoretical perspective, the most troublesome provisions from a practical perspective probably are those regulating the type of contact a lawyer may have with
clients and others.' 8 5 These "publicity" regulations can be divided into essentially two subgroups. First, some provisions specify that a lawyer may not make
false or misleading communications. 18 6 Other provisions regulate when truthful
184. As discussed supra notes 88-145 and accompanying text, the courts generally refuse to
enforce contracts containing unethical restrictive covenants. On the other hand, several courts are
willing to enforce contracts containing illegal fee divisions. See, eg., Phillips v. Joyce, 169 M11.
App.
3d 520, 523 N.E.2d 933, 940 (1988) (contract between two firms jointly handling case did not violate
DR 2-107 because clients consented and there was joint representation; in dicta court observes that it
may be inappropriate for attorney to attempt to use disciplinary rule and illegal contract argument
to avoid his contractual obligation); Watson v. Pietranton, 364 S.E.2d 812, 815 (W. Va. 1987) (fee
splitting agreement violated DR 2-107, but firm could not raise that violation as bar to payment); see
also Foote v. Shapiro, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 574, 577-81 (1978) (court upheld contract between lawyers
that violated DR 2-107, reasoning that DR 2-107 was not legislative enactment or statement of
positive law) (citing also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 870 (1965)) (attorney
should not set up unethical conduct as defense)). The reason for this difference may be that restrictive covenants are viewed as more harmful to the client, especially if such contract suits are brought
before representation is underway rather than after it is conducted. In any event, with respect to the
fee division cases, it arguably is more desirable to reject a DR 2-107 defense in a contract case on the
ground that the lawyers should not be able to avoid their obligations by relying on the illegality
rather than on the ground that there is no DR 2-107 violation. The latter reasoning leaves the client
without protection whereas the former reasoning only leaves the lawyer without protection.
185. See infra notes 186-224 and accompanying text for a discussion of publicity regulations.
186. See MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-101(A), DR 2-102(B)-(C); MODEL RULES, supra
note 35, Rules 7.1, 7.5. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A) provides:
Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partners, associate or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-101. Model Rule 7.1 provides:
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communications may be made, and in what manner.18 7
Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve,
or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison
can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 7.1.
Both the Code and the Rules also require that a firm must be truthful with respect to firm
names. Rule 7.5, for example, provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation
that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does
not imply a connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal
services organization and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.
Id Rule 7.5.
Model Code DR 2-102 provides:
(B) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is
misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm
name containing names other than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except
that the name of a professional corporation or professional association may contain "P.C."
or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the nature of the organization, and if otherwise
lawful a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its name the name or names of one or
more deceased or retired members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line
of succession. A lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative post or office shall not permit his name to remain in the name of a law firm or to be
used in professional notices of the firm during any significant period in which he is not
actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm, and during such period other
members of the firm shall not use his name in the firm name or in professional notices of
the firm.
(C) A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more
other lawyers or professional corporations unless they are in fact partners.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-102(B)-(C).
The Pennsylvania version of Rule 7.1 of the Model Rule is identical to the ABA version. See
PA. R. PROF. COtNucT 7.1. However, the Pennsylvania version of Rule 7.5 varies slightly from the
ABA version in adding the following to Rule 7.5(a): "If otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or
continue to include in, its name, the name or names of one or more deceased or retired members of
the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession." Id Rule 7.5(a). Another
difference is that the Pennsylvania version of subsection (d) of Rule 7.5 is stated in the negative
rather than the positive. Id Rule 7.5(d).
187. Se e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-101, DR 2-102, DR 2-103. Because these
Model Code provisions are very lengthy, and many aspects of them have been found unconstitutional, see infra note 207, they are not reprinted here.
In addition to Model Rule 7.1, see supra note 186 for text, the relevant Model Rules provisions
are Rules 7.2 and 7.3:
RULE 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through
public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical,
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The first subgroup is the easier one. Both the Model Code and the Model
Rules prohibit a lawyer from making false or misleading communications about
the lawyer or the lawyer's services. 188 Although these provisions should be easy
to comply with, some lawyers have alleged violations of these provisions during
law firm breakups. In Koeppel v. Schroder,18 9 for example, a law firm sued to
enjoin the departing lawyers from soliciting clients represented by the former
outdoor, radio or television, or through written communication not involving solicitation
-as defined in Rule 7.3.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept
for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was

used.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name of at least
one lawyer responsible for its content.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 7.2.
RULE.7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person, or
otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or
other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not
include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not
known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but
who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
Ia Rule 7.3.
The "targeted directed mail" prohibition in Rule 7.3 has been found unconstitutional. Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988). See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Shapero. The Pennsylvania version of Rule 7.2(a) is slightly different. It reads:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through
public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical,
outdoor, radio or television, or through written communications not within the purview of
Rule 7.3.
PA, R. PROF. CONDUCT 7.2.
The Pennsylvania version of Rule 7.3 is completely re-written:
(a) A lawyer shall not solicit in-person or by intermediary professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant move for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
The term "solicit" includes contact in person or by telephone, but, subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and Rule 7.3(b), does not include written communications,
which may include targeted, direct mail advertisements.
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a prospective client
for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or
mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive communications
from the lawyer; or
(3) the communication involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 7.3.
188. See MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 7.1. See
also PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 7.1 (identical to Model Rule 7.1). See supra note 187 for the relevant
text of these provisions.
189. 122 A.D.2d 780, 505 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1986).
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firm. 190 One of the bases the firm cited for the injunction was that the departing
lawyers had "falsely represented that the Koeppel firm had split up and implied
that it was no longer in a position to service and protect its clients' interests."' 191
Although the trial court granted the injunction, the appellate court reversed,
finding the lawyers had a right to solicit the former clients and no evidence of
fraudulent representations. 192 Conversely, in Preiserv. Druckman, 193 it was the
departing lawyer who alleged in his complaint that the old firm misled the public
by continuing to use his name. 194 And in Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 19 5 a
departing associate allegedly induced a client to sign a contingent fee contract by
representing that he was associated with his former firm. 196 Thus, even when it
is permissible and appropriate for a lawyer to make statements to clients of the
old firm,197 the lawyer must be careful that such statements are neither false nor
misleading.
Although there have been charges that certain communications during a
breakup were false or misleading, the more recurrent issue has been determining
what statements by lawyers involved in a breakup, if any, the ethics regulations
permit. 19 The issue most frequently raised is what contact the departing lawyer
may have with clients of the firm. There are over two dozen ethics opinions on
this issue. 199 Furthermore, the issue also arises indirectly in breakup cases, such
190. lId at 780, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 667-68.
191. Fox, 4 Lawyers Who Left

.LFirm Barredfrom Seeking Its Clients, supranote 1, at 1, col.

3 (citing portions of complaint and trial court opinion).
192. 122 A.D.2d at 781, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 669. See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the constitutionality of client solicitation.
193. No. CA 2187-0092 (S.D.W. Va. filed Jan. 15, 1987), cited in Oder, supra note 1,at 32, col.
1.
194. Oder, supra note 1, at 32 (quoting Complaint, Preiser v. Druckman, No. CA 2187-0092
(S.D.W. Va. filed Jan. 15, 1987)); see also Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1966) (plaintiff-attorney who left firm enjoined from using firm name because such use would be
misleading); Iowa State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 81-25 (1981)
(firm name may not include the name of former partner unless retired or deceased); Massachusetts
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-5 (1981) (it would be deceptive for law firm to continue using in
firm name, lawyer who left firm to join another firm in same city); Cf In re Weiss, Healey & Rea,
109 N.J. 246, 254, 536 A.2d 266, 268-69 (1988) (court held misleading "firm" name of lawyers
employed by insurer).
195. 140 II. App. 3d 512, 488 N.E.2d 1062 (1986).
196. Id. at 515, 488 N.E.2d at 1065.
197. See infra notes 198-224 and accompanying text for a discussion of when truthful communications are permitted.
198. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of permissible and impermissible communications with former clients.
199. See, eg., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1466
(1981) (prior Committee advice in Informal Op. 1457 would be same if lawyer were associate rather
than partner, distinguishing Adler Barish); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1457 (1980) (mailing letter to persons with whom attorney had active lawyer-client
relationship would be proper under Model Code); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 910 (1966) (withdrawing partner may send announcement to firm clients with
whom he had personal contact advising them without elaboration of change and thereafter represent
such clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 787 (1964) (act
of withdrawing lawyer telling clients he would be practicing elsewhere and would like to continue
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as in the context of an injunction hearing or a tort action for interference with
2 oo
contract.
doing work for them would violate Canons of Professional Ethics); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 681 (1963) (lawyer may send announcements of his withdrawal only to his clients, not to firm clients); Alabama State Bar General Counsel, Op. 82-689
(1982) (withdrawing lawyer may send letter to clients personally served, provided that part of letter
offering to serve clients was deleted); State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1985-86 (upon withdrawal from firm or dissolution, attorneys
must maintain balance between proper notice under Rule 2-111 and proscription against client solicitation contained in Rule 2-101; it is best for firm and departing attorneys to send joint notice, if
possible); Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 83-2 (in view of In re
R.J.M., 445 U.S. 191 (1982), DR 2-102 and DR 2-103 should be interpreted to permit withdrawing
attorney to send written communication to present and former clients of law firm); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181 (harmonized District of Columbia Bar opinions 97, 77,
and 65, finding no restrictive covenant is created by limitation on lawyer's right to solicit clients
provided lawyer can send written announcements); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Op. 97 (ethical to restrict associate's right to directly solicit clients provided firm preserves associate's right to mail announcement); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 77 (employment agreement limiting associate's right to solicit clients upon withdrawal was ethical because
associate could send printed announcement); Florida Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 84-1
(1984) (associate may inform client that he is no longer member of firm, but may not solicit response
from client regarding disposition of client's files); Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 108
(1981) (associate may notify clients of departure); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Responsibility, Op. 86-16 (1987) (associate, as well as firm, may contact clients whom associate
personally represented regarding departure and clients' right to select representation); Illinois State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 84-13 (1985) (same); Iowa State Bar Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op. 80-40 (1980) (upon dissolution clients can be notified by
mail and given choice of attorney); Kansas Bar Ass'n Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 82-18 (1982)
(withdrawing attorney may send announcements only to those clients personally handled or that had
asked for him); Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 317 (1987) (attorney can announce withdrawal by telephone or mail to those clients personally represented and advise them of right to select
attorney); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-59 (1983) (attorney may contact only
clients personally represented, not firm clients generally); State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 681 (1981) (attorney can notify clients of his withdrawal but cannot
express his willingness to represent them); State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. Cl 662 (1981) (lawyer may solicit only those clients he handled unless there was a
particularly close relationship between lawyer and client); State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 517 (1980) (only those clients with whom sufficient personal relationship has been established may receive announcement from withdrawing lawyer); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-65 (partner may communicate
in person or telephone clients of partnership with whom he had professional relationship to inform
them of his withdrawal and may advise clients that they have right to choose their new counsel);
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Op. 80-94 (notwithstanding firm's objection, lawyer
may notify clients that he is leaving firm; lawyer had no interest in continuing representation of
clients); State Bar of Texas Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 422 (1984) (associate has duty to his
clients and can therefore notify them of his withdrawal from firm); Virginia State Bar Standing
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 381 (1980) (attorney may notify clients of departure and offer to continue serving them or recommend another lawyer).
200. See, eg., Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 270-72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (solicitation of exfirm clients by associates after departure not improper where firm brought tort action for interference with contract); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 422-23, 393
A.2d 1175, 1178 (1978) (court enjoined associates from solicitation in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Koeppel v. Schroder, 122 A.D.2d 780, 78283, 505 N.Y.S.2d 666, 668-69 (1986) (court reversed preliminary injunction which had prohibited
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The answers given to what types of contact are permissible have differed
dramatically. Some authorities have said that a lawyer may not contact a client
unless the lawyer had a personal relationship with that client. 20 1 Others permit
contact with all firm clients. 20 2 Some state that the contact must be in writing.20 3 Others say that telephone contact is permissible. 20 4 Some would not
permit the lawyer to advise the client that the client has the right to choose the
2 6
group of lawyers the client prefers. 20 5 Others permit such notification. 0
The range of these views undoubtedly reflects the evolution in the Supreme
Court cases involving first amendment protection of a lawyer's commercial
speech. 20 7 The most recent case in this line is Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Associalawyers' "systematic" solicitation of clients from old firm); Preiser v. Druckman, No. CA 2187-0092
(D. W. Va. filed Jan. 15, 1987) cited in Oder, Firm Enmeshed In Litigation Over Split, supra note 1,
at 3, col. 4 (complaint alleges firm unethically solicited clients); Ladas & Parry v. Abelman,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1980, at 13, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (firm sued withdrawing partner and associates
who allegedly solicited clients and prepared for departure while still working for firm, court found
no basis for an injunction, finding no violation of DR 2-103); Paul L. Pratt,, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 521, 488 N.E.2d 1062, 1069 (1986) (court affirmed preliminary injunction prohibiting
departing attorney from soliciting firm clients).
This issue also has been discussed in several articles. See, eg., Bonner, supra note 27 (effect
during dissolution of California provision against solicitation and Uniform Partnership Act); Bufford
& Hubbell, supra note 28 (California Rules of Prfessional Conduct provision against solicitation);
Robinson, supra note 27 (discussing Paul L Pratt, P.C v. Blunt. Adler, Barish, Code provisions
against solicitation, and first amendment cases); Comment, Adler, Barish supra note 27 (discussing
Adler, Barish, Code of Responsibility proscriptions against solicitation, and constitutional limitations
on Code); Comment, Recent Developments supra note 28 (same).
201. See, e.g., ABA Informal Op. 681, supra note 199; Alabama Op. 689, supranote 199; Florida Op. 84-1, supra note 199; Illinois Op. 86-16, supra note 199; Kansas Op. 82-18, supra note 199;
Kentucky Op. 317, supra note 199; Maryland Op. 83-59, supra note 199; Michigan Op. 681, supra
note 199; Michigan Informal Op. 662, supra note 199; Michigan Op. 517, supra note 199.
202. See, e.g., Chicago Op. 83-2, supra note 199; Idaho Op. 108, supra note 199; Texas Op. 422,
supra note 199.
203. See, e.g., Iowa Op. 80-40, supra note 199.
204. See, e.g., Kentucky Op. E-317, supra note 199; City of New York Op. 80-65, supra note
199. See also Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Op. 80-94 (attorney leaving firm who
will not be soliciting his clients' business may notify his clients by phone of his departure).
205. See, e.g., Alabama Op. 82-689, supra note 199; Michigan Op. 681, supra note 199. Cf.
Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515-19, 488 N.E.2d 1062, 1065-67 (1986) (associates enjoined, during pendency of suit, from contacting clients without court approval; one basis for
injunction was letter advising clients they have right to choose group of attorneys they prefer).
206. See, eg., ABA Informal Op. 1466, supra note 199; ABA Informal Op. 1457, supra note
199; California Op. 1985-86, supra note 199 (attorneys requiredto notify client of this right); Iowa
Op. 80-40, supra note 199; City of New York Op. 80-65, supra note 199; Virginia Op. 381, supra note
199.
207. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-49 (1985) (Ohio's
ban on truthful and nondeceptive drawings in advertisements unconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982) (Missouri's rule prohibiting lawyer from sending announcements to nonclients and limiting advertisements to certain listed information unconstitutional); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978) (upheld rule against in-person solicitation for pecuniary
gain, as applied to lawyer who solicited clients in person, in their hospital rooms, and elsewhere); In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437 (1978) (disciplinary action against ACLU attorney who solicited by
mail potential client, offering free legal services to challenge state regulation that required steriliza-
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tion,208 in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional Kentucky Rule 7.3,
identical to the Model Rule, which banned targeted direct mail. 2° 9
In view of Shapero, it seems clear that a state cannot prohibit, on ethical
grounds, written contact between clients and the lawyers involved in a breakup,
provided such contact is not false or misleading. 2 10 One would assume that
since the advice is truthful, a state must also allow lawyers to advise their clients
that they have the right to counsel of their choice. 211 However, even post-Shapero, the state may have the right to prohibit in-person communication between
the lawyer and client and perhaps even telephone communication. 2 12 Thus,
whether such action would be ethical depends on the particular state rule in213
volved; they vary widely.
Of course, determining what contact is ethically permissible does not answer the question of whether a lawyer is free to engage in such contact. The
courts have resorted to other bodies of law, such as interference with contract, in
evaluating such contact. 2 14 The parameters of this tort cause of action are betion as condition of receiving medical assistance, unconsitutional); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
383 (1977) (Arizona's absolute ban on lawyer advertising of routine legal services unconstitutional).
208. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
209. Id at 1923. The Kentucky Rule was identical to Model Rule 7.3. Id at 1920.
210. In Shapero, the Supreme Court had to decide whether to treat targeted direct mail like inperson communication, against which the State may issue a prophylactic, categorical ban, see
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467 (1978), or like targeted advertisements, which
may not be categorically banned, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 64749 (1985). See 108 S. Ct. at 1921-22. The Supreme Court held that a prophylactic ban for targeted
direct mail was unconstitutional, distinguishing Ohralik. 108 S. Ct. at 1922-25. In characterizing
and distinguishing Ohralik, Shapero repeatedly referred to the mode of communication involved in
Ohralik and its unique characteristics: See, eg., id. at 1922 ("The relevant inquiry is... whether the
mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such [clients'] susceptibility."). Shapero found that the two characteristics of this mode of communication which justified a
prophylactic ban (possibilities for overreaching and "unique... difficulties" of state regulation) were
not present with respect to targeted direct mail. Id at 1922-24. In view of this holding, it is difficult
to imagine how the State could categorically ban truthful written contact between clients and lawyers involved in a breakup.
211. The reason for this is because such communication is indeed truthful. See supra notes 4142 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 210 with respect to in-person contact. The issue of telephone contact is
more difficult. Like in-person contact, it presents regulatory difficulties because it is "not visible or
otherwise open to public scrutiny," Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (1988)
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978)). On the other hand, it may
present less possibilities for "overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and
outright fraud," id. at 1922 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641
(1985)), than does in-person contact.
213. See, eg., regulations cited in Am. B. Foundation Code of Professional Responsibility by
State (looseleaf 1980).
214. See, eg., Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 Ill. App. 3d 512, 488 N.E.2d 1062 (1986) (court
affirmed preliminary injunction requiring departing associates to obtain court approval before soliciting partner's clients as partner may be able to prove tortious interference with contract); Adler,
Barish, Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1176 (1978) (associates who,
inter alia, solicited firm clients during and after their employment by firm and used firm files and
clients as collateral for bank loan were liable for tortious interference with contract and could be
enjoined), cert denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979); cf. Koeppel v. Schroder, 122 A.D.2d 780, 782-83, 505
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yond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that as ethically
permissible speech expands, the tort action may contract because tort actions
have been premised on the idea-now incorrect-that a departing lawyer has no
21 5
ethical right to contact the firm's clients.

A review of Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein 216 demonstrates this principle. Adler, Barish is the leading case finding interference with
contract in a breakup situation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated a
permanent injunction which prohibited the departing associates from commiunicating with former firm clients, other than in a manner permitted by DR 2-102,
the "mailed announcements" provision of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Among other things, the departing associates had used Adler, Barish files to
obtain a line of credit from a bank and one associate had phoned and met with
firm clients he represented and had sent clients a form letter which could be used
to discharge the firm. 217 Some of these actions were taken while the associates
were still salaried employees or using Adler, Barish premises. 218 The basis for
the injunction was the court's finding that the associates' conduct was improper
and, therefore, constituted an intentional interference with contract. 2 19 A major
reason why the court found the lawyers' conduct improper was because it was
"solicitation" prohibited by DR 2-103.220 However, the Supreme Court's subsequent cases reveal that Adler, Barish was incorrect when it concluded that DR
N.Y.S.2d 666, 668-89 (1986) (distinguishing Adler, Barish, court reversed preliminary injunction

prohibiting solicitation of former clients, finding it unlikely plaintiffs could prove a tortious interference with contract).
Some authorities have viewed the relevant action as one for breach of fiduciary duty, rather
than tortious interference with contract. See, eg., In re Silverberg, 81 A.D.2d 640, 641, 438
N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1981) (citing Adler, Barish and other cases, court said "solicitation of a firm's
clients by one partner for his own benefit, prior to any decision to dissolve the partnership, is a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to each other and the partnership and a breach of the partnership
agreement in general"); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 16.2, at 888 n.74 ("the preferable view is that
the associate breaches a fiduciary obligation of loyalty to the firm by attempting to persuade existingor former-firm clients to retain the former associate after his or her withdrawal").
215. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the premises of the tortious interference court decisions and why those premises are incorrect.
216. 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
217. 482 Pa. at 420-21, 393 A.2d at 1177-78.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 432-36, 393 A.2d at 1183-85.
220. Id. at 434, 393 A.2d at 1184 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 2-103). In finding

defendants' conduct improper, the court relied on the fact there was "nothing in the "'rules of the
game" which society has adopted' which sanctions [defendants'] conduct." Id. (quoting Glenn v.
Point Park College, 441 Pa. 474, 482, 272 A.2d 895, 899 (1971) (quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF ToRTs § 6.11 (1956))). The court stated it found the violation of DR 2-103 "significant in evaluating the nature of [defendants'] conduct." Id The court also said that it found the
reasons underlying the disciplinary rule relevant here, especially the concern that defendants easily

could overreach and unduly influence the clients. Id The court further noted that in addition to
having an impact on the informed and reliable decision-making of the client, defendants' conduct
also adversely affected the firm, denying it a source of anticipated revenue. Id. at 434, 393 A.2d at
1184-85. The court said that defendants had taken advantage of confidential information regarding
the status and details of cases to which they were assigned and that no public interest was served by
permitting such use because clients may too easily suffer in the end. Id. at 435-36, 393 A.2d at 1185.
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Therefore, even if the decision were correct when

decided,
it may no longer be good law since a major basis for the decision
(i.e., that the lawyers' contact was ethically impermissible solicitation and thus
223
improper conduct and tortious interference) is undercut.
Thus, while the primary basis for the decision was the violation of the disciplinary rule, it cannot be
said to be the only basis.
221. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988) (targeted direct mail provision
of Rule 7.3 is unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 655-56
(1985) (discipline based on offer of legal advice in violation of DR 2-103 is unconstitutional); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 196 (1982) (DR 2-102, which limits to whom mailed announcements may be
sent, unconstitutional).
222. Adler, Barish may have been correct when decided because all the court ultimately did was
enjoin defendants from soliciting clients other than as permitted by the Code ofProfessionalResponsibility. The court did not order defendants to pay damages and did not prevent defendants from
representing former firm clients. 482 Pa. at 422-23, 393 A.2d at 1178. Although the court mispredicted the Supreme Court's first amendment cases, the relief awarded is quite defensible. Furthermore, to the extent Adler, Barish based this injunction on the finding of a tortious interference
with contract, that finding, or a similar one based on breach of fiduciary duty, may also be correct
given the evidence of defendants' predepartureconduct. Among other actions, defendants furnished
bank officials with a list of 88 cases and their anticipated legal fees in order to secure a line of credit.
Id. at 420, 393 A.2d at 1177. At least one defendant apparently contacted firm clients while still
using firm premises in an effort to induce them to fire the firm. Id at 421, 393 A.2d at 1177-78.
Although both the fact of relief and the nature of that relief may be correct, much of the language in the opinion does not appear correct. When the Adler, Barish court says that departing
associates should not compete with their firms on the basis of information learned while in the firm's
employ and that such competition can be prohibited through a tort action, the court has come very
close to creating, by rule of law, a restrictive covenant. This, however, is against the strong weight of
authority. See supra notes 86-135. Insofar as Adler, Barish recognizes a claim for predeparture
action it should be followed, and insofar as it would enjoin solicitation in violation of the Code or the
Rules it should be followed, but it should not be used to prohibit otherwise permissible postdeparture
solicitation and representation by former firm attorneys. See I G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supranote
37, at 487 (1985), which states:
Equally questionable was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in the celebrated case
of Adler, Barish .... Under Rule 7.3, such conduct would not be a prohibited solicitation.
Indeed, it could [be] said that such "solicitations" must be allowed, for otherwise the old
firm will have a de facto covenant not to compete, which is prohibited under Rule 5.6(a).
Id See also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL ETHics, "EVERYTHING A LAWYER NEEDS TO
KNOW AND SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID TO ASK" 246-47 (1988) (suggesting that after separation from
a firm, lawyers may communicate with clients, but not before).
223. Several courts have refused to follow Adler, Barish's lead. See, eg., Bray v. Squires, 702
S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (court found credible evidence that former associates did not
contact firm clients until after their departure and that they did not accept employment until client
terminated firm, thus jury findings of no breach of fiduciary duty were upheld); Koeppel v. Schroder,
122 A.D.2d 780, 780, 505 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667-68 (1986) (injunction reversed because, interalia, lawyers had right to solicit former clients); Ladas & Parry v. Abelman, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1980, at 13,
col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (court denied preliminary injunction, finding that even if defendants discussed
new firm with corporate clients prior to departure, such contact may have been necessary if lawyers
were not to be derelict to their clients). But see Paul L. Pratt, P.C. v. Blunt, 140 Ill. App. 3d 512,
488 N.E.2d 1062 (1986). Pratt demonstrates a reflexive, unthinking approach. Although the case
was decided eight years and two significant Supreme Court cases after Adler, Barish, the Prattcourt
found the injunction constitutionally permissible, uncritically accepting Adler, Barish's reasoning
that:
the defendant's conduct here of attempting to induce clients of the plaintiff to change firms
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In sum, statements a lawyer may make during a breakup will be governed,
in the first instance, by the relevant ethical provisions, as limited by the Supreme
Court's first amendment cases. Under these first amendment cases, a lawyer has
a right to contact firm clients or anyone else in writing. Furthermore, because it
is truthful, lawyers should be able to advise clients of their right to discharge one
lawyer and substitute another. At least currently, a particular state may prohibit in-person or telephone communication with a client, especially a client with
whom the lawyer has no prior personal relationship. Whatever contact is permitted, a lawyer must be careful not to engage in false or misleading communication. Finally, in addition to the malpractice and ethical concerns, lawyers
must be sensitive to the tort law implications of their actions. Tort law is beyond the scope of this article but it should be noted that tort remedies probably
should contract as a lawyer's first amendment rights expand; as the states expand the type of communication by a lawyer that is ethically permissible, the
definition of what conduct is improper, and may be the basis for a tort remedy,
224
should contract.
5. Client Conflicts
Another issue lawyers face in law firm breakups is future conflicts of interest. Lawyers must take the necessary steps during the breakup to ensure that
they do not have an impermissible conflict in the future.
The Model Rules contain specific provisions advising lawyers on how to
deal with conflicts with former clients. Rule 1.9, in essence, states that absent a
former client's consent, a lawyer may not represent a different client if that representation would be materially adverse to the former client, and if the representation involves the same or a substantially related matter. 225 Under Model Rule
1.10, the imputed disqualification rule, this disqualification applies not only to
former clients a lawyer personally represented, but to all former clients of the
in the middle of their active cases may, to the extent that it is prohibited by the disciplinary
rules, be enjoined without violating the defendant's constitutional rights of free speech. We
adopt the reasoning of the Adler court ....
Id. at 520, 488 N.E.2d at 1068. The Pratt court never considered whether Adler, Barish correctly
predicted the direction of Supreme Court cases and the fact that the conduct cannot, constitutionally, be prohibited by a disciplinary rule. See supra note 221.
224. See supra notes 220-23.
225. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.9, which provides:
Conflict of Interest: Former Client
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.9 is slightly different from the ABA version, in that it requires "a
full disclosure of the circumstances" along with a consultation prior to consent of the client, PA. R.
PROF. CONDUCT 1.9.
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firm.2 2 6

In certain circumstances, however, the Model Rules would permit both the
remaining firm and the departing lawyers and their new firm to avoid the harshness of this rule. If a departing lawyer did not acquire material information
protected by the confidentiality rules, then neither the departing lawyer nor the
new firm is disqualified from representation adverse to a former firm client, even
in a substantially related matter.227 Similarly, the remaining lawyers and their
firm may represent a client whose interests are materially adverse to the interests
of a former client, even in a substantially related matter, provided no one remaining in the firm has any material information protected by the confidentiality
228

rules.

In contrast to the Model Rules, the Model Code does not contain any pro-

vision directly addressing the issue of conflicts of interest involving former clients. 229 Most courts confronted with the issue have concluded that despite this
226. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.10, which provides:
Imputed Disqualification: General Rule
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules
1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.10(a) is identical to the ABA version. See PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.10(a).
227. The imputed disqualification exception governing the departing attorney and the lawyer's
new firm is found in Rule 1.10(b):
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm
with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests
are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.10(b). The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.10(b) is significantly different from the ABA version in that it provides for an exception to subsection (b). This
exception is stated in parts (1) and (2) of subsection (b) and reads:
(b) ...

material to the matter unless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate client to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provision of the Rule.
PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.10(b).
228. The imputed disqualification exception governing the remaining firm is found in Rule
1.10(c):
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a
client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and
1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.10(c). The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.10(c) is identical to
the ABA version. See PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.10(C).
229. See MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 5-105 (addresses conflicts only among current
clients).
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omission, the Code does regulate conflicts of interest involving former clients. 2 30
The courts have diverged, however, when determining how the Model Code
should treat vicarious disqualification where there is a conflict with former clients. Some courts have banned a firm from representation whenever a lawyer
within the firm would be barred from representation. 23 1 Other courts have used
a balancing approach or have permitted screening devices to be used in such
2 32

situations.
There is no question that at least some lawyers are oblivious to the vicarious
disqualification rules for conflicts of interest. Perhaps surprisingly, such oversight can occur when small firms break up, as well as when large firms break up.
For example,. in 1982, a lawyer filed a petition for alimony modification on behalf of a husband. 2 33 The lawyer's former partner had represented the wife in
connection with the divorce. 2 34 When the wife questioned the propriety of opposing counsel's representation, her lawyer sought the advice of the Alabama
State Bar General Counsel & Disciplinary Commission 235 and asked whether he
had a conflict, stating that he saw no conflict in view of the fact he had never
talked with the wife or his partner about the case. The opinion concluded that
the representation of the husband was unethical in view of Alabama's version of
DR 5-105(C), which specifically applied to former clients, 236 and the absolute
237
vicarious disqualification rule in DR 5-105(D).

In short, some lawyers are not as familiar with the vicarious disqualification
conflicts rules as they should be. To adequately comply with their ethical obligations after a breakup, lawyers should compile and exchange a complete and
accurate list of all clients and matters handled by lawyers associated with the
230. Eg., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980) (court adopted "substantial relationship" test for evaluating former client conflicts, finding such test "necessary to implement"
Canons 1, 4-7, and 9); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 393-94 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
(Code prohibits conflicts of interest involving former clients; court drew comparison between Canon
6 of ABA Canons of Ethics and comments to DR 5-105(A) of Code); In re Evans, 113 Ariz. 458,
462, 556 P.2d 792, 796 (1976) (court used Canon 9, "Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety," to
find ethical violation based on obtaining confidential information from former client).
231. See, eg., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980) (disqualified entire firm
because of former client conflict with member of that firm); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. KerrMcGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.) (applying disqualification rule to large firm, even
though burden falls "more heavily" on such), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); American Dredging
Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 480 Pa. 177, 184, 389 A.2d 568, 572 (1978) (where one attorney is
disqualified because of conflicts, entire firm is disqualified).
232. See, eg., Silver Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54
(2d Cir. 1975) (firm was not disqualified because of conflict problems raised when new associate from
large firm joined firm).
233. See Alabama State Bar General Counsel, Op. 82-691.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The Alabama provision was identical to the Model Code provision, which states:
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under
a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 5-105(D).
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former firm. 2 3 8 Without such an exchange, there is a very real risk of a future
ethical violation. Especially with larger firms, departing lawyers could inadvertently oppose a former client of the old firm on a substantially related matter.
Even under the Rules, it would be useful for lawyers to know the identity of
former firm clients so that they can properly screen for conflicts and adequately
document their compliance with the exceptions in Rule 1.10(b) or (c) in the
event they decide to go forward with representation adverse to a former client.
Furthermore, if lawyers involved in a breakup recognized that they should routinely exchange client lists to comply with their ethical obligations, and recognized that their partners ethically may solicit former clients in writing, this
might reduce some of the fighting that occurs over clients and client solicitation.
6. Confidentiality
The confidentiality provisions of the Model Code and the Model Rules
2 39
probably are among the most familiar ethical regulations to most lawyers.
238. Although such advice seems sensible and necessary, it is not always heeded. One lawyer
who has represented partners going through a dissolution has advised the author that the opposing
client refused to agree to such an exchange.
239. The Model Code and Model Rules differ in their approach to confidentiality. First, they
differ in their definitions of what is confidential information. Second, the exceptions are different.
Many state provisions, such as Pennsylvania's, differ from both of these. For example, DR 4-101
provides:
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-cfient privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only
after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by
law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself
or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 4-101. Model Rule 1.6 provides:
Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:

(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
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These obligations continue even upon dissolution of the firm. 240 Because of
their familiarity, they should be among the easiest with which to comply. Nevertheless, it is in a lawyer's best interest to review these obligations during a law
firm breakup. 24 1 In Adler, Barish, for example, the departing lawyers secured a
line of credit from the bank for their new firm by giving the bank a list of "their

clients" and the clients' anticipated legal fees. 24 2 If this disclosure occurred
without client consent, they probably violated the confidentiality rules. Similarly, a departing lawyer could violate this rule by revealing client information to
the new firm the lawyer intended to join.24 3 These provisions would be espetween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.6. The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.6 provides:
Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information if necessary to comply with the duties
stated in Rule 3.3.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another;
(2) to prevent or to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent
act in the commission of which the lawyer's services are being or had been used; or
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge. or civil
claim or disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
(d) The duty not to reveal information relating to representation of a client continues
after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.
PA. R. PROF. CONDUcT 1.6.
240. MODEL CODE, supra note 34, EC 4-6 ("The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients continues after the termination of his employment."); MODEL
RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.6 comment ("The duty of confidentiality continues after the clientlawyer relationship has terminated."); see Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980) (need
for confidentiality important aspect of disqualification rule regarding former clients).
241. Cf. Corlett, Killian, Hardeman, McIntosh & Levi v. Merritt, 478 So. 2d 828, 835 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (Hubbart, J., dissenting), review denied, 488 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1985). The dissenting
opinion raises the confidentiality concerns during a breakup in an interesting context. A professional
corporation employee who was terminated sued to compel redemption of his shares. The majority
denied recovery saying it would not rewrite the parties' contract for them. Id at 835. The dissent
concluded that the majority stockholders had an ethical duty enforceable by law to redeem the
shares because to do otherwise would permit the terminated attorney to sit in on corporate meetings
where confidential client matters were discussed and could create conflict of interest problems resulting in improper fee-splitting. Id. at 835-36 (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
242. 482 Pa. 416, 420, 393 A.2d 1176, 1177 (1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
243. Both departing attorneys and the potential new firm have an interest in exchanging information. Attorneys will want to convince the firm of their experience and the possibility they will
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cially easy to violate in a state such as Pennsylvania which, until recently, specifically stated that even the identity of a client was confidential information which
244
could not be revealed absent consent.
7. Safekeeping Property
Both the Code and the Rules contain provisions detailing how a lawyer is to
handle client property, including funds. 245 These straightforward provisions
prohibit a lawyer from commingling the lawyer's property with the client's
attract clients. The firm will want to know what it might expect in the way of business and what
conflicts may occur if the attorneys join. Notwithstanding these interests, attorneys must be careful
not to violate the confidentiality rules.
244. Compare Pa. Code Prof. Responsibility DR 4-101(B)(1) ("Except when permitted under
DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client, including
his identity.") with PA. R. PROF. CONDUCr 1.6. See supra note 239 for the text of Pennsylvania
Rule 1.6.
245. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and
expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in
the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law
firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the
lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and
place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as
practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client
coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his
client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities,
or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to
receive.
MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 9-102.
RULE 1.15 Safekeeping Property
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office
is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall
be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of
[five years] after termination of the representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly
deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third
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property. 246 They also require a lawyer to identify and safeguard the client's
24 7
property.

Morales v. State Bar 248 illustrates how these safekeeping provisions might
be violated during a breakup. Morales's law firm "dissolved under very acrimonious circumstances" 2 4 9 and involved a "bitter breakup. ' 250 Morales received a
private reprimand and a criminal misdemeanor conviction and ultimately was
disbarred because of conduct which was "related either directly to the firm's
breakup or indirectly to the financial crisis that came in its wake." 25 1 Allegedly
because of inexperienced bookkeepers, Morales failed to keep complete records
of client trust funds, had insufficient funds in his trust account on one occasion,
and failed to withhold or pay payroll taxes and unemployment insurance contributions. 252 These actions were the bases for the private reprimand and misdemeanor conviction.

Morales's disbarment was based on his withdrawal of one-half of the funds
in the firm pension account and the endorsement and cashing of a check made
out to the old firm. 253 Morales responded to these two charges by stating that
the bank urged him to withdraw the pension money to repay a loan and gave
him a legal opinion as to the propriety of Morales's withdrawal of this money
and by arguing that the endorsement incident was "a simple mistake by some

temporary employee in the course of winding up the complex affairs of the old
254

law firm."$

Even if Morales's version is incorrect, as the California Supreme Court
found, 255 the case suggests some of the pitfalls for lawyers as a result of a
breakup. Lawyers must be extremely careful and exercise close supervision durperson is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly
render a full accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in
which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute
arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by
the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.15. Pennsylvania has adopted Rule 1.15 in its entirety. See
PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.15. The Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.15 is similar to the ABA version
except that the Pennsylvania version requires the lawyer to keep complete records of account funds.
This is accomplished by changing the last sentence of subdivision (a) to read:
Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.
PA. MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.15(a).
246. See supra note 245 for the text of the relevant provisions.
247. Id
248. 44 Cal. 3d 1037, 751 P.2d 457, 245 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1988).
249. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 458, 245 Cal Rptr. at 399.
250. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 458, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
251. Id at-, 751 P.2d at 458, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
252. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 458, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
253. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 463, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
254. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 460, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
255. Id at -, 751 P.2d at 461, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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ing a breakup so that temporary employees, inexperienced bookkeepers, and
general confusion do not contribute to any ethical violations by the lawyer.
Another issue that has arisen in this area is how to handle unclaimed client
funds upon dissolution of the firm. This was a topic addressed by three different
ethics committees. 256 They concluded that it was not unethical for lawyers
upon dissolution and liquidation to retain and divide unidentifiable funds placed
in a dormant client trust account a number of years ago, provided reasonable
notice is given to all affected parties, advising them of the existence of the funds
257
and giving them an opportunity to establish a claim to the balance.
8. Summary
In sum, when law firms break up, there are numerous ethical regulations
that can be triggered. Lawyers must ensure that they comply with the continuing obligations ethical regulations with respect to clients the lawyer personally
represents. Additionally, if a lawyer wants to be completely protected, the lawyer should have the former firm withdraw from the representation and the new
counsel substituted. This latter action will protect a lawyer whose former partner violates the continuing obligation provisions with respect to a client of the
former firm.
Lawyers also should comply with the restrictive covenant provisions. At a
minimum, this means lawyers should not be parties to, nor try to enforce, an
agreement which prohibits a lawyer from representing certain clients after the
breakup. Furthermore, lawyers should be aware that if the agreement provides
a financial penalty, that probably will be viewed by the courts and the ethics
committees as an improper restrictive covenant.
Third, lawyers should be aware that there is a difficult fee-splitting issue
that could arise if they divide fees after the breakup. Because this issue is still
unresolved, the more conservative approach (and the better approach, this author believes) is for lawyers dividing fees to satisfy the requirements of the fee
division provisions. While the fee division provisions in the Model Code and the
Model Rules differ, both require the client to be advised of the fee division,
require all lawyers dividing the fees to assume joint responsibility, and require
the total fee to be reasonable.
Lawyers also must comply with the publicity regulations. First and foremost, this means communications cannot be false or misleading. In addition to
truthfully communicating with clients, lawyers should ensure that the "firm"
accurately holds itself out to the public; this may affect, for example, the way
telephones are answered. Furthermore, lawyers must ensure that the relevant
state regulations permit truthful communications to be made in the manner contemplated. Finally, lawyers should be aware that some courts have imposed tort
liability on lawyers because of their communication with clients. Thus, the most
256. State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-752 (1982);
Kansas Bar Ass'n Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 85-11 (1985); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Ethics

Comm., Op. 84-75 (1984).
257. See opinions cited supra note 256.
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sensible course of action, in this area particularly, is for the lawyers involved in
the breakup to come to an understanding regarding when and how clients and
others will be notified of the breakup and how files will be handled. Ideally, the
lawyers should draft a joint letter to be sent to all clients, advising clients of their
right to select the lawyer they prefer and telling clients how the selection can be
made.
The fifth area lawyers should be sensitive to is conflicts of interest. Lawyers
need to obtain adequate information during the breakup to enable them to comply with their obligations. Lawyers should provide client data to all firm members. Indeed, a recognition of the obligation to comply with the conflicts
provision, together with the United States Supreme Court's recent first amendment cases, should lead to fewer "publicity" problems. The reason is that if
lawyers obtain client lists and have a right to directly solicit those clients following departure from the firm, and to notify the clients of their right to select the
counsel they prefer, then the lawyers may be less inclined to engage in all-out
battles with each other regarding temporary disposition of client files.
Sixth, lawyers should remember that their confidentiality obligations do not
end when the representation is concluded. Thus, during and after the breakup,
lawyers should ensure that they do not inadvertently reveal confidential client
information without consent.
Finally, lawyers should ensure that they comply with the safekeeping of
property requirements. Among other things, this means that lawyers should
take steps during the potential chaos of a breakup to make sure that all fiduciary
regulations are honored, that accounts are not confused, and that files are disposed of properly.
In sum, lawyers must be conscious of their ethical obligations and act carefully to comply with them. It would be easy for a lawyer to inadvertently violate
these provisions during a breakup.
III.

MALPRACTICE CONSEQUENCES OF LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

A. Introduction
Unlike disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer for ethical violations, a
legal malpractice action is a civil suit between a lawyer and an injured party. 25 8
The plaintiff is usually a client, although the courts increasingly are permitting
nonclients to sue. 2 59 The purpose of a malpractice action is to make the injured
258. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1981) (history and
discussion of civil actions for legal malpractice).
259. See id. §§ 71 to 82 (strict "privity of contract" rule has been relaxed by some courts).
Nevertheless, the vast majority of legal malpractice claims against attorneys continue to be filed by
clients ratherthan nonclients. See ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Profile
of Legal Malpractice: A Statistical Study of Determinative Characteristics of Claims Asserted
Against Attorneys 46 (1986) (of 29,227 claims reported to ABA's National Legal Malpractice Data
Center from January 1983 through September 1985, 87% were filed by clients, 13% by nonclients).
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plaintiff whole. 260 The term "legal malpractice" actually is a catchall expression
used to describe several different legal theories used against a lawyer. 261 The
theories that sometimes are discussed under this heading include negligence;
breach of fiduciary duties; breach of an express or implied contract; fraud; and
intentional tort. 2 6 2 Although this article focuses on the negligence claims that
might arise as a result of a breakup, much of the discussion would apply equally
26 3
well to a claim alleging breach of fiduciary duties.
The negligence theory is the most common form of legal malpractice
action.264 The legal malpractice negligence claim has the same elements as an
ordinary negligence claim: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and
26 5
damage.
To satisfy the duty element in a malpractice case, one must generally show
266
that a lawyer-client relationship existed at the time of the alleged malpractice.
Breach of duty is shown by proof that "the lawyer failed to exercise the skill,
apply the knowledge, and exert the diligence that would be brought to bear in
such a representation by a lawyer of ordinary competence and diligence." 26 7 A
breach of duty usually is established by comparing the lawyer's "performance
with the parallel performance of other lawyers in similar situations."' 268 Expert
260. See e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (in malpractice
action, client awarded damages equal to lost judgment).
261. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIr, supranote 258; D. MEISELMAN, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE (1980); D. STERN & J. FELIX-RETZKE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO PREVENTING MALPRACTICE § 1.01 (1983) ("defining legal malpractice can be an exercise in

frustration" because of intermingling of theories and language).
262. See eg., R. MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 258, § 100, at 169-70, D. MEISELMAN, supra
note 261, at 17-18.
263. Several commentators have said that whichever theory is used, the proof is essentially the
same. See, e.g., R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258,

§

100, at 169-70, D. MEISELMAN, supra

note 261, § 2:3, at 17-18; see also D. STERN & J. FELIX-RETZKE, supra note 261, §§ 1.02 to 1.07, at
3-19 (study and analyses of malpractice incidents by factors such as years in practice, type of firm,
type of malpractice).
264. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258, § 111, at 204.
265. d
d; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 209. As Professor Wolfram observed, Mallen
and Levit list only three elements, collapsing the proximate cause and damage elements. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, at 209 n.49. Accord Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 523, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 593 (1966) (citing elements, court reversed summary judgment for defendant-attorney in
malpractice case); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 87, 538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975) (reciting
elements); Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F. Supp. 227, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating elements of legal
malpractice claim; dismissed claim since underlying action was still on appeal); accord Vollgraff v.
Block, 117 Misc. 2d 489, 490, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (Supp. 1982) (citing three elements).
266. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 209-10, R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258,
§ 101, at 171 (duty arises from attorney-client relationship). Occasionally, a duty can be owed to
noncfients. See e.g., Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1988) (nonclient purchasers
permitted to sue attorney for improperly drafting deeds); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d
744, (1983) (will legatee permitted to sue attorney in assumpsit for breach of contract in improperly
drafting the will); see also R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258, §§ 71 to 82, at 142-68 (discussion of liability of attorney to nonclient); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.4, at 223-27.
267. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 210, see also Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303,
308, 578 P.2d 935, 938, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221-22 (1978) (reciting same standard).
268. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 212; see also Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal. App. 3d
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testimony is often used to establish the standard of care.26 9 Occasionally, however, courts may dispense with expert testimony or may decide that reasonable
persons could reach only one conclusion regarding malpractice. 270 While proof
of causation in a legal malpractice case may differ from proof in other negligence
271
cases, the basic concepts are the same as used in the ordinary negligence case.
B. MalpracticeActions Based on Neglect
Negligence is always a risk during a breakup because a lawyer's full attention may be diverted from the client's matters and concentrated on the lawyer's
own problems. Vollgraff v. Block 272 is an example of a case where a breakup
apparently led to a malpractice claim. The plaintiffs had been in a car accident
and hired the defendant law partnership to prosecute their claim against two
defendants. 273 Approximately six months after accepting the case, the partnership was dissolved. 274 The plaintiffs apparently were not notified of the dissolution.275 No further action was taken on the plaintiffs' case, and the statute of
276
limitations period expired.
When the plaintiff clients filed a malpractice claim, one partner asked for
relief on the ground that the partnership was dissolved before the accrual of the
malpractice action. 277 The court denied the motion, reasoning that "partnership dissolution does not discharge a partner from obligations existing prior to
'278
dissolution.
970, 975, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1978) (court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' malpractice action
because they introduced no expert testimony); Storm v.Golden, 371 Pa. Super. 368, 379-80, 538
A.2d 61, 64-65 (1988) (held, malpractice case properly dismissed in view of failure to introduce
expert testimony); Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of
Practice and Negligence in MalpracticeAction Against Attorney, 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968).
269. See, eg., C. WOLFRAM, SUpra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 211-12; R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra
note 258, § 660, at 828 (standard of care and breach must be established by expert testimony). But
cf. Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 424, 288 N.W.2d 443, 445 (1979) (plaintiffs
did not need to introduce expert testimony with respect to malpractice claim based on defendant's
failure to transmit settlement offer).
270. See. e.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 218 (1st Cir. 1987) (expert testimony unnecessary for gross legal malpractice; cases in accord listed); Dixon v. Perlman, 528 So. 2d 637, 642
(La. Ct. App. 1988) ("In other cases where the trial court is familiar with the standards of practice in
its community or the attorney's conduct obviously falls below any reasonable standard of care, the
assistance of expert testimony may be unnecessary."); R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258,
§ 665, at 837, 839-41.
271. See, eg., R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258, § 102, at 177-79; Helmbrecht v. St.
Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 103, 362 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1985) (in proving proximate cause in legal
malpractice case, plaintiff usually must show that "but for the negligence of the attorney, the client
would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of the action") (quoting Lewandowski v.
Continental Casualty Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 276 N.W.2d 284, 287 (1979)).
272. 117 Misc. 2d 489, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
273. Id. at 490, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 493, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
276. Id. at 490, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
277. Id.
278. Id at 492, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
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One commentator noted that situations where neither side in a breakup
wants a particular client also could lead to neglect, with the entire firm facing
the resulting malpractice claim. 2 7 9 Thus, as the courts and commentators have
observed, unless a lawyer is especially careful during the breakup, it is easy to
280
get absorbed in the dispute and lose sight of the client.
C. The Role of Ethical Regulations in a MalpracticeAction
Simple neglect, however, is not the only type of malpractice exposure a
lawyer faces during a breakup. It is quite possible for a lawyer to be liable for
malpractice based, in whole or in part, on a violation of the ethical regulations
described in part II, above.
At first glance, it might appear that the ethical regulations have no place in
a malpractice action. After all, an action for legal malpractice and a disciplinary
proceeding for violation of the ethical regulations have "different purposes, parties and procedures. ' 28 1 More and more, however, the Model Code and the

Model Rules are being used in some fashion in legal malpractice actions. 282 For

279. Hazard, supra note 79, at 35. Indeed, conversations with a colleague who has represented
attorneys going through a dissolution reveal that each side hoped certain clients would elect the
other lawyer, but felt compelled to continue representation when selected by the client. See supra
notes 68-69.
280. See supra notes 22-23, 27-28.
281. Hoover, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Lawyer MalpracticeActions" The
Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595, 598 (1988). Compare
supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussion of disciplinary proceedings for ethical violations) with supra notes 259-71 (discussion of civil actions for malpractice). But see Lashkowitz v.
Disciplinary Bi., 410 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1987) (discovery procedures specified in Rules of Civil
Procedure available in disciplinary proceeding).
282. See, eg., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1988) (court
refused to set aside malpractice judgment for plaintiff-client on ground that expert referred to Code
violations because expert did not testify, nor did court instruct jury, that violations constituted negligence per se); Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 1982) (in action to recover partial legal
fees, court reversed judgment for attorney to permit jury to consider DR 2-106 and DR 2-110 in
establishing whether attorney breached fiduciary duty); Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th
Cir.) (en banc) (Code of Professional Responsibility establishes some evidence of legal standards),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1147, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89,
102 (1985) (court found Doris Day's attorney liable for malpractice; no expert testimony needed
because conduct was clearly contrary to established standards and because expert's testimony could
not override Rules of ProfessionalConduct), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968) (appellate court set aside jury verdict for
defendant-attorney; relying on violations of conflict of interest requirements, court found defendant
breached duty to plaintiff and remanded for trial on causation); Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp., 146 Ga.
App. 250, 256-57, 246 S.E.2d 684, 689-90 (1978) (unsuccessful defendant filed suit against opposing
attorney based on violation of DR 7-102's prohibition against frivolous suits; court assumes such an
action is valid and finds no violation); Beattie v. Fimschild, 152 Mich. App. 785, 791, 394 N.W.2d
107, 109 (1986) (court rejects argument that Code violation is negligence per se, finding instead
"there is a rebuttable presumption that violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility constitute actionable malpractice"; thus plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed for lack of expert testimony); Sawabini v. Desenberg, 143 Mich. App. 373, 385, 372 N.W.2d 559, 566 (1985) (Code
violations create rebuttable presumption of malpractice, but plaintiff did not allege sufficient acts to
show a breach of confidentiality); see also Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893,
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example, in Woodruff v. Tomlin, 283 the court reversed a judgment for an attorney and concluded that Code violations could be used as evidence of the standards required of lawyers; the court remanded to allow the jury to consider
28 4
malpractice based on violation of the conflict of interest provisions.
Proper use of these ethical regulations in a civil action against a lawyer is a
controversial topic. 285 The range of arguments concerning proper use vary:
28 6
ethical regulations should be used to create an independent cause of action;
ethical violations should be used to create a presumption of a breach of the malpractice standard of care; 287 ethical violations should be used as evidence of a
897, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-24 (1977) (court relied on violation of Rule 7-104 to conclude that
attorney's threat of criminal action to gain an advantage in a civil suit was outrageous, thus plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should not have been denied); 1 G. HAzARD & W, HODES, supra note 37, at 11-12.2 (Supp. 1987) (trend in courts has been to recognize
disciplinary codes as relevant, but not per se, evidence for malpractice purposes); R. MALLEN & V.
LEvrr, supra note 258, § 7, at 22, § 67, at 39-40, § 122, at 213-14, § 153, at 245-46, § 256, at 340-41,
§ 584, at 741-45 (describing overlap of ethical regulations and certain types of malpractice actions);
C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 212 ("Courts have not hesitated, however, to apply the
mandatory standards of the lawyer codes to lawyers as appropriate measures of required lawyer
conduct in malpractice suits.").
283. 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
284. Id. at 936-38.
285. See, e-g., Dalquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1 (1982); Hoover, supra note 281; Schneyer, The Model
Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, AM. B. FOUND. REv. 939 (1980);
Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a Measure ofAttorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REv. 281 (1979); Note, Lipton v. Boesky: The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as
an Independent Basis for Legal Malpractice Liability, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 135 [hereinafter Note,
Lipton v. Boesky]; Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Basisfor Civil Liability of Attorneys, 39
U. FLA. L. REv. 777 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct]; Comment, Violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as Stating a Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 692 (1979).
286. See eg., Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 285, at 803-04 ("To afford
non-clients the protection that the drafters intended, courts should use the appropriate provisions as
the basis for private causes of action."); contra Dalquist, supra note 285, at 30 (argues that Code
should not be used to create independent cause of action, although appropriate to establish existing
cause of action). See also R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258, § 256, at 340 ("Unfortunately,
there has been little consideration of whether ethical standards provide an independent basis for
liability, define the standard of care or merely suggest proper conduct."); Wolfram, supra note 285,
at 286-95 (arguably endorses use of Code both to create new causes of action and as means of
determining liability under existing causes of action).
According to one commentator, the courts steadfastly have refused to use the Code to create an
independent cause of action, although some courts have hinted it might be appropriate. Note, The
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 285, at 784-85; accord Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33
Cal. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271-72 (1973) (plaintiff could not rely on ethics provision prohibiting communication with adverse party to create cause of action in her favor and against
opposing attorneys); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 137, 199 S.E.2d 260, 263
(1973) (independent basis for suit not intended legislative purpose of solicitation prohibitions in
Code); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D. 2d 287, 289, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (1983) (in finding plaintiff's
suit against his attorney governed by three year malpractice statute of limitations, rather than six
year contract statute, court rejected plaintiff's argument that breach of conflict of interest section
gives rise to breach of contract and stated that violation does not in itself generate cause of action).
287. See, eg., Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 135 (endorsing use of code violations
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breach of the standard of care;288 and, finally, ethical violations should not be
28 9
permitted at all in a malpractice action.
The parameters of this debate were set by Professor Charles Wolfram in his
article, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a MeasureofAttorney Liability
in Civil Litigation.29° In this article, Professor Wolfram discussed all three possible ways of using the Model Code-to constitute evidence of malpractice, to
create a presumption of malpractice, for example, as negligence per se, or to
support an independent cause of action.29 1 Without distinguishing particularly
among these uses, Professor Wolfram offered three reasons in favor of greater
use of the Model Code in civil actions against lawyers. 292 He then offered sevwhich "would have the same effect as a violation of a statute for the purpose of establishing negligence" to create rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice); accord Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal.
App. 3d 1125, 1149, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 104 (1985) (used violation of California's Rules of Professional Conduct to establish negligence per se, stating, "The rules set the standard ...the facts
revealed Rosenthal's violation"), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). Cf. Lipton v. Boesky, 110
Mich. App. 589, 598, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1981) (permitted use of Code violations as "rebuttable
evidence" of malpractice).
288. See, eg., Dalquist, supra note 285, at 11 (agreeing that it is "proper to allow the Code to
be considered in legal malpractice actions as an indicator of the standards"); see also Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 528, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597 (1966) (court reversed summary
judgment for defendant-attorney, finding that in view of violation of conflict of interest provisions,
"fact trier might reasonably find him negligent") and cases cited supra note 282; cf. Hoover, supra
note 281, at 595-616 (advocating increased use of Model Rules in malpractice actions, although he is
somewhat vague about precise use).
289. See, e.g., Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 111, 362 N.W.2d 118, 128
(1985) (court reversed judgment N.O.V. for defendant-attorney and entered judgment for client,
finding sufficient evidence of malpractice; in dictum, court quoted Code language that it does not
"undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct").
290. Wolfram, supra note 285. Professor Wolfram also cited several related articles in his discussion. See id. at 289 n.37 (citing Schidman & Salzler, The Legal MalpracticeDilemma: Will New
Standardsof Care Place ProfessionalLiability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U.
CIN. L. REv.541 (1976); Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice,26 Am.U.L. REv. 408

(1977); Note, Standardof Care in Legal Malpractice,43 IND. L.J. 771 (1968). Nevertheless, Professor Wolfram's article is the cornerstone for the resulting discussion.
291. See id. at 304-05 (endorsing use of conflicts provision of Code by clients against attorney
to create presumption of negligence); id.at 308 (suggesting courts may hold that violation of confidentiality provision "creates a right of action in the client"); idat 314 (recommending use of Code
provision against frivolous litigation as guidance for determining what constitutes lack of probable
cause in malicious prosecution case).
292. Id. at 286-95. The first argument offered by Professor Wolfram is that ethical provisions
are analogous to criminal or administrative regulations. Thus, they should be treated like other
codified law and violations of applicable provisions should serve as evidence of negligence or to
establish negligence per se. Id at 286-87. Accord Dalquist, supranote 285, at 14; Note, The Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, supra note 285, at 780-83; Comment, supra note 285, at 699-700 (violation of
Code in professional negligence action similar to violation of statute establishing negligence per se);
Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 143-44 (code violations analogous to statute violations
which create rebuttable presumption of negligence). See also Schneyer, supra note 285, at 946-47
(critiques Model Rules' disclaimer, not to "undertake to define standards for civil liability").
The second justification offered is that the current enforcement mechanism for ethical violations
is insufficient. Wolfram, supra note 285, at 288. Use of the Code or Rules in malpractice actions
would help achieve an acceptable level of attorney compliance. Id at 289-93. Accord Dalquist,
supra note 285, at 14; Hoover, supra note 285, at 616 (application of ethical standards in Code
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eral counterarguments to such use, and explained why he thought the counter29 3
arguments were not persuasive.
Since that article, there has been more written on the topic.29 The debate,
however, basically remains as framed by Professor Wolfram. The commentators
generally focus on one particular method of using the Model Code or Model
Rules-as an independent cause of action, as negligence per se, or as evidence of
during malpractice proceedings may increase deterrence of unethical conduct); Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 145-46; Note, The Rules ofProfessionalConduct supra note 285, at 787-88;
Comment, supra note 285, at 699 (Code drafted to set minimum standards of conduct; active use of
Code would complement Code's "deterrent aims").
A third argument is that these provisions can help establish the standards of conduct below
which an attorney will be civilly liable. Wolfram, supra note 285, at 293. In other words, they add
specificity to the notions of "fiduciary obligations" and "reasonable care" that currently are used in
malpractice litigation. Id at 293-95. Accord Dalquist, supra note 281, at 15-16; Hoover, supra note
281, at 615; cf Comment, supra note 285, at 698 (Code has generally withstood constitutional attacks for vagueness).
293. The arguments against use of the Code or the Rules in a malpractice action often begin
with the language of these regulations. The Code states that it "does not undertake to define standards for civil liability." MODEL CODE, supra note 34, Preliminary Statement lc. The Rules contain a lengthier statement, advising in part: "Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of
action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached." MODEL RULES,
supranote 35, Scope 12. Professor Wolfram and others have responded to this argument by observing that the courts have ignored this language and by suggesting this language expresses neutrality,
not hostility, to the possibility of using ethics provisions in a malpractice action. See Wolfram, supra
note 285, at 287; Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 285, at 788; Comment, supra
note 285, at 699 (Code should be read as neutral; Code does not proscribe use in legal malpractice
actions). See also 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 37, at 12.1 (Supp. 1987), which states:
The Scope Note's follow-up proposition that a violation of the Rules "[should not] create
any presumption that a legal duty has been breached," is also quite sound, so far as it
goes....

Passing automatic imposition of liability at the suit of every client and third person,
however, it should be evident that rules of professional conduct are relevant to malpractice
cases at some level, no matter what the Rules themselves try to say.
Id
The second argument offered against use of the Code or the Rules in a malpractice action is a
"floodgates" argument. Wolfram, supra note 285, at 295. As Professor Wolfram stated it, "permitting every allegation of an attorney violation of the Code to survive a motion to dismiss in a subsequent damage action against that attorney would result in unneeded litigation against attorneys."
I Accord Dalquist, supranote 285, at 16; Comment, supra note 285, at 700; Note, Lipton v. Boesky,
supra note 285, at 147 (dispels "floodgates" argument).
A third objection raised is that the Code and the Rules are too protective of attorney interests
and thus may be inadequate to protect the interests of nonlawyers participating in civil litigation
against attorneys. Wolfram, supra note 285, at 300. Accord Dalquist, supra note 285, at 17; Note,
Lipton v. Boesky supra note 285, at 145; Comment, supra note 285, at 700-01. For example, in
Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 305, 578 P.2d 935, 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1978), the court
reversed the judgment entered against the defendant-attorney, in part because he had complied with
the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct.
Some additional objections that are offered are that the Code or the Rules are too vague to be of
much use in litigation, and that allowing their use might create difficult iisues of whether discipline
should be given collateral estoppel (Le., issue preclusion) effect in civil suits. See Wolfram, supra
note 285, at 297-300. Accord Note, The Rules of ProfessionalLiability, supra note 285, at 789-90,
Comment, supra note 285, at 701; Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 148.
294. See supra note 285 for a list of commentaries.
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malpractice 295-and then attack or defend that method, relying primarily on
296
variations of Professor Wolfram's original arguments or counterarguments,
297
although occasionally offering additional points.
The commentators disagree on exactly how the ethics provisions should be
used in a malpractice case. All these commentators recognize, however, that,
slowly but surely, courts have permitted ethics violations to be used as evidence
of malpractice. 298 Furthermore, none of these commentators objects to use of
ethics violations as evidence of malpractice. 299 Thus, as breakups occur in the
future, lawyers probably should not expect the dispute to be whether the courts
will use ethics violations in a malpractice action, but how these violations will be

used.

300

295. See, e.g., Dalquist, supra note 285, at 3 (endorsing use of Code violations as evidence of
malpractice, but concluding "general arguments advanced for a more expanded use of the Code are
not persuasive"); Hoover, supra note 281, at 614-15 (observing that Model Rules are likely to become influential in civil litigation and endorsing greater use without predicting exactly how they will
be used); Schneyer, supra note 285, at 945-46 (stating that comments to Rules express "unwarranted
animus against Model Rule enforcement in malpractice and disqualification cases" and recommending that courts be allowed to consider such uses); Note, Lipton Y.Boesky, supra note 285, at 137
(endorsing use of Code violations to create rebuttable evidence of malpractice); Note, The Rules of
Professional Conduct, supra note 285, at 804 (arguing, inter alia, that to "afford non-clients the
protection that the drafters intended, courts should use the appropriate provisions as the basis for
private causes of action"); Comment, supra note 285, at 692 (addressing viability of using Code
violations as negligence per se).
296. See supra notes 292-93 for citations to the responses by subsequent commentators to the
original arguments or counterarguments.
297. One additional objection that has been offered is founded on the difference between the
purposes of the Code and the Rules on the one hand, and the purpose of legal malpractice actions on
the other. The argument is that there traditionally has been and properly should be a fundamental
difference between the standard of conduct applied in a disciplinary case and the standard of conduct
applied in civil damages actions. See, e.g., Dalquist, supra note 285, at 18.
Another additional argument that has been offered is that use of ethics provisions would, in
effect, be an abandonment of the privity doctrine since these provisions might permit nonelients to
sue. Dalquist, supra note 285, at 19. One commentator argues that the debate must recognize that
fact and address the merits of the proposals on those terms, as well as others. Idl at 19-20. Accord
Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 285, at 791-95.
298. See, eg., Dalquist, supra note 285 (observing that ". . . courts often use the Code as a type
of persuasive precedent in such malpractice litigation and violations of the Code are frequently
treated as evidence of negligence or negligence per se); Hoover, supra note 281, at 616 ("drafters
have all but assured that these provisions will become an alternative resource in civil malpractice
litigation"); Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 151 (in Michigan, Code violations will be used
as rebuttable evidence of malpractice); Note, The Rules of ProfessionalConduct supra note 285, at
779 ("[m]any courts are not adverse to applying the Code in 'client v. attorney' negligence actions to
determine whether the attorney breached a duty owed to the client"); Comment, supra note 285, at
694 (" he Code of Professional Responsibility plays an integral part in the establishment of the duty
element and the conduct which evidences the breach of that duty.").
299. See supra note 298.
300. Pennsylvania adopted the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct with modifications, effective April 1, 1988. See PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1988).
How Pennsylvania will use the Rules in legal malpractice actions is unclear.
In Estate of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 461 A.2d 259 (1983), the superior court relied on the
Code of Professional Responsibility to find a presumption of undue influence against an attorney
who drafted a will awarding himself a gift. Id at 494-95, 461 A.2d at 265-66. The court used the
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D. Ethical Violations During a Breakup That Might Form the Basis of a
MalpracticeAction
A review of the ethical provisions discussed earlier reveals several provisions that conceivably could be used in a malpractice action. Creative lawyers
may rely on violations of these provisions as evidence of negligence, to establish
negligence per se, or perhaps even as the basis for an independent cause of action. 30 1 Thus, lawyers going through a breakup should be sensitive to their ethical obligations not only because it is proper and because they might later be
subject to discipline, but also because such violations could be the basis for30 a2
malpractice action brought by a client who was injured or merely unhappy.
The most difficult hurdle for a client who brings a malpractice action based
on the ethical regulations probably will be to show causation and damages due
to the ethical violations. In malpractice cases, if clients can satisfy these elements, they probably will be able to use the client-lawyer relationship to estabCode to modify the Pennsylvania common law rule regarding undue influence. Id at 492-95, 461
A.2d at 262-66. In In re Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 482 A.2d 215 (1984), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected the Younger rule. Id. at 535, 541-43, 482 A.2d at 217, 220-22. The supreme
court said that the failure to comply with the Code would not invalidate a will because the Code does
not have the force of substantive law and held that the burden of proving undue influence does not
shift to the attorney in this instance. Id
Neither Younger nor Pedrick, however, definitively answers the question of how the Pennsylvania courts will treat, in a legal malpractice action, violations of the Rules. In both Younger and
Pedrick, the Code was being used, in essence, to create an independent cause of action in favor of the
beneficiaries. Neither case rejects the argument that Rules violations may be used as evidence of
legal malpractice, or even to establish negligence per se. Indeed, the supreme court in Pedrick recognized that it may be appropriate in certain circumstances for the trial courts to use the Code in
nondisciplinary actions. 505 Pa. at 542-43, 482 A.2d at 221. The court approved the use of the
Code in ruling on disqualification motions. Id
As the articles in supra note 285 demonstrate, many who would not use the Code or the Rules
to create an independent cause of action would permit it to be used as evidence or a presumption of
legal malpractice. See supra notes 282, 286-88 and accompanying text. Thus, the issue remains open
in Pennsylvania whether Rules violations may be used in a malpractice action. Cf Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985) (court rejected defendants' argument
that judge should have excused himself because of his alleged hostility to defendants' counsel, noting
that Code of Judicial Conduct, like Code of Professional Responsibility, does not have force of
substantive law); Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 13-14, 514 A.2d 114, 118 (1986)
(Code provision regarding ethical obligation of counsel to zealously represent client is not defense to
obstruction of justice charge against defense attorney who withheld physical evidence in belief that
action was permitted under Pennsylvania Code of ProfessionalResponsibility).
301. See supra notes 282-300 and accompanying text. Indeed, one commentator has argued
that it would be legal malpractice if a lawyer failed to rely on a Code or Rule violations in a legal
malpractice case. See, Note, Lipton v. Boesky, supra note 285, at 150.
302. See Woody v. Mudd, 258 Md. 234, 265 A.2d 458, 466 (1970) (court suggests client filed
malpractice suit because of disappointment in result and need to blame someone rather than because
attorney did anything wrong). Accord C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 5.6.2, at 209 n.46. Although
nonclients have been permitted to sue attorneys for malpractice, see supra note 259 and accompanying text, the focus in this article is on suits by clients against attorneys. The reason for this focus is
because the author is primarily concerned about harm to clients during a breakup and because the
least controversial method of using ethics violations in a malpractice suit is as evidence of malpractice in a suit brought by a client. See supra notes 282-89.
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lish the duty element and use ethical violations as evidence of the breach

element. 303
1. "Continuing Obligation" Regulations
Because the "continuing obligations" ethical regulations require competence, diligence, and communication, 3° 4 it is easy to envision their use in a malpractice action. These provisions essentially impose an ethical duty to do that
which is required under contract and tort law.30 5 For example, in Lipton v.
Boesky, 3° 6 the plaintiffs brought a suit based on breach of the common law duty
of care and on violations of Code provisions including those prohibiting incompetence, misrepresentation, and commingling. 307 Among other actions, the defendant-lawyer allegedly failed to file a lawsuit, misrepresented the consequences
of plaintiffs' executing an assumption agreement, and failed to oppose a summary judgment. 30 8 This case suggests how a lawyer's violation of the ethical
duties of diligence or communication during a breakup might be used as evidence of malpractice.
2. "Restrictive Covenant" Regulations
Violations of the restrictive covenant provisions will present a different and
more difficult case for the client because the type of breach and the nature of the
injury are different than in an ordinary malpractice case. Clients might allege
that they were injured not because their lawyers did an inadequate job, but because the defendant-lawyers' use of a restrictive covenant deprived the client of
the hotshot lawyers who would have done more than an adequate job; they
would have done a winning job. Such a client could easily find authority stating
that the prohibitions on restrictive covenants are designed to promote client
choice. 3° 9 Because the statutes are designed to protect clients, 310 clients could
argue that they should be able to sue for any injury caused by the lawyer's
breach of the duty required by the statute. While injury would be difficult to
prove, such clients might be able to survive a motion to dismiss directed against
such a claim.
In re Silverberg3 lt demonstrates how such a suit could arise. That agreement required each partner to pay the other eighty percent of the fees charged,
even with respect to new matters, for certain designated clients. The client may
303. See supra notes 282-89.
304. See supra notes 54-56.
305. Compare supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (ethical duty) with supra notes 272-80
and accompanying text (malpractice). Although a lawyer can face malpractice liability for a single
instance of neglect, the courts have been less certain whether a lawyer can be disciplined for a single
instance of neglect. See 1 G. HAZARD & W. HoDEs, supra note 37, at 5-8 (Supp. 1987).
306. 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981).
307. Id. at 593-94, 313 N.W.2d at 164-65.
308. Id
309. See supra note 88.
310. Id
311. 75 A.D.2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980).
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be placed in an awkward position if the partnership splits, as it did, and the
client wants the "wrong" partner to handle its case. The "wrong" partner either
has to challenge the agreement or risk a substantial financial penalty for the
representation. The partner might simply decline to represent the client, or
charge higher than standard fees. If the client were unhappy with the final result, it might claim that its injury was due to its failure to receive counsel of
choice.
3. "Fee-Splitting" Regulations
A client arguing that a fee-splitting provision was violated might similarly
claim that the fee division prevented the client from using counsel of choice, that
be able to
the client was harmed by this deprivation, and that the client31 should
2
sue for the injury caused by the attorney's ethical violation.
Alternatively, clients might allege injury based on having to pay higher fees
31 3
Professor
than the clients would have had to pay without the fee division.
Wolfram envisioned this latter type of injury and recommended that an action
based on this violation be permitted. 314 Whenever there is a fee division following a breakup, it would be understandable if clients thought they were paying
more than they would have to pay without the division and were tempted to
3 15
sue.
4. "Conffict-of-Interest" Regulations
Conflict of interest violations have been used frequently as evidence of malpractice. 3 16 In Ishmael v. Millington,31 7 for example, a California court permit312. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
313. The client could argue that one of the purposes of these ethics provisions was to guard
against such injury. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
314. See Wolfram, supra note 285, at 318.
315. In Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 211, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180,
186 (1983), the departing attorneys initially offered to represent the client for approximately 26% of
the fees charged by their firm. The court ultimately required the departing attorneys to share these
fees with their partners. Presumably, the departing attorneys would have negotiated a higher fee if
they knew they would have to share fees and thus the case illustrates how a client could be hurt by a
fee splitting agreement. It demonstrates that different configurations of lawyers may be able to
charge quite lower fees in the absence of any fee splitting requirement. Accord Champion v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. App. 3d 777, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1988) (court refused to enforce fee splitting provision as between lawyers, finding it would lead to unconscionably high fees).
316. The second largest legal malpractice settlement believed to be awarded was $27 million
arising out of the failure of Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation (MSSIC). The basis for
the complaint was the law firm's conflict of interest in simultaneously representing MSSIC and several of the institutions it regulated. See [3 Current Reports] LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 176 (June 10, 1987). Accord Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 935-37 (6th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (overturned summary judgment for attorney to allow jury to
consider malpractice claim based on breach of conflict of interest provision; Code can be used as
evidence of standards required of attorneys); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 148, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 406, 414 (1968) (attorney violated legal and ethical duties towards his client, insured, in rejecting a settlement offer and acting solely on interests of his client, insurer); ABC Trans Nat'l
Transport, Inc. v.Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 831-32, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1311
(1980) (court verdict that attorney did not breach fiduciary duty was not against manifest weight of
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ted a malpractice claim against a lawyer based on a client's claim that in
connection with her divorce, the defendant-lawyer represented both her and her
husband and negligently allowed her to be duped by her husband. The basis for
her suit was the mere fact of improper dual representation, not improper advice
actually given to her by the lawyer. In permitting this suit, the court relied on
the provisions of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA
Canons of Ethics, which require disclosure and consent before dual
representation. 31 s
One can easily imagine similar reasoning being used in a case involving
former-client conflicts, as opposed to dual-client conflicts. If the improper representation were discovered early, a client might allege that the lawyer's breach
of the ethical regulations is evidence of the breach of a duty, and that this breach
caused the client damage by requiring the client to pay unnecessarily to educate
a second set of lawyers about the case. If the conflict were not disclosed until
the matter was complete and if the client were not completely satisfied, a claim
could be made, as in Ishmael, that an unsatisfactory result was caused by the
conflict and the lawyer's failure to give the client the proper allegiance. Indeed,
this claim theoretically could be brought by either the current client or the former client.
5. "Confidentiality" Regulations
A malpractice cause of action based on the unauthorized disclosure of confidences or secrets is well-recognized. 319 Imagine that as a result of the breakup,
one group of lawyers loses a particular client and, in a fit of pique, reveals confi320
dential information or makes disparaging but true remarks about the client.
evidence; claim, based on conflict of interest provision, was not so clear as to be undisputed and thus
expert testimony was necessary); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 302, 327
A.2d 891, 904 (1974) (clients' judgment against attorney upheld because dual representation without

full disclosure incurs risk of civil liability to client caused by lack of disclosure).
317. 241 Cal. App. 2d 570, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
318. Id
319. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 258, § 126, at 220-21 & nn.76-86 (and cases cited
therein). Accord Wolfram, supra note 285, at 307 n. 114.
320. Complaint, Welch v. Winston, No. 87-1475 (M.D. Pa.), illustrates some of the surprising
ways in which such suits can arise. The complaint alleged that defendant-attorney represented
plaintiff, who was charged with driving under the influence and manslaughter. Id The client allegedly could not remember what happened before the accident, including who was driving. The eyewitness reports and physical evidence suggested the client was driving and was guilty. During the
plea hearing, testimony revealed that the client was in fact innocent; he had been pulled from the
passenger's side of the car, but because the car was upside down, there was some confusion, and he
was reported as the driver. After this testimony, the client was permitted to withdraw the guilty plea
that he had entered. His attorney later wrote a short story entitled Stranger Than True" Why I
Defend Guilty Clients. Winston, Why I Defend Guilty Clients, HARPERS, Dec. 1986, at 70. This
story was published and later republished (including in one law school legal ethics casebook), allegedly without client permission. The client sued his attorney for breach of fiduciary duty, among
other things, claiming that there was sufficient detail in the stories so that he was identified by friends
and suffered embarrassment and distress. Complaint, Welch v. Winston. supra. Because the attorney
went bankrupt, the case was dropped without any resolution of these claims. Order, Welch v. Winston, No. 87-1475 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1988) (dismissing complaint without prejudice).
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Or, perhaps more likely, imagine that in a fee dispute, one side files suit and

32 1
includes in court papers confidential client information.
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen 322 suggests how such a suit might
arise. In that case, two partners ("C&R") had handled a large antitrust case for
their firm for over five years. 323 Approximately six months before the case was
to go to trial, the partners demanded double their partnership percentage for the
antitrust case. 324 When their partners refused this and other demands, C&R
withdrew from the firm. 325 The antitrust client then discharged the firm and
retained C&R. 326 This substitution and resulting fee agreement reduced the client's fees from a thirty-three percent contingency fee to a fee of $250,000 per
year and an eight and three-quarters percent contingency fee.327 With a settlement of thirty-three million dollars, the fees owed to C&R were approximately
328
twenty-six percent of the fees the client had agreed to pay the firm.
After the settlement, the firm fied suit against C&R. Although the opinion
does not indicate, one wonders whether the lawyers obtained the client's consent
to the disclosure of confidential information such as the fee agreement and fee
329

discussions.
If the court were willing to accept embarrassment or invasion of privacy as
a type of damage, then a client might bring a malpractice action, alleging that
330
the lawyer's breach of the confidentiality obligations caused that damage.
The lawyer could, of course, raise a first amendment defense to such an action,
but most lawyers probably would prefer not to have to rely on such a defense.
As these examples show, there are subtle ways a lawyer could violate the confidentiality rules during a breakup, and these violations possibly could lead to
liability.
321. See infra notes 323-26.
322. 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1983).
323. Id at 209, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
324. Id at 209-10, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
325. Id at 210, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
326. Id.
327. Id at 210-11, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
328. Id. at 211, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
329. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) permits disclosure of "confidences or secrets necessary to
establish or collect [the lawyer's] fee." MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 4-101(C)(3). It is not
obvious that this exception applies to suits between lawyers. Furthermore, California has not
adopted this provision. Cf. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (Deering Supp. 1988) ("It is the
duty of an attorney . . . [t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to
preserve the secrets, of his or her client."). Information regarding the fee agreement and fee discussions probably would be considered confidential under both the Code and the Rules. It is "information relating to representation of a client," triggering Rule 1.6. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule
1.6. Under the Code it could be a "secret" because it might be considered "information gained in the
professional relationship ... the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client." MODEL CODE, supra note 34, DR 4-101. See supra note 239 for the text
of DR 4-101 and Rule 1.6.
330. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 221 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding jury awards for pain,
suffering, humiliation, and mental anguish caused by legal malpractice); Salley v. Childs, 541 A.2d
1297, 1300 (Me. 1988) (in legal malpractice case, client entitled to damages for emotional distress).

1122

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

6. "Safekeeping" and "Publicity" Regulations
The two remaining categories of ethical regulations concern safekeeping
property and the publicity regulations. Not surprisingly, the courts will permit
malpractice liability based on violations of these "safekeeping" ethical provisions. In Day v. Rosenthal,331 for example, the lawyer's breach of the ethical
rule against commingling was one basis for the twenty-six million dollar malpractice judgment in favor of Doris Day and her family. 332 Indeed, the court

permitted the judgment to stand even though there had not been any expert
testimony, concluding that the ethical rules "set the standard. ' 333 Similarly, in
Blackmon v. Hale,334 the court overturned a judgment in favor of the defendantlawyer, finding that the lawyer breached his fiduciary duties when he released to
his ex-partner, upon dissolution of the firm, funds in the firm trust account.3 35
The ex-partner had opened a new trust account, from which he diverted the
plaintiff's money. 336 Violation of these safekeeping provisions thus may be relied upon, especially in breach of fiduciary duty suits.
On the other hand, it is more difficult to imagine a malpractice claim based
on a violation of the publicity provisions. If misrepresentations were involved, a
client could, of course, allege reliance on those misrepresentations and injury.
For example, in Paul L. Pratt,P.C. v. Blunt,337 the client arguably selected a
certain lawyer because the client was told that the lawyer was still affiliated with
his ex-firm. 3 38 A client might possibly be able to claim injury caused by such a
breach, although obviously the proof will be difficult. Absent such misrepresenby receivtation, however, it is difficult to see how the client could claim injury
339
ing more information than permitted by the ethical regulations.
In sum, if a lawyer violates ethical regulations during a breakup, one can
imagine scenarios in which these ethical violations could lead to malpractice
exposure. While such cases may still be rare, the underlying principles for this
liability are in place and the factual situations that could give rise to such liability are occurring all too frequently. Thus, lawyers going through a breakup
should ensure not only that they attend carefully to all their cases, but also that
they comply carefully with the ethical regulations. A violation of these regulations not only might give rise to disciplinary action, but also might be the basis
for, or be used in, a malpractice action.
331. 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985), cer denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).

332. Id. at 1149, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The court was relying on former CAL. R. PROF. CONDUcr 9.

333. 170 Cal. App. 3d at 1149, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
334. 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979).
335. Id. at 559, 463 P.2d at 424-25, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01.
336. Id. at 554-55, 463 P.2d at 421, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
337. 140 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 488 N.E.2d 1062 (1986).
338. Id at 517-18, 488 N.E.2d at 1066-67.
339. Cf Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 137, 199 S.E.2d 260, 263-64 (1973).
In Tingle, a nonclient tried to rely on an alleged violation of the publicity provisions to create a
private cause of action. Id. The court rejected this attempt, affirming a summary judgment in favor
of defendant lawyers who, after successfully obtaining a jury verdict in a prior action, were sued by
the loser of that prior action for soliciting defendant lawyers' client. Id
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IV. A REviEw

OF SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THE ETHICAL AND
MALPRACTICE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN LAW FIRM BREAKUPS

If ethical pitfalls and malpractice consequences abound during a breakup,
what is a lawyer to do? The standard advice 340 given to lawyers is to have a
written agreement to preempt some of these problems. 341 While the agreement
itself may become the subject of a dispute, 34 2 having an agreement forces lawyers to think about the issues before the situations arise and before the lawyers
are emotionally involved. It also provides a focus for action once the breakup
occurs. Surprisingly, a recent survey showed about one-half of the law partner34 3
ships surveyed did not have written agreements.
The courts, like the commentators, stress the importance of a written agreement. The lack of a partnership agreement led one judge to compare lawyers to
barefoot shoemakers, lacking that which they are in the business of producing. 344 Still another court stated that
the partners in the [firm] not only lacked an agreement about the allocation of fees from active cases upon a dissolution of the partnership
but, contrary to the sound legal advice they undoubtedly always gave
their partnership clients, they had no written partnership agreement.
The absence of a written partnership agreement345was an invitation to
litigation upon a dissolution of the partnership.
Once a breakup occurs, the courts and the commentators suggest that a
primary objective should be to solve the difficulties quietly, quickly, and privately. 346 They agree that clients are hurt and courts are burdened by these
340. This section reviews briefly some of the advice given to lawyers going through a breakup
and the programs that are available to assist lawyers. This article does not purport to analyze in
depth how lawyers should respond or the nature of the Alternative Dispute Resolution programs.
The author hopes to address those topics in a later article.
341. See, e.g., ALTMAN & WEIL, supra note 7, § 8.01, at 8-2; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 29,
§ 16.2, at 887 ("The breakup of a partnership should be provided for in the partnership agreement."); Feerick, Avoiding and Resolving Lawyer Disputes, in ABA, WITHDRAWAL, RETIREMENT
AND DispuTEs 3, 7 (1986) ("A possible starting point in dispute avoidance is for lawyers to set forth
their understandings in a written partnershipagreement."); Galante, ForFirms, Breaking Up Is Hard
To Do, supra note 1,at 44, col. 3, 46, col. 4 ("Law firm consultants and lawyers who have been
involved in such fee battles say the most important step in preventing problems is a partnership
agreement that anticipates all aspects of a breakup."); McMenamin, Dissolution Of A Law Firm.
supra note 27, at 3 (recommending written partnership); Wel, supra note 20, at 2, col. 3 (recommending written partnership agreement that covers withdrawal).
342. See, eg., Folsom v. Woodburn, Wedge, Blakey and Jeppson, 100 Nev. 331, 333, 683 P.2d
9, 10 (1984) (partner and firm disagree over meaning of withdrawal provision in contract).
343. See, eg., M. ALTMAN & R. WEIL,supra note 7 § 8.01, at 8-1 to 8-2 (about half of existing
law partnerships do not have written agreements); accord, Galante, ForFirms Breaking Up Is Hard
To Do, supra note 1, at 44 (citing 1985 Altman & Weil nationwide poll, in which less than half of
firms surveyed had agreements). Cf. Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 79, 485 N.E.2d 413, 415
(1985) (partners fought about proper allocation of fees upon dissolution, under oral partnership
agreement); Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 699, 365 N.W.2d 816, 818 (1985) (court forced to construe disputed oral partnership agreement).
344. Smith v. Daub, 219 Neb. 698, 705, 365 N.W.2d 816, 821 (1985).
345. Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 175, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1984).
346. See, eg., Feerick, supra note 341, at 7; Pollock, supra note 8, at 60 (describing two break-
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disputes. 347 Furthermore, such disputes do the lawyers no good; "the quality of
life within a law firm and its image in the larger community can be diminished
by perceptions that the firm has not been fair in its treatment of withdrawing
partners," or by a perception that the "lawyers are litigious, over-reaching, or
difficult to deal with."'348 Commentators suggest that lawyers are retained for
their judgment probably as much as their skills. Breakup disputes can dispel the
image of a lawyer "as unflappable, a cool hand, always in control, and devoted
349
to solving clients' problems."
In addition to a written partnership agreement, the commentators recommend several procedures to help lawyers resolve disputes quietly, quickly, and
privately. The parting lawyers have been advised to enlist the assistance of par350
ticularly close, nonwithdrawing partners or a good friend of the law firm.
Lawyers also may want to enlist independent counsel, although some recommend that counsel be involved only in a consulting role. 35 1 Mediation is also
one of the procedures advised, 352 as is arbitration. 353 Indeed, even when the
parties do not voluntarily choose such procedures, they occasionally are com354
pelled by the courts to submit to them.

ups that were accomplished with "tolerable unpleasantness," those of Chicago's Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust and N.Y.C.'s Kaye, Scholar, Fierman, Hays & Handler); Reuben, Saying Goodbye
Gracefully, in ABA, WITHDRAWAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES 5 (1986).
347. See, eg., Graham, Can Ugly Litigation Be Avoided, supra note 1, at 1 (effect of acrimonious litigation on court calendar). See also supra notes 22-23 and infra notes 353-55.
348. Feerick, supra note 341, at 7. Accord McMenamin, Dissolution Of A Law Firm, supra note
27, at 6 ("any name-calling, public dispute or downgrading of former lawyers will hurt every lawyer
concerned"); McMenamin, Dismembering A Law Firm supra note 27, at 18, col. 3 ("Any namecalling, public dispute or downgrading of former partners or associates will hurt every lawyer concerned. The public expects that lawyers are adult, educated and intelligent individuals who will act
in a professional manner."); Weil, supra note 20, at 2, col. 3 (management consultant with experience in breakups states, "If overly assaulted by the contenders, the best of clients and employees may
simply seek alternatives. No client wants to be involved in the fratricidal struggles of lawyers, and
many an employee prefers to avoid such an emotional cost, especially those who have job offers
readily available.").
349. See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 346, at 5.
350. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 341, at 7.
351. Id. at 7-8; Graham, Can Ugly Litigation Be Avoided, supra note 1, at 23-24 (quoting those
who think outside counsel can aggravate disputes and those who favor use of outside counsel, especially in consulting role).
352. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 341, at 8; Galante, Jenkins & Perry Feud Almost Over, supra
note 1, at 5 (dissolution "was a result of binding mediation hammered out over the past six months
by former San Diego Superior Court Judge William A. Yale").
353. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 341, at 8; Weil, supra note 20, at 2 (experienced management
consultant says private arbitration "is cheaper, quicker and far more private, and consequently does
less damage to the parties involved. A binding arbitration clause should be considered in any partnership (or shareholders) agreement."). See also, Greenberg v. Gitlin, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 3,
coi. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (court said, "if the parties [in this dissolution] had proceeded to arbitration
initially, this matter would be much closer to a final resolution").
354. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Gitlin, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (court
ordered parties to submit their grievances to binding arbitration under American Arbitration Association rules, as required by partnership agreement); Glatzer v. Diamond, 19 Misc. 2d 77, 187
N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct.) (parties submitted dispute about proper fee allocation upon dissolution to
arbitration), aff'd, 9 A.D.2d 675, 192 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1959); Granelli, supra note 1 at 2, col. 4 (court
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In response to the increased number of breakups and lawyers' desires to
resolve these disputes quietly and privately through alternative dispute resolution, several bar associations around the country have instituted alternative dispute resolution programs for lawyers facing a breakup of their firm. 355 To date,
five different bar associations have instituted such programs, and at least one
other bar association is considering such a program. 356 Four of the programs
are sponsored by city bar associations; one is sponsored by a state bar association. 357 The five programs are those of the Cleveland Bar Association, the Denver Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, and the Bar Association of San Francisco. All
five programs provide arbitration. Only one program, Pennsylvania's, provides
mediation in addition to arbitration. 358 These programs are designed to help the
client, as well as the lawyer, protecting client confidences by use of nonpublic
alternative dispute resolution and minimizing possible neglect by expediting resappointed 20-year county trial judge as additional firm director and referee in breakup of L.A.'s
Gilliland, Roberson & Moser; both parties endorse procedure heartily).
355. See, e.g., Denver Bar Ass'n Intraprofessional Disputes Committee, Plan For Screening
Intraprofessional Disputes § I (as amended Apr. 21, 1982 and Jan. 19, 1984) [hereinafter Denver
Plan] ("The purpose of the Plan is to investigate on a confidential basis and, where possible, resolve
disputes between attorneys to the end that the public and the legal profession will be protected from
the intraprofessional disputes which can hinder the orderly administration of justice and legal affairs."); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Arbitration and Alternative
Dispute Resolution, ProposalForAssociation-SponsoredArbitration Of Disputes Among Lawyers, 42
RECORD 877, 879, 882 (1987) [hereinafter NYC Comm., Proposal] (summarizing need for programs
and stating: "In addition to the drain on the courts, such litigation [over breakups] has a distressing
and potentially dangerous impact on clients, who have been likened to the children over whom
custody battles are fought in divorce cases."); Moss, supra note 17, at 9, 10 (need for alternative
dispute resolution shown by lawyer's plea for help with painful firm breakup, by survey of judges and
county bars in urban areas, and by fee division fights involving small firms in more rural areas);
Subcomm. on Arbitration of Law Firm Dissolutions and Fee Disputes Among Attorneys, Comm. on
Arbitration of Fee Disputes, Bar Ass'n of San Francisco, Special Rules of Procedure § I(A) (June
19, 1987) [hereinafter San Francisco Rules] ("These Special Rules are designed to respond to many
requests from attorneys that the Committee assist in resolving [dissolution and attorney fee]
disputes.").
356. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Dispute Arbitration [hereinafter Cleveland Statement];
Denver Plan, supra note 355; Denver Bar Ass'n Intra-Professional Comm., Guidelines for Dispute
Resolution (Proposed) (Jan. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Denver Guidelines]; Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Rules for Arbitrationof Disputes Between Lawyers, 42 RECORD 985 (1987) [hereinafter NYC, Rules]; Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Amended Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Between Lawyers (amended June 1, 1988) [hereinafter "Amended NYC Rules";
Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program Rules (amended Mar. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Pa. Rules]; San Francisco Rules, supra note 355.
There is no information clearinghouse that keeps track of these programs. These five programs
were located through contacts with ABA officials, local bar officials and alternative dispute resolution experts. Anyone with information about additional programs is asked to contact the author.
357. See supra notes 355-56 for the sponsors of the programs. The Cleveland, Denver, New
York City, and San Francisco programs are sponsored by city bar associations; the Pennsylvania
program is sponsored by a state bar association. Id. None of the five bar associations is integrated
(Le., bar membership is not a prerequisite to the practice of law).
358. See Pa. Rules, supra note 356.
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olution of the dispute. 359
Thus, while the emotional toll of a breakup can be great and ethical pitfalls
and malpractice consequences may abound, much more is being written on this
difficult topic, advice is now offered by those with experience, and the organized
bar is beginning to take steps to help lawyers going through a breakup.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article summarized the ethical issues that can arise when law firms
break up. The potential problems include lawyers who neglect their continuing
obligations to clients; lawyers who attempt to use restrictive covenants, which
include both outright prohibitions on competition and financial penalties for
competition; fee divisions that may be improper, especially if the lawyers allocate fees for new matters which arise after the breakup; publicity issues, such as
who a departing lawyer may contact and by what method, and whether any
communications are false or misleading; issues of maintaining client confidentiality; taking the necessary steps to protect against client conflicts; and issues
involving safeguarding client property.
In addition to ethical pitfalls, a lawyer could face malpractice consequences
as a result of the law firm breakup. The malpractice claims could be gardenvariety claims, based on the lawyer's neglect of the client's case when the lawyer
was distracted by the breakup. On the other hand, malpractice claims may be
based, in whole or in part, on a lawyer's violation of ethical regulations. Thus, a
lawyer should comply with the ethical regulations not only because it is proper,
not only because their violation can be the basis of disciplinary action, but also
because their violation may be the basis for civil liability. Lawyers should carefully consider both before and during a breakup steps that can be taken to minimize such problems. Indeed, a lawyer may want to consider submitting any
disputes to one of the alternative dispute resolution programs that have sprung
up around the country. Furthermore, lawyers and bar associations may want to
consider sponsoring their own alternative dispute resolution program for law
firm breakups. It is prudent to get all the help one can with a problem that is
36°
here to stay. As the old song goes, "Breaking up is hard to do."

359. See supra note 355.
360. See Neil Sedaka & Howard Greenfield, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do (1962).

